Feminism and deconstruction : towards a theory of embodied subjectivity by Jagger, Gill, 1965-
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL 
Feminism and Deconstruction: Towards aTheory of Embodied 
Subjectivity 
Being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Gillian Ann Jagger BA (hons. ) (CNAA), MA (York) 
October 1999 
For Victoria, Richard, Emma and Joanne 
and especially for David for always being there 
Contents 
Acknowledgements i 
Introduction and Synopsis 1 
PART 1 Feminism and Deconstruction 13 
1. Derrida, Deconstruction and Dif fe ra nce 14 
2. Feminism and Deconstruction: Anti- Essentialism 
and the Politics of Female Subjectivity 56 
PART 2 The Body 104 
3. Subjectivity, Sexual Difference and Corporeality 107 
4. Derrida and Foucault: 'Writing' and Discourse 147 
5. Judith Butler: Performance and Performativity 186 
Conclusion 
Comprehensive Bibliography 
244 
255 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank the University of Hull for a three year bursary in 
the form of a University of Hull Award that enabled me to embark on 
this project in the first place. I would like to thank Kathleen Lennon 
for her shrewd insight and inspiring support and above all her ability 
to pick up my spirits and set me back on track at the low times. Thanks 
also go to the School of Cultural Studies, Leeds Metropolitan 
University for valuable support in the last few weeks which gave me 
the time to complete. 
I want to thank my mother whose early support was vital and my 
children, for their forbearance as they have become used to me 
spending all my time in front of a computer, and especially Emma 
whose technical help made all the difference. Above all I want to 
thank David for his unswerving support which has been vital to the 
completion of this project, as indeed all my projects. 
1 
Introduction and Synopsis 
Subjectivity, corporeality and sexual difference: the question of the 
relationship between these three aspects of human being is perhaps 
currently the most fundamental issue as far as feminist theory is 
concerned. The sex /gender distinction is increasingly problematised 
but there is still little agreement about the relationship between sex, 
sexuality and gender and the role of the body in all this; or about the 
significance of these factors for the frameworks we think in and the 
practices we engage in. However, although there is much 
disagreement about precisely how to think these relationships, there is 
at least some consensus that it involves rethinking the body, in its 
corporeality, beyond the various dualisms (e. g. mind/body, 
nature/ culture, subject/ object) that have structured much 
contemporary thinking on these matters and that have in the main 
sustained the neglect of the issue of gender/ sexual difference as a 
serious philosophical issue. There is also some agreement that this 
rethinking involves attention to the role of representation, in one 
form or another, in the constitution of sexed (and gendered) 
embodiment. 
It is my contention that setting these concerns in the context of 
Derrida's philosophical concerns with sexual difference and the 
insights to be gleaned from deconstruction can help us in these 
endeavours, despite much feminist hostility to these moves. It both 
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raises the question of sexual difference as a philosophical issue and it 
can help in the reformulation of corporeality incorporating feminist 
insights. It can help us to rethink the materiality of corporeality in 
such as way as to recognise the salience of sexual difference to 
embodiment, and the salience of (sexed) embodiment to subjectivity, 
without, importantly, rendering sexual difference immutable or tying 
women to some sort of essential nature - however conceived. In this 
way it marks a significant intervention into contemporary gender/body 
theory in general, and within deconstructive approaches and coporeal 
feminisms in particular. 
Alongside this, however, there has developed a major fault-line 
within feminist theory. For, although there has been an increase in the 
number of feminists applying deconstructive insights in their own 
projects during the 1990s, alongside this there has been a growing 
hostility to such work from feminists who see their own work as 
materialist but who seek to debunk the materialist pretensions of those 
whose work owes much to deconstructive insights. Any such moves 
are rejected on the grounds that the emphasis on representation 
involved renders them 'merely cultural' and entails the neglect of 
material factors such as the (biological) body or, in Marxist terms the 
economic system and class power. Again it is my contention that 
setting these concerns in the context of Derrida's philosophical 
attention to sexual difference and the insights to be gleaned from 
deconstruction can help us move beyond this impasse. This is a 
significant move for debates within feminism. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part my aim is to 
examine the possibilities and limitations of a deconstructive approach 
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and to argue that the insights of Derrida's work are of much positive 
significance for feminists concerned with gender and sexual difference. 
The issues raised in Part 1 serve as a prolegomenon for the application 
of these deconstructive insights in the rethinking of corporeality, 
subjectivity and sexual difference that is the main focus of Part 2. The 
concern here is to develop a theory of gendered embodiment that 
acknowledges the social constitution of gendered embodiment whilst 
simultaneously avoiding either voluntarism or cultural determinism 
yet allowing for the possibility of change and transformation. 
In chapter one I begin by setting out the main features of 
deconstruction and in particular dif fe ra n ce and putting straight some 
popular misconceptions. Rather than attempting to cover every aspect 
of Derrida`s work, I concentrate on the implications of dif fe ra n ce i. e. 
the critique of the metaphysics of presence that Derrida discerns at the 
heart of the Western philosophical tradition and undecidability. One 
of the ways in which Derrida develops his critique of presence is 
through a deconstruction of the speech/ writing opposition. The 
privileging of speech that is involved in this distinction is revealed to 
be based on the myth of presence. Derrida suggests an alternative 
understanding of writing and signification or language. This is 
examined in chapter 1 along with two highly significant implications: 
the challenge it presents to the reference /representation distinction 
and the impossibility of unmediated experience. All this is important 
for developing the critique of identity and establishing the 
undecidability of the category woman, which is the basis of my 
arguments in chapters 2,3 and 5 
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Particular attention is also paid to the notorious suggestion in Of 
G ra mmatol og y that there is nothing outside of the text. In particular 
the conclusion drawn from this that Derrida's position is playful, 
rather than serious, and that deconstruction involves a refusal of 
materiality and therefore has no way of dealing with reality. This is a 
view that has haunted Derrida's work more or less since its inception 
and Derrida himself has attempted to counter it on many occasions. 
An examination of this view is of particular importance here because 
one of the main arguments of this thesis is that not only is this not the 
case, but breaking down the reference/ representation distinction 
(which is also sometimes conceived of in terms of a 
reality / representation dichotomy) and relatedly the materiality / ideality 
distinction, is a necessary move for feminist gender theory in a number 
of important ways. (The detail of these will be demonstrated later. ) It 
is argued that aspects of Derrida's work concerning the relationship 
between language, 'writing' and 'reality' can help us to do this. 
The issue of the ethical and political implications of the undecidability 
involved in a deconstructive approach is also considered and addressed 
in a number of ways. One of these is through a comparison of 
deconstruction and pragmatism. I argue that the most significant 
difference between these two approaches lies in Derrida's concern with 
alterity - with otherness as that which exceeds logocentric closure (and 
as such challenges the myth of presence and the dream of plenitude). It 
is this that provides deconstruction with the critical edge that Rorty's 
pragmatism lacks. These issues are also addressed through an 
examination of the status of deconstruction as an intervention and its 
relation to empirical reality. These both involve further attention to 
the ethical commitment involved in deconstruction. Again these are 
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key themes in my argument and they reappear in various guises in the 
chapters that follow. 
In chapter 2I turn more specifically to the relationship between 
deconstruction and feminism. In order to demonstrate the positive 
possibilities presented for feminist concerns with gender and sexual 
difference I focus on the main obstacles to an appreciation of these 
insights. These are identified as Derrida's own use of the feminine and 
whether this is inimical to feminist concerns, the political implications 
of the anti-essentialism and undecidability involved in deconstructive 
insights, the threat to women's sense of themselves as women that the 
undecidability of the category women presents and accusations of 
nominalism and formalism. This involves returning to some of the 
main themes and arguments of chapter 1, in particular the 
deconstruction of the materiality/ ideality distinction which emerges 
here in the guise of the reality/ representation distinction, the political 
implications of undecidability, which are considered in the context of 
feminist concerns with gender and sexual difference and the critique of 
the category woman. 
I begin with an examination of Derrida's use of the feminine and 
concern with the issue of sexual difference in Spurs. The main issues 
here revolve around whether or not these are considered inimical to 
feminist concerns. Although Spurs is not the only place in which 
Derrida employs metaphors of femininity and the category woman, it 
does involve an explicit concern with sexual difference as ontological 
difference and it has also been the focus of much feminist criticism. For 
these reasons I use it as an example on which to base my argument. 
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As I have established in chapter 1, Derrida's work opens up the space 
for concern with the 'other' as that which exceeds logocentric closure. 
In Spurs he characterises that other in terms of the 'becoming woman' 
and it is this that I examine in chapter 2. I do this through an 
examination of Kelly Oliver's (1994) argument that opening up the 
space for differance in Derrida, as in Nietzsche, depends on the 
exclusion of the feminine (especially the feminine mother) and in so 
doing, precludes the possibility of a specifically feminine voice or other. 
This also involves an examination of the argument that Derrida's 
concern with sexual difference does not relate to 'real-life' women in 
the world. Against this view I argue that the rendering of sexual 
difference as undecidable in Spurs helps us to see the role that the 
denigration or negation of the feminine (and/or woman) has played in 
fixing logocentric closure (e. g. in logocentric notions of subjectivity, 
sexual difference etc. ). Further to this, precisely because it does not tie 
the feminine to the bodies of women it calls attention to the practices 
and knowledges, violence and exclusions, that do precisely that. I 
argue that appreciating the relevance of all this for 'real-life' women in 
the world involves applying the deconstructive insight that there can 
be no unmediated experience to the problematic of sexual difference 
and the body. I draw on the work of Gayatri Spivak to illustrate that 
rather than precluding attention to experience deconstructive strategies 
actually call attention to the mediating factors in the production of 
women's experiences - including such apparently intimate experiences 
as experiences of their own bodies and identities. 
Further to this, I also examine whether the undecidability of the 
category woman requires abandoning the category altogether in a move 
'beyond gender'. I draw on the work of Diane Elam to argue against 
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this move. Deconstructing the category women and rendering it 
undecidable allows us to focus productively on the factors involved in 
the production of woman as a determinate category and to highlight 
the violence and exclusions involved in this. This does not necessarily 
entail relinquishing the category but rather involves keeping it open as 
a site of contested meaning. This also relates to the question of the 
political implications of undecidability. Again I draw on the work of 
Elam to examine the positive possibilities that these insights present 
when applied to questions of gender and sexual difference. 
Finally, in chapter 2,1 consider arguments that deconstructive insights 
involve both nominalism and formalism and as such are unable to 
account for gender. Again, this involves returning to the arguments in 
chapter 1 and applying them to the problematic of gender and sexual 
difference, specifically those concerning the need to rethink the 
reference/ representation distinction in order to accommodate the 
materiality of language. 
To sum up then, in Part 1I argue that deconstructive insights are of 
enormous significance for some of the fundamental issues in 
contemporary feminist gender and body theory, in particular: (the 
production of determinacy in relation to) the category woman; sexual 
difference and its ontological status; the significance of theoretical 
insights for everyday practices and identity formation; and identity 
politics. A further issue remains implicit in chapter 1, but is made 
explicit in Part 2. This concerns the issue of biology and the causal role 
that is traditionally accorded to it in the determination of sexual 
difference. These issues are introduced in the course of my arguments 
in Part 1 in the context of the relationship between feminism and 
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deconstruction more generally, but I will also return to, and develop, 
them in Part 2, in relation to the Body. 
In Part 2 of the thesis I turn to the problematic of subjectivity, sexual 
difference and the body. As I said at the beginning, this is because the 
question of the relationship between these three aspects of human 
being is perhaps currently the most fundamental issue for feminist 
theory, and it is my contention that the insights I have been discussing 
in Part 1 can help in this regard. One of the ways they can do this 
concerns the issue of biology. They can help us address the question of 
biology and its role in the production of gender and sexual difference. 
The issue here concerns the extent to which it is biology which fixes 
these categories. Feminists have long questioned the equation of 
feminine characteristics with biological foundations and the 'natural'. 
Deconstructive insights applied to this issue further develop this 
questioning. They help us to see how it is that biology and the body are 
also historical and cultural products. Moreover I argue that they do 
this through rethinking the production of the matter and materiality of 
bodies rather than by rendering that matter immaterial, as the counter- 
argument goes. 
In chapter three then I raise these issues in the context of attempts by 
feminist theorists to rethink the body in such a way as to recognise the 
salience of sexual difference and the embodied roots of subjectivity, 
without tying women to any sort of essential nature, whether 
biologically or psychologically based. I take as my focus the work of 
Rosi Braidotti, Elizabeth Grosz and Judith Butler. These three theorists 
all share the view that rethinking the body in this way involves 
rethinking corporeality beyond Cartesian dualism of mind /body, 
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subject/object. They all also attempt to move beyond the sex/gender, 
essentialism/ construction, biology /culture dichotomies that have 
shaped much feminist thinking on these matters in the last three 
decades. There is some agreement that this all involves reformulating 
the relation between the natural, representation and the objects of 
representation. The main disagreement concerns the extent to which 
this rethinking involves a reconstructive project around the bodies of 
women, as in Irigaray's view. This is Grosz and Braidotti's move. I 
examine their arguments in some detail and argue that if we apply the 
insights of deconstruction regarding the materiality of signification 
(and the implications of this for the reference / meaning distinction) to 
the problematic of sex, gender and the body we can see two things. Not 
only does the attempt to build a reconstructive project around the 
bodies of women (and maybe men) serve to perpetuate the very binary 
thinking it seeks to challenge, in which case it is bound to fail, but these 
very insights provide a way of rethinking the materiality of the body 
that can acknowledge the salience of sexual difference without reifying 
it and thus avoid this pitfall. 
Ultimately then Grosz and Braidotti fail because although they do in 
fact assimilate some deconstructive insights, they do not take these far 
enough. Butler, however, develops the notion of the materiality of the 
body as a discursive product. It is performatively produced in a process 
of subjectification that incorporates gender and sexual difference 
without according them primacy. This enables her to turn the question 
of sexual difference and the materiality of the body around. In 
her 
account the focus falls rather on the political effects of grounding the 
category woman in the materiality of bodies and posing that materiality 
(i. e. the materiality of sex) as causal, rather than the other way around.. 
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In chapter 5I go on to examine Butler's notion of performativity and 
its implications for feminist praxis in more detail. However Butler's 
notion of performativity draws on aspects of Foucault's work as well as 
Derrida's. Indeed at first sight it may seem to be more influenced by 
the former than the latter. On top of this, Foucault's genealogy 
involves an explicit focus on the body that is absent in Derrida's work. 
So before moving on to Butler's own work in chapter 5, I examine 
Foucault's genealogy in chapter 4 to see what his work has to offer that 
Derrida's does not and vice versa. 
By now Derrida's early spat with Foucault over the interpretation of 
Cartesian doubt and the possibility of radical otherness is fairly well 
documented. Therefore, although it seems expedient to mention it 
here, the main focus of this chapter is rather a comparison of the 
relative merits of Foucault's notion of discourse and Derrida's notion 
of 'writing'. I return to Derrida's pronouncements concerning the 
nature of writing and language in Of Grammatology and develop them 
in the context of his critique of J. L. Austin's (1962) speech act theory in 
How To Do Things With Words. My purpose here is to demonstrate 
the significance of Derrida's view of the performative power of 
language and, in particular. the role of iterability within this. I argue 
that although Derrida himself does not apply these insights to the 
question of sexual difference and its relation to the body, such an 
application helps us to establish two things. These are that language 
plays a performative role in the production of sexed and gendered 
bodies. And that because this understanding of the performative 
includes a the notion of iterability (and thus the possibility of failure) it 
allows the space for resistance and change that is somewhat 
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problematic in Foucault's account of the body as a disciplined product 
of power relations. Butler brings these insights together in her notion 
of performativity. 
In chapter 5I provide a detailed examination of Butler's notion of 
performance and performativity. Almost all of the themes of chapter 1 
resurface here in one guise or another. For example, there is the 
question of the status of materiality in general and in the context of 
women's experience and biology in particular. There is also the charge 
of political inadequacy and the question of play. Added to this, other 
issues that follow from these themes but which are not captured 
within them are raised. For example there is the question of the 
constituted subject and the problem of agency, the issue of power and 
the debate with materialist feminisms. 
I start by providing an overview of the development of Butler's work 
and drawing out the implications and motivations of the various 
moves she makes. The main theme concerns the rethinking of the 
reference/ representation dichotomy that accompanies the 
deconstructive emphasis on the materiality of language and 
signification. I argue that this is the most fruitful move in rethinking 
the materiality of the body to develop a theory of embodied subjectivity 
within the problematic of subjectivity and sexual difference. This is in 
stark opposition to the arguments of certain materialist feminists who 
resist such deconstructive moves, describing them as ludic. I examine 
such arguments in some detail, focusing in particular on the work of 
Teresa Ebert. This has a twofold effect. It allows me to revisit some of 
the main criticisms levied at the deconstructive strategies examined 
and advocated in this thesis and once again reveal their basis in 
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misunderstanding and faulty premises; and it enables me to highlight 
the limitations of Ebert's own apparently more truly materialist 
approach. I argue that this is based on the search for an objective reality 
outside signification that is rendered futile by the insights of 
deconstruction. It is the argument of this thesis that this view of 
materiality as something outside language and signification is just not 
sustainable. Butler, no more than Derrida, dematerialises social 
realities as the counter-argument goes. It is rather that they both 
provide a means of examining the production of those realities in their 
materiality and, importantly for my concerns here, they both attempt to 
find a means of challenging them. Indeed this is the fundamental 
argument of this thesis. 
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PART 1 
FEMINISM & 
DECONSTRUCTION 
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Chapter I 
Derrida, 
Deconstruction and Di f ferance 
"The relation to self... can only be differaiice , that is to say, alterity, or 
trace" (Derrida 1992: 261) 
What exactly is deconstruction? This is a very difficult question to 
which there is no easy answer. In fact my intention in this thesis is not 
so much to delineate what deconstruction is, as to examine how certain 
deconstructive insights can contribute to the understanding of 
gendered embodiment. In particular the seemingly intractable 
questions that currently haunt feminist gender theory concerning the 
'nature' of sexual difference and the relationship between this and the 
body, identity and subjectivity. The main concern amongst those 
working in this area is to find a way of acknowledging the corporeal 
roots of gendered subjectivity without succumbing to some from of 
essentialism (however conceived) or psychological or biological 
reductionism (as I discuss in chapter 3). The basic argument is that this 
involves rethinking the relationship between the cultural and the 
natural, representation and the objects of representation. My 
argument, to reiterate, is that a deconstructive approach and, in 
particular, aspects of Derrida's work concerning the relationship 
between meaning or 'writing' and reality, can help us to do this. They 
can be employed within feminist frameworks despite Derrida's lack of 
feminist credentials himself and the apparent misogyny in his 
theorising around sexual difference (that I examine in chapter 2). If I 
sometimes use the term deconstruction interchangeably with the name 
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'Derrida' this is not because I confuse the man and the work but 
because I use the them both to describe his work and to indicate the 
strategies and insights that attach to his name, whether he likes it or 
not. I say whether he likes it or not because he sometimes insists that 
deconstruction is not a strategy or a method but it is a process and an 
intervention. All this can seem very confusing but it is not my 
concern to untangle it by engaging with debates around these issues but 
rather, to reiterate, to examine, selectively, what I have called the 
insights of deconstruction. However I do want to point out that it 
would seem to me to involve a method as well as a process, if method 
is taken to imply simply what one does. The method aspect involves 
an explicit attempt to focus on what is involved in the production of 
coherent meaning, especially the marginalisation and exclusions it 
entails. The process aspect refers to the ways in which the elements 
that Derrida describes in deconstruction are always already in process. 
They are part and parcel of the production, reception, and 
interpretation of meaning and, importantly, its instability and 
undecidability (as I will demonstrate here). Moreover, all this would 
seem to imply a strategy of reinscription and intervention. 
In this chapter I will begin by setting out the main features and 
implications of deconstruction and differance that I find to be of 
particular relevance and, my disclaimers above notwithstanding, 
setting straight some popular misconceptions. The main focus will be 
Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of presence, the critique of the 
speech/ writing opposition and the undecidability that these involve. 
However as way into the specifics of these aspects of deconstruction I 
will begin with a more general introduction to Derrida's work and 
its 
precursors and contexts. 
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Precursors and Contexts 
Deconstruction, or grammatology as Derrida first introduced it, has far 
reaching implications for understanding the role and status of 
heterosexually defined sexual difference in Western thought and 
practice. Even while Derrida ignores almost completely the 
implications for the positioning of female subjectivities and individual 
experiences of gendered subjectivities, the insights gleaned through his 
work nevertheless serve to challenge the whole system of thought on 
which the contemporary epistemico-ontological regime and 
concomitant understandings of the subject and subjectivity are based. 
However since all of Derrida's work is notoriously difficult to 
summarise, it might be helpful to sketch in some of the main strands 
that have contributed to its development, or at least the development 
of the elements I have identified as my main focus here. Much of what 
is to follow in the section below is drawn from Of Ga mma to l og y 
(Derrida, 1967). 1 For although Derrida's work has many strands and is 
plurivocal, multi-layered and contrapuntal, and amounts to a 
veritable labyrinth, as one interlocutor suggests, (in Positions, Derrida 
1981a). This early work provides a classic account of his critique of 
presence, and much of what is involved in is e. g. his view of language 
and 'writing', and dif fe ra nce. Moreover Spivak's translator's preface 
affords valuable insight into not only this early work, but Derrida's 
whole corpus. 
1 It is here in Part I that he deconstructs the speech/ writing opposition and in Part II 
turns to Rousseau to develop the notion of the supplement and the dependence of 
identity on difference and to Levi-Strauss to demonstrate the dangers of obectifying the 
'other' in the form in this case of the peoples he was researching among. Derrida 
deconstructs the presence / sign binary opposition in Speech and to Phenomena. 
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Derrida's three main precursors are acknowledged in Of 
G ra mmatol og y as Nietzsche, Freud and Heidegger. These three set the 
context in various ways for Derrida's own work, or one might say, 
deconstruction. All three in their different ways were concerned with 
difference and all three, again in their different ways, questioned the 
closure of metaphysics. 2. Indeed they all moved towards articulating 
the need for a strategy of sous rature, (under erasure), as Spivak points 
out. Freud and Nietzsche implicitly (and respectively) put the psyche 
and knowing under erasure, Heidegger explicitly put Being under 
erasure. 
Derrida developed this strategy from Heidegger's practice of writing 
Being sous rature, i. e. Being. This involved crossing out the word but 
then letting the word remain legible covered by the deletion. The 
reason being that although the word is inadequate it nevertheless 
remains necessary. Heidegger put Being under erasure as he came to 
think that the word Being was inadequate, since the concept of Being is 
always necessarily precomprehended, always anterior to thought itself. 
For as Spivak succinctly puts it, drawing on Zur Sei ns fage, (where 
Heidegger engaged with the problem of definitions) "in order for the 
nature of anything in particular to be defined as an entity the question 
of Being in general must always already be broached and answered in 
the affirmative. That something is, presupposes that anything can be" 
(Spivak in Derrida, 1974: xiv). It cannot then answer the question 
'What is...? ' Nevertheless since our language does not permit of 
anything else it is still necessary to use the word Being, which is why 
Heidegger puts it sous ra tu re. Derrida also faced with the difficulties 
2 However Nietzsche is said to be the only one of the three whose texts, with their 
disruptive play manage to avoid (at least in part) the thrall of metaphysics 
17 
and contradictions involved in using the language of metaphysics to 
question metaphysics and to render the familiar unfamiliar, adopts this 
same strategy (without the mark). Indeed his writing as Spivak 
reminds us, always implies an invisible erasure (Derrida, 1974: xviii). 
However Derrida's links with Heidegger do not stop there. Heidegger's 
call for an end to, indeed destruction of, metaphysics sets the context at 
least in part for Derrida's own deconstruction of metaphysics. 
Nevertheless Derrida discerns in Heidegger the attempt to make of 
Being (albeit under erasure) the ultimate reference, in his terms the 
transcendental signified. For in privileging 'Being' as opposed to 
'being' in the ontic-ontological distinction, Heidegger places it outside 
of signification and therefore although it is not ascribed some kind of 
fixed origin, or end point of language, it nevertheless retains a 
recognizably theological situation. In contrast to this Derrida's own 
major concern is to avoid any such founding moment or master 
concept which he might refer to as a transcendental signified, using the 
language of Lacan with whose work he also engages. Hence Derrida's 
emphasis is not on Being but on di ffe ra n ce, the trace, supplementarity 
and, at least in Of Grammatology, arche-writing. However I will 
discuss these 'terms' further, later in this chapter, along with 
accusations that despite his intentions to the contrary, Derrida similarly 
succumbs to a kind of ontotheology. For now I want to continue to set 
the context for deconstruction and differance by turning to Nietzsche. 
"No-one would think of saying that Derrida is Nietzschean" 
announced Michael Hoar boldly in his paper 'The Play of Nietzsche in 
Derrida' (Hoar 1992: 52). (No-one that is except Rorty who is obviously 
not present on Hoar's list of reading materials. ) Hoar argues that 
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Derrida's concern with temporality and temporalization as involved in 
the structure of differance and his concern with the metaphysics of 
presence, among other things, are far removed from Nietzsche's 
philosophy of life and the cosmos. However he concedes that he does 
take from Nietzsche a certain orientation. Something that Derrida 
himself refers to as a sense of "philosophizing with a hammer" 
(Derrida, 1982: xii) and which is indicated by a kind of all-pervasive 
reflexivity. However, while it may be true that Derrida's concerns are 
not well reflected in Nitzsche's philosophy of life and the cosmos, in 
many ways both the style and the strategy of his writing is anticipated 
by Nietzsche. For example, Nietzsche also grappled with the 
relationship between language and reality and meditated on the 
problem of the inescapability of language. He took the view that we are 
caught within language and that this is all the more evident in the fact 
that even to give expression to that fact we must use the very language 
that entraps us. It is not possible therefore to have an original thought 
because if we could express such a thing we would not then be trapped. 
Reality then is not directly perceived it is rather constituted by 
language. All this means that literal, true, self-identical meaning is 
simply not possible. Words are signs and each sign can only have 
meaning in a contextual relationship with other signs; no meaning is 
literal, all meaning is metaphorical. Nietzsche responded to this 
problem by adopting a (philosophical) strategy of play and laughter and, 
embracing paradox, incorporated reflexivity into his own writing. 
Nietzsche and Metaphor 
In terms of understanding Derrida's view of language it is helpful to 
consider Nietzsche's view of metaphor. As already mentioned, in 
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Nietzsche's view, all language is intrinsically metaphorical but the 
philosophical significance of this lies in the fact that ever since Plato 
this point has been systematically suppressed. (In this sense then the 
Sophists were closer to wisdom, for they implicitly acknowledged that 
thought is ineradicably tied to the rhetorical devices that pervade it, as 
Hoar (1992) points out. ) However Derrida, like Nietzsche, makes the 
point that language is intrinsically and inescapably metaphorical. All 
language works by tropes and figures, including that of philosophy and 
not just literature where such devices are more obvious. All language 
is arbitrary and fictive. The difference is that while literary works 
acknowledge their own rhetorical status other forms of writing do not, 
although they are equally figurative. Metaphor is ubiquitous and 
ineradicable therefore no language is ever literally literal. What 
Derrida does then is to stress the irreducibility of metaphor and the 
play of differences even within the construction of purportedly literal 
meaning. In his deconstructive practice3 this involves focusing on the 
points in a (philosophical) text, or indeed the construction of meaning, 
where these structural features are dissimulated. He does this through 
close readings of texts which highlight the ambiguities in the 
metaphysical binary oppositions at work within them. He finds that in 
each of these oppositions the first term is privileged and depends for its 
identity on the exclusion of the other. He suggests that there is thus 'a 
logic of the supplement' at work in these terms (which I will discuss 
further later). They are not autonomous and self identical although 
again these 'facts' dissimulated. 
3Derrida may dispute that deconstruction is a practice, though he would insist, as I 
said earlier, that it is a process but since it is what in fact he practices I reserve the 
right to use this description 
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One strategy he employs in this practice involves the reversal of 
metaphysical oppositions such as concept/metaphor, literal/ 
metaphorical. This is a strategy he takes from Nietzsche. However, 
Derrida goes beyond reversing them and revealing their complicity 
with each other since this would do nothing to challenge the 
oppositional structure itself but would rather result in a sort of 
reversed Platonism. He thus adds a strategy of displacement to the one 
of reversal. Indeed this two pronged aspect is characteristic of the 
double strategy of deconstruction. Derrida's aim (if I may be so bold as 
to impute his intentions) is to introduce undecidability into the logic of 
reversal in order to reveal the ambiguities involved in sustaining such 
terms as oppositional. As he puts it in 'Tympan', which serves as an 
introduction to Margins of Philosophy, he wants "to inscribe a loxos" 
and "to set the lox os in the logos to work" (Derrida, 1982: xv). His point 
is that these are not superficial ambiguities. They are rather 
constitutive of logocentrism. 
Logocentrism is the term Derrida introduces in Of Grammatology to 
characterise the Western philosophical tradition (and thus the 
contemporary epistemico-ontological regime) which is based on the 
suppression of these ambiguities. He uses it to suggest the ways in 
which the Western philosophical tradition succumbs to a 'metaphysics 
of presence' which is organised (economically) around an illusory 
centre (the logos). 4 Deconstructive readings therefore destabilise the 
whole system. Hence he is accused of nihilism and irrationalism by 
41n. Margins of Philosophy, Dissemination and Spurs logocentrism becomes 
phallogocentrism to indicate the presence of the phallus in the logos. In other words to 
mark the sexual structure of the metaphysics of presence. As Peggy Kamuff puts it, "to 
indicate a certain sexual scene behind or before -but always within-the scene of 
philosophy" (Kamuf 1991: 314). This is despite the pretensions of philosophy to 
objectivity. 
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those whose interests are antithetical to such revelations5. However 
this is also something that I will discuss in more detail later. For now I 
want to turn to Derrida's notion of language as 'writing' and 
differance, and introduce the notion of 'presence' which is a key 
element in his critique of logocentrism. 
Language as writing and differance 
In Derrida's critique of logocentrism his overriding concern, following 
Heidegger, is with the myth of original presence. It is this which 
sustains and characterises the western philosophical tradition, which is 
why he also refers to it at various times as 'Western metaphysics', or 
the 'metaphysics of presence'. For Derrida the language of 
metaphysics, entails a dream of plenitude and a myth of presence, 
which privileges identity and certainty through the suppression of 
difference and ambiguity. This dream or myth is ubiquitous. It is 
foundational to Western thought and pervades every aspect of 
Western culture. It is an unacknowledged presumption in all 
knowledge-claims and it underpins the notion of the Cartesian 
sovereign subject. Nevertheless if language is understood as in 
Derrida's extended version of writing and placed in the context of 
differance this myth just is not sustainable. '. 
But what then is presence? Simplifying in the extreme in order to be 
clear about the complex and radical ideas involved in deconstruction 
and their profound implications for philosophy and therefore, in 
Derrida's view and mine, for understanding the nature of western 
5 See for example Barry Smart's letter to the London Times, 9 May 1992 (cited in Royle 
1995: 1) in which just such accusations are made. 
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thought, presence can be thought of as pure unmediated knowledge. 
This is an ideal which he maintains has pervaded the main traditions 
of western philosophy at least since Plato. 6 Indeed Derrida's seminal 
deconstructive writings span a wide range of disparate thinkers. They 
began however with an early engagement with Husserl's 
phenomenology, and as Dews points out, all involve a basic insight 
concerning the paradoxical status of writing that he gleaned while 
working on the introduction to his first book which was a translation 
of Husserl's The Origin of Geometry (Dews 1987). This is the paradox 
that writing simultaneously institutes truth and meaning yet also 
undermines them. This insight stemmed from Husserl's recognition 
of the role of language in the institution of objectivity and truth; that 
they are mediated by language. 
Further to this, Dews (1987) points out that Derrida's early concern was 
with locating the point at which the idea of transcendental 
consciousness starts to break down. He perceived this to be the point 
when language or, more specifically, writing is recognised as an 
intrinsic aspect of transcendental consciousness rather than an 
extraneous factor. Thus the initial focus of deconstruction in Of 
Gram ma to l og y was on the speech /writing opposition that Derrida 
discerns at the heart of the 'metaphysics of presence'. He argues that it 
is through posing speech and writing in oppositional terms that speech 
(or the voice and 'auto-affection') came to be privileged over writing 
and considered to be the precondition of writing. Whereas he 
6 Derrida identifies these traditions as Platonism (see the deconstruction of the 
Phaedrus in Of Grammatology (Derrida 1974) ; Romanticism (see the deconstruction of 
Rousseau's texts also in Of Grammatology(Derrida 1974) (Herein after OG)); 
Structuralism (see his deconstruction of Saussure in 'The Supplement of Copula' in The 
Margins of Philosophy, (Derrida 1982) (herein after MOP); Ordinary language 
analytic philosophy (see Signature, 
Event, Context (herein after SEC) also in MOP and 
his debate with John Searle in Glyph reprinted in Limited Inc (Derrida 1988a) 
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demonstrates that it is rather the other way around and writing is the 
precondition of speech but that in privileging speech over writing in 
this way the externality of speech itself is suppressed. Through this 
suppression the fact that it is writing, not speech that is the 
precondition of language is dissimulated. 
The point he wants to make in all this, however, is that this 
privileging and suppression, which he refers to as 'phonocentrism', is 
not so much a matter of error, as intrinsic to the dream of plenitude, 
and the association of truth with self-presence, that pervades and 
sustains the Western philosophical tradition i. e. logocentrism. 
However Derrida's deconstruction of the speech/writing opposition 
also involves a reformulation of the notion of writing and this needs 
to be grasped for the full force of his argument to be appreciated. He 
argues that not only does writing, in the conventional sense, depend 
on a system of marks so, too, does speech. This system of marks also 
needs to be recognised as a form of writing and then it can be 
recognised that speech is not, and cannot be, self-identical any more 
than writing is or can be. 
Speech is dependent on a linguistic economy which he portrays as 
having a graphematic structure, in which all the sounds are signs 
(marks, graphemes) dependent for their meaning on both their 
relation to other signs and the context: i. e. language. Thus he extends 
the concept of writing through introducing terms such as 'grapheme'. 
He argues: "there are no phonemes before the grapheme. That is 
before that which operates as a principle of death within speech" 
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(Derrida 1974: 245).? In Of Grammatology the terms he uses for the 
system of marks that enable speech is 'archi-writing' or the 'trace 
structure'8. Hence despite the illusion of 's'entendre-parler', (that is 
the experience of hearing oneself speak) the meaning of the spoken 
word is no more immediate, no more fully present to the speaker, or 
for that matter to the hearer, than is that of the written word to the 
writer or the reader. 
The concept of writing is therefore broadened from the empirical 
concept of an intelligible system of notations on a material substance, 
as in marks on a page. Derrida extends it to demonstrate the 
graphematic structure of spoken language; that is that words are signs 
or marks that are always inhabited by the trace in a signifying chain). 
This graphematic structure is analogous to Freud's application of the 
metaphor of writing to the structure of the psyche. 9 It thus comes to 
signify the structure of the sign as that which is always inhabited by the 
trace. The trace, that is, of a radical alterity; that which is totally other. 
7The theme of death is a frequent occurrence in Derrida's work on language and 
communication see in particular The Gift. However it is not one that I particularly 
develop in this thesis. 
8 Structure is a complex notion here; it is not to be distinguished from structure in the 
structuralist sense of base / superstructure or an edifice built around a stable centre. 
Structure, for Derrida, is dependent on, and produced by, a process of iteration which I 
will discuss later. (See Positions., and Gasche 1986,1994). 
9 See 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' in Derrida (1978)Writing and Difference. Here 
Derrida focuses on three of Freud's texts, 'Project for a Scientific Psychology' (1985) The 
Interpretation of Dreams (1899) and 'A Note on a Mystic Writing Pad' (1925) He charts 
the emergence in the latter of Freud's description of the psyche, in terms of both content 
and apparatus, as a 'space of writing'. The separation of the psyche into content and 
apparatus is significant for Derrida for two reasons in particular. In establishing the 
workings of the psychic apparatus as inaccessible to the psyche, perception becomes an 
originary inscription. That is, since it is the psychic apparatus that receives outside 
stimuli and thus protects the psyche, perception is always therefore already an 
inscription. This then implies that permanent traces develop which are not available 
to consciousness but which later affect it. It also undermines the continuity of time- 
perception. Time becomes a mark of what Derrida terms the economy of writing on, 
what Freud terms, the mystic writing pad of the psyche. In other words the psyche is 
inhabited by a radical alterity; and perception and temporality become functions of 
writing. Secondly and relatedly, this also serves to decentre the sovereign subject. 
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There is always a beyond, a structural supplementarity to language 
(signification). This too is part of writing in the extended sense that 
Derrida develops. Hence he says `Writing will appear to us more and 
more as another name for this structure of supplementarity" (Derrida 
1974: 245). 
Differance 
And it is this constitution of the present, as an 'originarv' and irreducibly 
nonsimple (and therefore, stricto seilsrr nonoriginary) synthesis of marks, or 
traces of retentions and protentions (to reproduce analogically and 
provisionally a phenomenological and transcendental language that will soon 
reveal itself to be inadequate), that I propose to call archi-writing, archi- 
trace, or differance . Which (is) (simultaneously) spacing (and) temporization" 
(Derrida, Differance 1982: 13). 
Differance, then, is an attempt to think the unthinkable, to deny 
presence and to challenge and displace the binary thinking of Western 
logic. It is a neologism which combines two elements: Saussure's 
insight concerning the differential structure of language, wherein the 
meaning of each word or sign is produced only in relation to all the 
other words or signs; and Husserlian ru ck f rage in which there is both a 
potential endlessness and an attempt to recover an original sense 
(Dews 1987: 11). Where it differs from Saussure is in the separation of 
the signifier, which is the sound or mark, and the signified, which is 
the meaning. In Saussure's structural linguistics far from being 
separated these two aspects are like the two sides of a sheet of paper. 
Although for Saussure meaning is produced within, rather than 
reflected by, language, and there is an arbitrary conjunction of signifiers 
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and signifieds, meaning is, nevertheless, still fixed. Whereas for 
Derrida it is not that the signified is fixed, but rather that any apparent 
fixing is a temporary retrospective effect of representation. This works 
through a process of iterability, as his various deconstructions show. 1 
Meaning is thus never fully present in a sign. Each sign is always 
inhabited by traces which are never present and absent others . Derrida 
thus suggests the impossibility of closing off the process of the differing 
and deferral of meaning within language. 
Differance, however, as Derrida insists in 'Differance ' (reprinted in 
Margins of Philosophy) needs to be understood in the context of its 
place in a chain of other terms, or 'nonsynonymous substitutions', 
which also refer to writing and which inscribe differance 'according to 
the necessity of the context' (Derrida 1982: 12), e. g. archi-writing, the 
archi-trace, spacing, the supplement, pharmakon, hymen, the margin- 
mark-scratch, among others. Although all these terms are similar they 
are not exactly the same. They are all themselves supplements or 
hinges or brisures which disrupt the binary oppositions that are at the 
root of conceptuality. They are not third terms as in some sort of 
Hegelian Au fbeh u ng in which contradictions are transcended, but 
rather represent an alternative to it. They have a nonself-identical 
kind of sense that involves movement and avoids and disrupts the 
dialectic of opposition and synthesis, and prevents them rejoining the 
logocentric order of western metaphysics. Thus, differance, Derrida 
warns, in Positions, "cannot be elevated into a master-word, or master 
concept, since it blocks every relationship to theology, [it] finds itself 
10 1 discuss this notion further later in this chapter and in chapters 4 and 5. 
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enmeshed in the work that pulls it through a chain of other 'concepts' 
other 'words' other textual configurations" (Derrida, 1981: 40). 11 
The movement of differance , then, undermines the interpretive 
attempt at closure, any attempt to grasp the coherent and unitary 
meaning of the text or its definitive truth. For Derrida it is this 
movement, this play of presence and absence that blocks the possibility 
of closure. No term or text, (and that is text in Derrida's extended sense 
of writing), carries within it self-evident, or self-identical, meaning. 
Meaning also involves the play of further terms whose own meaning 
is also instituted in a similar way. Importantly then the implications 
are that there simply is no founding moment. No transcendental 
signified. No originary origin. Indeed the concept of origin is linked to 
presence. Hence di fferance , or 
for that matter the trace, or archi- 
writing are not to be considered as involving origins, but rather as 
involving temporization, or spacing. In other words "The sign 
represents the present [or the 'thing'] in its absence" (MOP: 9) "When 
we cannot grasp or show the thing, state the present, the being-present, 
when the present cannot be presented, we signify, we go through the 
detour of the sign" (MOP: 9). And of course for Derrida it is precisely 
the point that we never can grasp or show the thing -- whatever 'it' 
may be, in itself. Hence all of meaning is part of this process of 
temporization and spacing. To indicate just how expansive, or indeed 
inclusive, this is he goes on: 
Whether we are concerned with the verbal or written sign, with 
the monetary sign, or the electoral delegation and political 
representation, the circulation of signs defers the moment in 
110f course their is a sense in which such 'non-concepts' cannot help 
but become concepts, 
despite these protestations of Derrida's. The point is they are employed to instantiate 
that which Derrida seeks to demonstrate as outside of logocentric 
logic. 
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which we encounter the thing itself, make it ours, consume or 
spend it, touch it see it, intuit its presence (MOP: 9). 
Signification is thus the dif fera nce of temporization. All this, he 
argues, moves away from classical semiology in that it rejects the idea 
within that of the sign as a substitute of an absent presence (albeit 
secondary and provisional). This is because of the way that di f fe ra nce 
itself becomes originary. This is not in the traditional sense of origin as 
implying presence as in ousia or pa ro uisia, which, he points out in a 
footnote (p. 9), both "imply presence as both origin and end, the 
founding principle (arkhe-) as that toward which one moves (telos, 
askhaton)" (p. 9). Differance, temporization, and spacing do not imply 
something that is included in the concept of the sign itself, he argues. 
This is because this has traditionally been seen as representing a 
presence in a system of thought which conceived of itself as moving 
towards (full) presence. (Differance, to reiterate, does not suggest a 
representation of a possible but absent presence. It is rather the 
conditions of possibility of signification itself. ) This therefore entails 
questioning the authority of presence and also, rn u to ti smu to nd is, the 
other half of the binary opposition, absence or lack. In this sense then 
the question of differance , 
Derrida argues, returns to a kind of 
Heideggerian question and to ontico-ontological difference. And he 
likens the notion of temporization in differance to Heidegger's 
comments in Being and Time about "temporalization as the 
transcendental horizon of the question of Being which must be 
liberated from its traditional metaphysical domination by the present 
and the now" and says that there is between them "a strict 
communication, even though not an exhaustive and irreducibly 
necessary one" (MOP: 10). Differance he insists does not stand 
before 
the differences it produces in a simple, straightforward way. It is rather 
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that dif ferance is "the non-full, non-simple, structured and 
differentiating origin of differences" and, importantly, he stresses that 
"the name "origin" no longer suits it" (MOP: 11). Thus: "To come to 
recognise, not within but on the horizon of the Heideggerian paths, 
and yet in them, that the sense of being is not a transcendental or trans- 
epochal signified (even if it is always dissimulated within the epoch) 
but already, in a truly unheard of sense, a determined signifying trace, 
is to affirm that within the decisive concept of ontico-ontological 
difference, all is not to be thought at one go; entity and being, ontic and 
ontological, 'ontico-ontological, ' are, in an original style, derivative 
with regard to difference; and with respect to what I shall later call 
differance, an economic concept designating the production of 
differing/ deferring" (Derrida 1974: 23). For Heidegger the ontico- 
ontological difference and its ground are not originary in an absolute 
sense; for Derrida "Di fferance by itself would be more 'originary' but 
one would no longer be able to call it 'origin' or 'ground', those 
notions belonging essentially to the history of onto-theology, to the 
system functioning as the effacing of difference" (Derrida 1974: 23). 
Play 
However, although I will discuss further the status of differance etc. as 
origin, for now I want to mention the significance of describing this 
process in terms of play. The use of the word play in describing the 
movement of differance has had rather unfortunate repercussions. It 
has been widely taken up and used as a means with which to criticise 
Derrida's view of language and meaning as both non-serious in 
philosophical terms and as something essentially free-floating and 
unrestricted in descriptive terms. However Derrida does not himself 
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anywhere speak of the free-play of the signifier, as Marion Hobson 
(1987: 114) has pointed out. Indeed to construe the play of signifiers as 
'free-play' is a misnomer with important ramifications for the political 
implications of deconstructive notions of reinscription and 
destabilisation and Derrida's concern with the hierarchies of forces. 
Nevertheless it was translated in this way by the first translator of 
Structure, Sign and Play' in the USA in 1966 and became the dominant 
reading there. Indeed even the French word for play, ', jeu' is rarely 
used apart from in Of Grammatology and then again in Spurs/Eperons. 
The mistake, Hobson suggests perhaps stems from a confusion with 
Kant's 'freies spiele' - the free play of the power of judgment. Whereas 
Derrida informs us in Positions that what he meant by 'play' was the 
kind of play that becomes evident in mechanical parts as of, say, a car 
engine. A certain looseness and movement nevertheless bound 
within the structure of the machinery. 12 
Another important point to note in relation to this point about play 
and movement is that just as this account is not to suggest that there is 
a freeplay of signifiers, neither is it to suggest that meaning is 
completely flexible. It is rather to demonstrate through close readings 
of the philosophical canon that meaning is not fixed but open to 
multiple interpretations. These are fixed retrospectively through the 
process of interpretation and are always context specific. 13 
12 However this misunderstanding is a good example of the very problems of 
translation that deconstruction highlights. Derrida also comments on it in a number of 
places, e. g. in the 'Afterword' in Limited Inc (Derrida 1988a: 115-6) 
13 See for example Signature, Event, Context and Limited Inc where Derrida discusses 
this point in the context of John Searle's rejection of his (Derrida's) deconstruction of 
Austin's 'How to do things with words' drawing out the implications and covert 
metaphysical assumptions.. Moreover a close reading of Derrida's own texts reveal the 
serious and indeed rigorous argumentation wrapped in a playful, rhetorical style. See 
for example Gayatri Spivak's discussion of these issues in Diacritics, Vol XIX, 1982 
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One more aspect of Derrida's view of language to consider in relation 
to these points about the play of signifiers and the flexibility of 
meaning before moving on to considering the implications of all this, 
for my (feminist) purposes here, is the significance of the distinction 
Derrida makes between polysemia and what he terms dissemination. 14 
Polysemia suggests the multiplicity of meanings whereas what Derrida 
is concerned with in dissemination is the way that meaning is never 
fully captured; that there is always an irreducible excess. This excess is 
always spilling over, as meaning is always dispersed, divided and 
never identical with itself. The point, therefore, is not, as he is 
sometimes interpreted to mean, that there is no meaning, or that, to 
reiterate, meaning is completely flexible, but rather that if there is no 
stable economy of words and concepts, then meaning is far more 
insecure, elusive and prone to undecidability than it is traditionally 
philosophically presumed. 
This account of meaning and its production then, if accepted, clearly 
has profound implications for the whole of the Western philosophical 
tradition. Most notably in that, through a phonocentric privileging of 
the voice, meaning is deemed present in the Word (logos) and this, in 
turn, presupposes the presence of a speaking subject as unitary origin. 
This is exposed now as an illusion, a result of the impossible dream of 
plenitude. It can be seen that Derrida's account of language as writing 
and di fferance has opened up unprecedented perspectives on meaning, 
interpretation and indeed the fundamental nature of western 
philosophy. It challenges the traditional philosophical understanding 
of language, rejecting the notion of a transcendental signified - i. e. that 
14 (See for example Dissemination). I discuss these points in more detail in chapter 4. 
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which gives meaning to all other signifieds, such as God, the Subject or 
the Author - at the endpoint of the process of deferral. He draws 
attention to the instability of language and meaning, which are always 
dispersed, never at one with themselves, and as his analysis of 
temporality, shows, this instability denies access to the present in the 
sense of 'nowness'. 
Reference 
Moreover, since Derrida's notions of dif fe ra n ce, the trace structure, 
iterability, etc. render impossible any straightforward match between 
language and the world (the referent), they problematize the notion of 
referential truth. The trouble is, however, that this has seemed to 
suggest that there is nothing outside language. As, for example in 
Derrida's notorious statement in Of Grammatology that "Il n'y as pas 
d'hors texte" (p. 274) which, taken outside of his own extended sense of 
the term 'text', is often understood in this way. Nonetheless a 
significant aspect of Derrida's sophistication and the appeal of his work 
for me, is precisely that, in contrast to more outrageous postmodernist 
proclamations, he refuses to take that view. Indeed it is precisely his 
point in speaking of the disseminating, rather than polysemic, power 
of language, that there is always something spilling over, always that 
which resists conceptualization. As he remarks in response to a 
question from Richard Kearney, "To distance oneself from the habitual 
structure of reference, to challenge or complicate our common 
assumptions about it does not amount to saying that there is nothing 
beyond language (Derrida in Kearney 1984: 124). What it is doing 
though, is pushing our conceptualization of the structure of reference 
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to its limits. 15 Nevertheless this is a complex point and the status of 
materiality is perhaps one of the chief stumbling blocks for feminists 
like myself concerned with subjectivity, corporeality and sexual 
difference, and it is one to which I will return in each of the following 
chapters. . 
However it seems to me that deconstruction, and in 
particular differance, in focusing on the productive power of 
language16 do provide useful ways of understanding the production of 
sexed bodies - subjectivity, identity and sexual difference and the 
devaluing of female identity represented as other. However as this is 
the subject of my next chapter suffice it for now to say, with Robyn 
Ferrell, that it is perhaps better to translate the statement 'il n'y as pas 
de hors-texte 'as 'there is no outside to the text ' in order to grasp at the 
Derridean notion that there there is no radical alterity which is 
graspable. There is no pure outside that can can stand apart from 
representation and found it. Deconstruction and differance do not 
address the sceptics question. 'Reality', as Ferrell puts it, "is not the 
subject of their concerns but rather philosophy's quest for a pure 
outside untouched by the philosophers subjectivity" (Ferrell 1993: 126). 
Deconstruction and Pragmatism 
Another way into addressing these issues around differance , etc. is to 
consider Richard Rorty's pragmatist respone to deconstruction, and to 
consider his view of differance , iterability etc 
"as merely abbreviations 
for the familiar Piercian-Wittgensteinian anti-Cartesian thesis that 
meaning is a function of context, and that there is no theoretical barrier 
to an endless sequence of recontextualizations" (Rorty 1991: 240). 
Not 
15 Indeed Drucilla Cornell (1991) renames deconstruction as 'philosophy of the limit'. 
16 Cornell (1991) also makes this point, see in particular p. 28 and p. 104. 
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only does according Derrida the staus of rigorous philosophical 
argumentataion - albeit couched in performative style - amount to a 
contradiction in terms. "It amounts to paying good old logocentric 
compliments to someone who is an enemy of logocentrism" (Rorty 
1991: 37). However it is precisely to avoid logocentric strategies that 
Derrida does couch much of his work in performative style. Indeed it 
is precisely because of this that his work has met with such controversy 
and a refusal of recognition in analytic circles. The latter refuse to 
countenance this style in which he often gets his philosophical points 
across by instantiating that which he wishes to demonstrate. Rorty also 
wants to ignore the (albeit much disputed) 'serious' philosophical 
aspect of Derrida's work and rejects any notion of him as a 'much 
misunderstood philosopher of reflection' in favour of an 
interpretation of him as 'a much misunderstood nominalist, a sort of 
French Wittgenstein'. At one point he even tries to appropriate 
Deconstruction to 'his kind of pragmatism'. This latter, he claims, is 
aimed at edification rather than questions of truth and falsity which he 
deems to have lost their relevance since philosophy can no longer be 
usefully seen as 'the mirror of nature' and is better conceived as one of 
many voices in the conversation of mankind (sic). The trouble with 
this view, however, is that it ignores altogether Derrida's ethical and 
political concerns. Rorty's mistake rests on his Wittgensteinian 
reduction of language to a mere tool. For despite certain similarities 
with Wittgenstein on the one hand (see Staten 1994) language as 
characterised in di fferance, iterablity etc is something more than this. 
Here, there is always something extra, something other, something 
which resists and persits beyond any attempt to conceptualize it or to 
use it. This otherness or alterity is what interests Derrida. He is not 
making the idealist move that Rorty suggests. He is rather concerned 
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with the failure of idealism to appreciate the problem of alterity. The 
root of this difference that makes a difference, then, lies in this concern 
with alterity. 
Indeed it seems to me that Rorty's argument in Deconstruction and 
Circumvention' is deeply flawed. His argument can be summed up in 
the followig thre points: all words are enmeshed in the kind of chain 
Derrida posits for dif fe ra nce; despite Derrida's insistence to the contrary 
dif fera n ce has become a word; and that it is paradoxical of Derrida to 
take a language game account of the meaning of words and 
simultaneously privilege some as incapable of theological use. This, it 
seems to me, exemplifies a spectacular but nevertheless strategic 
misconception of differance, and what Derrida is trying to do through 
it: that is to think the unthought, the unthinkable, the 
unrepresentable; to allude to the 'ghosts' that necessarily haunt all 
language use and to gesture, in a double strategy characteristic of 
deconstruction, towards thinking outside of the language of 
metaphysics whilst simulataneously recognising the need to do so 
from within it. Hence di fferance is an attempt to inscribe both/ and 
and in so doing avoid conceptualizing in the metaphysical terms of 
either / or. 17 Rorty, however, sees this as somekind of theological move 
and he himself is very concerned not to accord any kind of theological 
status to any aspect of language or language use, and to avoid any sort 
of ultimate reference point for the 'conversations of mankind'. 
Moreover his contention in the following passage exemplifies again 
both what seems to be an inadequate understanding of differance and 
17 Interestingly, and indeed somewhat paradoxically, it is however an example of 
Grellings paradox in that in instantiating that which it itself alludes to it therefore 
paradoxically simultaneously becomes identical with itself and also instantiates the 
very possibility of that which it renders impossible ( see Hobson 1985). 
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that which is at stake in the difference beteen Derrida's deconstruction 
and Rorty's pragmatism: 
Again, if Derrida wants a 'general strategy of deconstruction', he 
must formulate one which is something more than 'avoiding 
both simply neutralizing the binary oppositions of metaphysics 
and simply residing in the closed field of operations, thereby 
confirming it. Such dual avoidance can be achieved simply by 
pointing out that the oppositions are there, and then not taking 
them very seriously. That is what most of our culture has been 
doing for a long time now. Our culture has not only been 
carried upward by a bubbling fountain of puns and metaphors; it 
has been increasingly conscious of iteself as as resting on nothing 
more solid than such a geyser. If all Derrida is saying is that we 
should take the dead metaphors of the philosophical tradition 
less seriously than Heidegger took them, it is only fair to reply 
that his own early writing takes them more seriously than the 
later Heidegger himself took them. (Rorty 1991: 103-4) 
However as I have tried to make clear that is precisely not what Derrida 
is saying or what differance implies. In Rorty's view of language, 
previous accounts, 18 whether refential or representational, are not 
rejected as illusory but rather they are viewed as simply more usefully 
dispensed with. He is not, therefore able to accept any attempt to view 
Derrida as seeking the conditons of possibility of lanuage use (Gasche 
1986) or as portraying the essential nature of language (Culler 1982) or 
of giving an accurate representation of language. Or for that matter of 
showing any concern with what is not captured in language. 
18 See Rorty 1991 for details of this account. 
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Thus Derrida's concerns with alterity are far removed from the ambit 
of Rorty's pragmatism. Deconstruction is a critcal project in which the 
critical aspect stems from the process of reflection and continuous self 
reflecetion. Rorty's Pragmatism, by contrast, and in particular his 
liberal utopia, 19 involves a rejection of the viability of critical projects, 
adopting the view that if we cannot get outside our institutions and 
beliefs then self-reflection is not useful. Therefore we should abandon 
any attempt to do so or to theorise our practices. Hence, to articulate 
this point a little more clearly, while Rorty, like Derrida accepts the 
inescapability of logocentrism (at least in any straightforward sense) but 
the conclusions they both draw from this are very different. Rorty 
thinks we should simply accept this, accept our society and its major 
inststutions, accept that radical critique is no longer, indeed never was, 
possible, and turn to the bourgeois liberalism (characterised as 
'postmodern' at one point) of the North Atlantic democracies as the 
best of all possible worlds; forsaking the search for foundations along 
the way, in 'a culture of ironism' in which poets and novelists replace 
scientist and philosophers as the instigators of new metaphors and 
vocabularies. This, then, is a palpably conservative view. Derrida by 
contrast takes the implications to be ethical, hence his concern with 
otherness, difference, alterity. In Levinasian terms he seeks to heed the 
call of the other. 20 Hence Derrida's insistence that deconstruction is an 
intervention. 
19 See for example Rorty (1991). 
20 Although of course Levinas' notion of the other is in terms of the infinite, the Good 
beyond being which provides the trace, i. e. transcendance. See Violence and 
Metaphysics (in Derrida 1978) for Derrida's engagement with Levinas; Critchley 
(1992) for a discussion of the ethics of deconstruction in the context of the work of 
Levinas. 
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The Principal of Reason 
Against a popular (mis)reading of deconstruction, then, I would argue 
that it does not amount to some kind of postmodern irrationalism 
involving the rejection of the principle of reason. In fact Derrida 
himself explicitly rejects this view and indeed the very possiblity of 
such a possiblity. Deconstruction does however p ro ble fna t i: e the 
principle of reason, as he makes clear in his inaugrual lecture lecture at 
Cornell University (The Principal of Reason: The University in the 
Eyes of its Pupils') where he emphasises the practico-political interests 
involved in the institutional production of knowledge. He arguse that 
whilst it is true that deconstruction involves a rejection of Kants view 
of philosophy as the 'disinterested voice of reason' and that it 
problematizes 'pure reason' bu this is not the same as rejecting reason 
out of hand. To do so would preclude the possibility of rational 
critique and serve to support the status quo, which is decidedly not 
what deconstruction aims to do. Nor might I add is it an unintended 
consequence. 21 The point is that deconstruction challenges the ideal of 
'pure reason' as some sort of ultimste ground. Therefore, contra 
Pierce, for instance, whom he quotes as saying, "One cannot very well 
demand a reason for reasonableness itself', for Derrida reason and 
rationality become historically specific, and he aims rather to expose 
the repressions and distortions involved in the notion of pure reason. 
In this sense, then, Derrida's relation to Kant can be interpreted, not as 
some would have it as an outright rejection of Kantian conceptual 
critique (e. g. Rorty), nor as continuing it; but rather as Irene Harvey 
puts it in her seminal interpretation of deconstruction, as "a 
21 Gasche (1994) also examines the implications of Derrida's questioning of the 
principle of reason and defends it against charges of irrationalism. 
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prolegomena to the deconstruction of metaphysics and the recognition 
of di ferance" (Harvey 1986: 2). 
Harvey locates Derrida within, rather than against, the Kantian 
tradition by focusing on the ways that deconstruction relates to Kant's 
epistemological concerns. In particular his use of a priori, 
transcendental - deductive forms of arguments. She argues that it is 
not so much that Derrida abandons the Kantian tradition as that he 
reframes the Kantian question. Not only does he seek the conditions 
of possibility of Kantian critique but also the conditions of impossibility 
that mark its limits. In a sense then, she argues, deconstruction begins 
where Kant's critique ends - with the notion of reason itself. For Kant 
reason is the transcendental signified - that which gives meaning to 
everything else. This is despite the antinomies to which he himself 
freely admits. It is this which provides the grounds of possibility for 
metaphysics. However for Derrida the problem is that reason's self 
knowledge is accepted as fully present to itself, as unmediated - by the 
sign, absence or writing. Indeed it is this apparent transparency, the 
myth of presence, at the heart of reason that pervades all the main texts 
of the philosophical tradition that are the focus of Derrida's 
deconstructions. 
However I do not mean to imply here that Derrida himself should be 
interpreted as offering transcendental arguments (as, despite Derrida's 
insistence to the contrary, this is often the case). 22 For, although there 
is a sense in which he does seek the conditions of possibility 
for 
metaphysics, he also and simultaneously seeks the 
limits, the 
22See for example the interview with Houdebine and 
Guv Scarpetta in Positions. 
(Derrida 1981b) 
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conditions of its impossibility. That is, not only does he not posit 
transcendental entities, he does not posit any ultimate grounding. 
Di fferance 
, 
iterability, spacing etc. are all attempts at producing non- 
logocentric concepts; marks in a chain in process, and as such do not 
signify an ultimate presence or originary moment, as I have already 
argued, but not explained in detail. Indeed these 'non-concepts' rather 
seek to mark the impossibility of any such founding moment. If we 
consider this point in the context of Gasche's discussion of the arche- 
trace it becomes clearer. 
Gasche delimits three possibilities that characterize the arche-trace. 
These are that it constitutes: the possibility of any and all relation to an 
Other; the origin of temporality; the origin of language and sense. In 
sum, it is not a thing with a sensible existence it rather constitutes the 
system of differences which provides the conditions of possibility for 
meaning. Thus Derrida remarks, "[it] does not depend on any sensible 
plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. On the contrary, [it 
constitutes] the condition of such a plenitude" (Derrida in 1974: 62 cited 
in Gasche 1994: 261, fn. 46) Nor can it be approached 
phenomenologically. It is that which allows speech and writing to 
become present, 'as such'. 
In other words, Gasche argues, the arche-trace engenders those three 
foundational elements traditionally perceived as engendering 
themselves: temporaliszation i. e. time; presence (relationship with the 
other); and speech (language). Plus their absolute (and absent) others - 
absence, space and writing. 
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Most emphatically then Derrida is not seeking the transcendental 
conditions of possibility of knowledge in a Kantian sense. 'Structures' 
(which Gasche (1986) terms 'infrastructures') such as the trace are not 
structures as in the language of metaphysics and transcendental 
philosophy, (though the language used to express them is inescapably 
drawn from these hence the problem). They rather represent what 
Gasche (1986) terms an 'irreducible nonphenomenal' that it is not 
possible to explain in the terminology and premises of transcendental 
phenomenology. The thing that perhaps marks these conditions off 
from the transcendental is that they do not merely represent the 
enabling function but also the limits of such possibilities, their 
impossibility. Though note that this is not to stress their disabling 
function. 23 It is rather to mark the limits to reflection. 
It may seem that I have rather belaboured this point. The reason for 
this is it is a very significant point that is difficult to get across and is 
often misunderstood. The general point is that dif fera n ce is not to be 
understood in terms of cause and effect because it does not represent or 
imply some sort of generative grounding. It is better understood as a 
strategy. David Wood (1988) sums up the aim of the strategy as 
transgression: "to infiltrate differance into the syntax of foundationalist 
and generative thinking with a view to depriving it of its attraction" 
(Wood 1988: 64). Added to this is the point, made earlier, about Derrida, 
acknowledging his own inescapable dependence on the language of 
metaphysics by invoking the strategy of writing under erasure. This 
would imply that his use of metaphysical concepts is in a restricted way 
and marks a recognition of their inadequacy. 
23 Mark C. Taylor (1988,1990) does this taking issue with Gasche's The Tam of the 
Mii, rro1. 
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However, Wood argues that, all this notwithstanding, the claim that 
Derrida's arguments are nevertheless formally transcendental is not 
refuted. Precisely because they depend on the use of such terms as 
differance out of erasure; that is as effectivities in practice, as producers 
of effects. In which case, Wood argues, Derrida is making use of the 
transcendental notion of causality. Thus: "It is either that Derrida uses 
transcendental forms of argument in explaining the term differance, 
in which case he undermines his whole project, or he does not, in 
which case the force of all he says about differance (and its 
intelligibility) evaporates" (Wood 1988: 65). 
However, whether or not Wood is right, I do not think the issue 
benefits from being posed (once more) in terms of this polarised 
either/ or dichotomy. It is precisely such either/ or dichotomies that 
differance seeks to avoid and displace. The problem for Derrida stems 
from having to work at the limits of, but still nevertheless within, that 
which his work puts into question. Hence, as he puts it in Positions, a 
term such as differance is 'impossible-unthinkable-unsayable' in the 
language of metaphysics, which is all that is currently available to us. 
Ethical and Political Implications 
Deconstruction involves a rejection of the Platonic notion of truth as 
alethia (or unveiling), and the concomitant view of knowledge as 
representation and associated notions of foundationalism and 
universalism. It does, nevertheless, retain a strong ethical-political 
commitment. However an important question becomes: does the 
dissolution of absolute standards and universal truth entail the 
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abandonment of all discrimination, value and critique? I would 
answer no, and so, as I understand him, would Derrida. But does to 
argue this require a means of showing how, or in what sense, 
competing knowledge claims are to be, or can be made to be, 
commensurable? Or is such vocabulary rendered inadequate in the 
radically revised notions of truth and reference, knowledge and 
meaning that differance and deconstruction involve? Moreover 
Derrida himself insists that deconstruction is an intervention (see for 
example Positions;, p. 93; 'But Beyond.. . 
(Open Letter to Anne 
McClintock and Rob NIxon'). He tries to explain how this is so in his 
response to accusations of indifference to racism in South Africa. 24 He 
points out that deconstructive readings and writings are not simply 
concerned with analysis of discourse, conceived in a narrow sense, but 
with texts in his extended use of the term. "They are also effective or 
active (as one says) interventions, in particular, political and 
institutional interventions that transform contexts without limiting 
themselves to theoretical or constative utterances, even though they 
must also produce such utterances" (Derrida, 1986a: 168) ) Indeed a 
frequent misconception of the possibilities of deconstruction and 
deconstructive practice stems from the focus on textual analysis and 
Derrida's notorious pronouncement in Of Grammatology that there is 
nothing beyond the text (discussed above). To reiterate, this is often 
(mis)understood as reducing all of social life to the status of a written 
word or a book, and it tends to be forgotten that the very meaning of 
the word 'text' has been radically, strategically extended to mean 
something more like a general economy of meaning, in order to make 
clear his fundamental point that their simply is no aspect of social 
life 
or reality that is graspable without some sort of mediation. 
Thus 
24 See 'Racism's Last Word' (Derrida 1985) 
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Derrida states: "That's why there is nothing 'beyond the text'. That's 
why South Africa and apartheid are like you and me, part of this 
general text. Which is not to say that it can be read in the way one 
reads a book. That's why the text is always a field of forces: 
heterogenous, differential, open and so on" (Derrida 1986a: 167-8). 
Nevertheless this remains an area of much contention. Although it 
often the radical political aspiration is often conceded it is the actual 
political practice that is involved that is the problem. 25 Of particular 
concern is the question of how in what sense are these political 
aspirations are to be operationalised. For example one question that is 
raised is whether deconstruction provides the means with which to 
subject institutional knowledge and social institutions to critical 
scrutiny, in order to contribute to the struggle for social change. 
However, in considering questions such as these, it needs to be borne 
in mind that deconstruction is a critical project in which the critical 
aspect stems from the process of reflection and incessant self-reflection. 
Although this may be perceived to be inadequate as a political project 
as Terry Eagleton, who is sympathetic to deconstructions political 
dimension, (despite being one of poststructuralism's biggest critics) 
sums it up, it nevertheless involves "an attempt to dismantle the logic 
by which a particular system of thought, and behind that a whole 
system of political structures and social institutions, maintains its 
25 Many commentators make this point. See for example Dews (1987), Fraser(1989) 
Habermas (1987) Although I cannot attribute intentions to Derrida without recalling 
that Derrida has done much to problematise this concept by revealing the 
undecidability and plurivocity of all texts, including his own. Indeed this is a an 
example of his strategy of 'double bind' for he both expresses his intentions, specifying 
what deconstruction is and is not, and simultaneously undermines the interpretation of 
texts through reference to the authors intentions. What I do want to emphasise here, as 
well though, is that it is not that intentions become irrelevant; it is rather that the 
content of those intentions is itself subject to deferral as I discuss in relation to Derrida's 
critique of Austin in chapter 4. 
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force". Moreover, as he goes on: "He [Derrida] is not seeking, absurdly, 
to deny the existence of relatively determinate truths, meanings, 
identities, intentions, historical continuities; he is rather seeking to see 
such things as the effects of a wider and deeper history- of language, of 
the unconscious, of social institutions and practices" (Eagleton 1983: 
148). Furthermore the implications of these deconstructive insights 
might be to highlight ambiguity where there was once certainty, 
instability where there was once perceived to be stability, but this is not, 
at the same time to deny the production of relative stability. It is rather 
to highlight the violence and suppression that is involved in that 
production. (Or maybe to recognise the significance of this instability as 
constitutive, as Deutscher (1997) does in relation to the philosophical 
tradition, and as Butler does in relation to heterosexuality, as I will 
discuss in chapter 5) 
However it is not only the feasibility of deconstruction as an 
intervention that is called into question. Even among many who 
would want to advance a sympathetic approach to Derrida's political 
intention, or as Bernstein (1991) does, vaunt the ethical-political 
horizon that permeates all his work, and who accept that the search for 
archai and a fixed centre is futile, still persist with the question: 
How can we "warrant" (in any sense of the term) the ethical- 
political 'positions' we do take? This is the question that Derrida 
never satisfactorily answers. What is worse, despite the 
overwhelming evidence of his own moral passion and his 
willingness and courage in "taking positions", he seems to call 
into question the very possibility of 'warranting' ethical-political 
positions. Or rather, it is not clear how Derrida understands the 
practice of warranting our ethical positions. What are we to 
do 
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after we realize that all archai tremble? (Bernstein 1991: 191, 
original emphasis) 
Deconstruction, in this view, contributes to the process of making the 
'archai tremble', and is even accepted as seeking to avoid nihilism, but 
it is still nevertheless castigated for failing to provide us with "an 
orientation for avoiding this abyss of nihilism" (Bernstein 1991: 191). 
Indeed for Bernstein this abyss of nihilism is not only Derrida's 
problem, but our collective problematic. 
However, since avoidance of this said abyss seems to depend on 
warranting our ethical-political positions, this criticism is surely 
misplaced or even misconceived. It stems from a failure to accept the 
radicalism and implications of deconstruction and it also seems to miss 
Derrida's point that deconstruction is always already at work in the 
philosophical texts of the West. As Bernstein himself points out, and 
indeed as I have argued earlier, Derrida deconstructs the Cartesian 
Either/ Or. He does not simply capitulate to irrationalism, nihilism etc. 
Moreover drawing on Staten (1984) Bernstein differentiates between a 
concern with the overflowing of boundaries and the defence of 
formlessness. Deconstruction is concerned with the former, not the 
latter. Hence, "The point is not that we can get along without 
boundaries, but rather that there is no 'boundary-fixing' that cannot 
itself be questioned" (Bernstein 1991: 184). Surely there is an analogy 
here, with the question of warranting positions. It is not that we 
cannot take a position. It is rather that there is no position that can be 
adopted that is not itself open to question, to deconstruction. 
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Deconstruction does not, it is true, provide an essence or ground from 
which to build a politics; no normative position, as Nancy Fraser (1989) 
argues. Nevertheless, in deconstructing all such normative 
groundings, it does not necessarily entail nihilism and the 
abandonment of all value and critical inquiry. Indeed it is the case that 
it does involve an ethics - and can contribute to an ethics of sexual 
difference, as Diprose (1992), who I discuss in the next chapter, argues. 
Indeed it involves demonstrating that value is, in fact, an inescapable 
ingredient of any restricted and general economy, and cannot be 
stepped outside of, even as it alters the basis of critical inquiry. 
Moreover, since deconstruction invites a strategy of intervention and 
reinscription, it is my contention that it can contribute usefully to the 
development of feminist theorizing about subjectivity, the body and 
gender/sexual difference. 26 The ethical basis of deconstruction lies in 
Derrida's concern with radical alterity. That which is excluded, denied, 
denigrated to produce stability, plenitude, presence. And it is this 
which is of interest to feminists concerned with the problematic of 
subjectivity, gender/ sexual difference and the body, whose focus is on 
the exclusion of the feminine and/or denigration of the female 
whether in the simultaneous equation of women with the body and 
the exclusion of the body from philosophical discourse; or the neglect 
of sexual difference in traditional philosophies of the body; or the 
exclusion of women's experiences in the history of ideas, philosophy 
etc. (all of which topics I will examine in more detail in later chapters). 
20 This is despite Derrida's own notorious anti-feminism. See for example 
'Choreographies' (Derrida and Macdonald 1982). 
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Without dif ferance, and without the 'presence of the other' Derrida 
concludes, in Of Grammatology, that there is no ethics only 
ethnocentrism reproduced in the guise of an anti-ethnocentrism 
(p. 139-40). Here he is referring to Levi-Strauss and his work among 
other cultures, but it could equally be applied to the occlusion of the 
question of sexual difference and the resultant exclusion of the female 
body from that which is traditionally conceived as the human (and on 
which traditional ethics is based); without this there is no ethics only 
androcentrism reproduced in the guise of an anti-androcentrism. 
And this is where deconstruction and di fferance can be of service to an 
ethics of sexual difference and an understanding of the inadequacy of 
traditional ethics. For example, as Diprose argues, examining issues to 
do with surrogacy, traditional approaches to ethics do not address the 
ways that "social assumptions about sexual difference constitute 
women's embodied existence as improper and secondary in relation to 
men" (blurb at beg of Bodies of Wo me n). The aspects of bodies that 
make them specifically women's bodies i. e. their reproductive capacity, 
positions them also as other to the generic human (male) body. 
Whereas "In so far as differance evokes a material remainder to the 
economy of representation which confines woman to the position of 
man's deficient other, then it indicates that the bodies of women are 
open to other possibilities" Though importantly, as she goes on, "But 
this openness of embodied experience is not an objective reality or a 
transcendental signified prior to and outside of, the work of 
signification" (Diprose 1994: 78). DTfferance as she makes plain is not 
about a pre-existing set of differences waiting to find representation. 
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However, despite her own defence of deconstruction and its relevance 
to an ethics of sexual difference, Diprose still argues that "it would be 
foolish to assume that the tendency for critics and disciples of Derrida 
to write embodiment out of deconstruction is based simply on a 
misunderstanding. The preconditions for that misunderstanding are 
no doubt there" (Diprose 1994: 79-80). For Diprose then this means 
that 'correcting' cannot be effected through highlighting particular 
parts of Derrida's work or of that of feminists who appropriate it. Since 
the focus here would be, in poststructuralist terms in the context of a 
problematics of place she argues, an ethics of sexual difference derived 
from this would need to attend to the conditions of the production of 
sexed bodies. Whereas it seems to me that this is not a shortfall in the 
deconstructive problematic. At the formal philosophical level 
deconstruction exposes the work of exclusion inherent in logocentric 
conceptions of ethics, logic, subjectivity, the body, sexual difference etc. 
It also exposes the role of the feminine as metaphor for that which is 
excluded (which I discuss in chapter 2) and at the same demonstrate the 
impossibility of its total exclusion (where could it go to if there is no 
'outside'? ) This includes the exclusion of the body as a matter of 
relevance to philosophical concerns as in the mind /body, 
subject/object dualisms even if those concerns directly involve bodies 
in the form if individuals e. g. in the fields of ethics, subjectivity, and 
citizenship). 
Meaning, moreover, is in operation at the empirical level and 
manifested in social and cultural practices. At the empirical level 
deconstructions of the practices that constitute particular cultures and 
shape their social organisation can help us to see just what is involved 
in the constitution (not simply construction) of particular bodies in 
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particular ways (See for example Spivak and the practice of female 
genital mutilation, which is sometimes euphemistically called 
clitoridectomy and/or Vicky Kirby (1987) who also discusses what a 
deconstructive reading of such practices can bring to our understanding 
of them and the role of male power in the production and valuation of 
female bodies. I merely mention these examples here but I will discuss 
them more fully Chapter 2). 
Perhaps a consideration of the point made by Derrida in his response in 
'But Beyond... ', to Anne Mclintock and Rob Nixon's open letter to him 
about 'Racism's last word', mentioned earlier, might help to 
illuminate this point. Mclintock and Nixon take Derrida to be ignoring 
the real situation by focusing on texts but he points out that 'real 
situations' are precisely the stuff of texts. Which point, of course, links 
to the earlier discussion of texts (mine and Derrida's) and Derrida's 
extension of writing beyond iconography or 'marks on a page'. This 
point cannot be grasped without an appreciation of this distinction and 
generalisation. 
Conclusion 
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, Derrida's work is complex 
and rather than attempt to summarise something that hardly bears 
summary, or get into definitional debates around the meaning of 
deconstruction, I have focused on those aspects that can most usefully 
contribute to the understanding of gendered embodiment. These will 
inform the rest of my arguments throughout the thesis. Hence the 
focus has been on the critique of the metaphysics of presence on which 
logo- and phallocentrism are based. 
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This critique rests on the close reading of a number of texts in the 
philosophical canon that demonstrate that the notion of unmediated 
presence or (self-identical knowledge) is a myth. There is always an 
absence at the heart of presence (which Derrida often characterises in 
terms of death and ghosts). By demonstrating the graphematic 
structure of speech he establishes that it too is a form of writing. The 
privileging of speech over writing that characterises logocentrism and 
the metaphysics of presence is revealed to be based on the suppression 
of the role of writing in the production and interpretation of speech. 
Even this is dependent on a prior absence - the 'principal of death 
within speech' that he refers to in Of Grammatology. Speech is 
reconceived as a form of writing consisting in a series of marks whose 
intelligibility stems from their relation to other marks in a general 
economy of meaning. It is not possible to get outside of this economy 
of meaning. There is no meaning outside of interpretation. 
There are a number of important points that I want to draw out of all 
this. These form the basis of my arguments in the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. The first one is to emphasise that there can be no 
unmediated experience since there is no meaning outside of language 
and signification. Meaning is never simply there in the text or in the 
intention of a speaker or an author. It always involves a process of 
interpretation and this also always involves a process of iteration 
(which indicates repeatability but, significantly, not closure). Meaning 
is always context specific and can only ever be fixed retrospectively. 
This is related to my second point that, although there can be no 
unmediated experience, logocentrism functions as if there could be by 
assuming that language represents reality, and meaning is fixed and 
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transparent to consciousness. This is a crucial point in the critique of 
presence and it is one to which I will return again and again in each of 
the chapters of this thesis. It is of particular importance in relation to 
the notion of undecidability because it is only in recognising the 
illusory nature of logocentric certainty that the positive possibilities of 
undecidability can come to be appreciated. 
Deconstructive insights allow us to see the undecidabilty and 
ambiguity in the categories once deemed foundational and to reveal 
the violence and dissimulation involved in the suppression of those 
ambiguities in the establishing of certainty in logocentric closure. 
Undecidability and ambiguities are revealed to be constitutive features 
of the binary oppositions that found logocentrism. Rather than a logic 
of non-contradiction, a logic of supplementarity is at work in them all 
rendering them parasitic. 
The third point I want to emphasise is that although these insights 
highlight the role of language in the constitution of reality they do not 
involve either a denial of reality in its materiality, or an insistence that 
it is only a matter of words. They do however involve rethinking the 
reference/ representation, materiality/ ideality dichotomies and 
questioning the status of the material world as something which stands 
outside significatory frameworks and shapes them. This is of 
enormous significance for rethinking sex, gender and the 
body, and for 
identity politics, as I argue in chapters 3 and 5. 
This leads me to the fourth point which is that there are two things 
that prevent Derrida's account of 'writing' or 
language and 
signification from succumbing to metaphysical closure. 
(It is important 
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for my purposes that it does so, as will eventually become clear). These 
are, one, that there is always something extra to interpretation that 
cannot be captured in interpretation (and that extra is better 
characterised in terms of dissemination rather than polysemia); and 
, two, the play of movement involved in dif fera n ce and iterability. 
What the latter means is that while repeatability is necessary to the 
possibility of meaning and communication, the iterability involved in 
differance involves movement (temporization, spacing). It is not a 
mechanical repetition as would be implied in logocentric closure 
wherein repetition is a repetition of the same. This is precisely because 
meaning is not fixed as these deconstructive insights demonstrate. 
Such a mechanical repetition would depend on the suppression of 
difference and differance. Differance. and iterability open up the space 
for concern with the other of language; of representation; of 
philosophy; of Western humanism; and anything else that exceeds 
logocentric closure. This is an important point because it is this that 
allows the possibility of difference, of change and transformation as I 
will argue in chapters 4, and 5 where I develop these insights in 
relation to Derrida's critique of Austin and Speech Act theory and 
Butler's application of this in her account of performativity. 
The fifth point that I have made in this chapter is that this view of 
language and signification does not involve the 'free play of 
differences' as is sometimes argued, but rather a way of rethinking the 
relation between identity and difference and the role of language and 
signification in the establishment or suppression of either. 
This is of 
particular importance for women because it is women who are 
located 
in a position of difference (as standard deviations 
from a male norm) 
in logocentrism. Indeed Derrida himself raises the issue of the sexual 
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structure of logocentrism when he renames it phallogocentrism as I 
discuss in chapter 2. Finally, the ethical basis of deconstruction lies in 
Derrida's concern with alterity as that which is excluded, denied, 
denigrated in order to produce stability, plenitude, presence. The 
political promise lies in the possibilities this concern opens up. 
Similarly, although these insights do remove the certainty of universal 
laws, they do not necessarily entail irrationalism, nihilism and 
relativism but rather an ethics of justice and judgment based on 
obligations and responsibilities. This can be particularly useful for 
feminists concerned with gender and sexual difference in the realm of 
ethics, as I argue in chapter 2. 
These six points form the basis of my arguments in the rest of this 
thesis. The issues raised in them form important themes that will be 
revisited in relation to fundamental debates in feminist gender and 
body theory. I argue that the deconstructive insights discussed here all 
have positive epistemological and political implications for feminists 
concerned with gender and sexual difference (in chapter 2) and for 
rethinking the interrelation of corporeality, subjectivity and sexual 
difference in theories of gendered embodiment (in Part 2). 
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Chapter 2 
Feminism and Deconstruction: 
Anti-Essentialism and the Politics of Female Subjectivityl 
Derrida's work provides a powerful critique of patriarchal metaphysics 
and the dualisms on which it is based. It destabilises these dualisms, in 
particular male /female, mind /body, subject /object, and reveals both 
the masculine/ feminine opposition at the root of conceptuality and 
women's exclusion from it (except in phallic terms). Thus both Derrida 
and feminists note the connections between the privileging of the 
sovereign subject, logocentrism and phallocentrism. 2 
However two major difficulties for feminists have been identified. 
One concerns the potentially disturbing implications of the radical 
critique of identity categories entailed in deconstruction. This amounts 
to a radical anti-essentialism that involves recognising the sheer 
undecidability of what is 'proper' to sexual difference. Identity 
categories such as woman are thereby revealed as normatively rather 
than ontologically compelled. Therefore, even as deconstruction, 
1This title is not indicative of a tendency to homogenize the great diversity of 
feminisms. It is rather I hope suggestive of an attempt to identify some of the issues 
particular feminists have raised in their respective encounters with deconstruction and 
some of the benefits of feminist appropriations of deconstruction. There is a 
deliberately broad sweep in this chapter in order to set the context for focusing on the 
particular issue of gendered subjectivity and corporeality in Part 2 of this thesis. 
2 See Feminist Studies 1988 special issue 'Feminism and Deconstruction' which 
addresses such connections in a survey of the debates around feminism and 
deconstruction in literary criticism. Derrida draws this connection in Of 
Grammatology, in his discussion of Lacan in 'The Purveyor of Truth', French Yale 
Studies, 52 also reprinted in The Post-Card and deconstructs the man/ woman binary in 
'The Double Session' in Dissemination, trans. Barbara Johnson, London: Athlone Press. 
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importantly, foregrounds the salience of sexual difference in a 
philosophical sense it nevertheless also threatens women's very sense 
of themselves, ourselves, as women. At the same time Derrida 
himself poses 'woman' and the 'feminine' as a revolutionary force 
that does not involve a political programme on behalf of 'real life' 
women. This is the source of the second major problem. Derrida's 
apparently abstract parologising thus seems to bear little relevance to 
the 'real' world of women. Indeed it rather seems to occlude the 
category woman and deny access to women's experience. Hence 
accusations of masculinism, relativism, nihilism and political 
inadequacy loom large. The connection between feminism and 
deconstruction is therefore far from unambiguous and any alliance 
would necessarily be, if not 'forever deferred' (Bartowski 1980) then at 
least 'uneasy' (Brennan cited in Cornell 1993)). Indeed many feminists 
dismiss both Derrida and deconstruction out of hand. In the course of 
this study I have found this to be especially true of British feminists, 
(discussed in chapter 5) who, in my experience, tend to favour what 
they would describe as a 'materialist' position. This they render in 
opposition to a deconstructive enterprise, without, it seems to me as 
indeed to others who espouse this view, adequately taking account of 
the materiality of the performativity of language or, relatedly, the 
insights of deconstruction3. 
Even among those more favourable to deconstruction the problem 
remains that although it would seem that feminists can use Derrida's 
work strategically to deconstruct androcentric theories and texts, 
4 the 
3 See for example Jackson 1995, Ramazanoglu 1995. 
4 Hence perhaps the earlier impact of deconstruction in US 
literary critics circles where 
it contributed centrally to the 'equality versus - 
difference' debates (e. g. see Scott X, 
Miller 1988) 
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emphasis on representation seems to neglect women's experience and 
the materiality of women's bodies. Plus the emphasis on both 
undecidability, and the exclusion of the feminine from representation, 
except in phallic terms, make it difficult to see how it can help 
feminists in a politics of sel f-representation which aims to establish a 
speaking position for female subjectivity. Or even, indeed, how it 
cannot help but actively hinder feminist praxis empirically. 
Deconstructing patriarchal or phallogocentric texts is therefore taken to 
be one thing but creating the space for women's self-representation or, 
relatedly, a place of enunciation for women, is another and the two are 
far from obviously compatible. Added to this, deconstructing the 
masculine/ feminine opposition seems to suggest that what is needed is 
a way of thinking sexual difference that avoids the hierarchical 
relations that inhabit that opposition and the violence and exclusion 
inherent within them; a way, instead, of posing sexual difference in 
non-binary terms, in terms of multiplicity, as Derrida suggests in his 
conversation with Christie Macdonald in 'Choreographies' 
(Derrida 
1982). But this raises a series of questions. What would become of the 
category woman then? Would this involve a move 'beyond gender'? 
Most importantly, would such an approach actually be of any use to 
feminists concerned with gender inequalities in a world that 
is in fact 
organized in terms of asymmetrical gender 
dualities, male /female 
dichotomies? Moreover, one argument goes, since deconstruction 
undermines or displaces modernist epistemology and 
the humanist 
subject on which it depends, it undermines 
both feminist attempts to 
establish a specifically female subject - or what 
De Lauretis (1987,1990) 
terms 'a female, feminist subject' - and the very possibility of a 
specifically feminist epistemology. 
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Moreover the question of multiplicity is a complex one. There are 
readings of Derrida that take the destabilising of binary structures in 
deconstruction to entail a celebration of multiplicity, pluralism even. 
However it seems to me that this is, if not a misreading, then at least 
an unhelpful one. As Derrida's discussions of multiplicity in relation 
to dissemination stress, deconstruction reveals the instability of 
meaning but the significance for him rests not so much on noting 
some kind of polysemia as on noting the ways in which there is always 
an excess, something 'other' that is not fully captured, or fully 
capturable, in representation (as we know it). 5 Also troubling here is 
the utopian element involved, for Derrida goes on to admit that such a 
position - to posit a non-binary, non-oppositional sexual 'otherwise' - 
is utopian. However I have to agree with Cornell (1991) and Elam 
(1994) that this form of utopianism is useful here because it does not 
involve a fixed ideal but rather implies an elsewhere to the present 
sex/gender system, even as it recognises its current inescapability. The 
utopian it is thus invoked, as Elam suggests, as the grounds of an 
exploration in which notions such as woman are destabilised both 
ideally and empirically. It "demands the continual exploration and re- 
exploration of the possible and yet also the unrepresentable" Cornell 
cited in Elam 1994: 58). This matter will be discussed further below in 
the context of the political implications of undecidabilty . 
In this chapter then I want to consider the issues that frame much of 
feminist hostility to Derrida's work through an examination of five 
aspects or consequences of deconstruction that [Anglophone] feminists 
have identified as problematic: Derrida's use of the 'feminine'; the 
rethinking of the reference/ meaning distinction; the political 
5 See for example Dissemination (Derrida 1993) 
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implications of undecidability and a politics of 'indeterminacy'; a 
putative move beyond gender; and charges of nominalism and 
formalism. 
Derrida's Use Of The 'Feminine' 
Let me begin by emphasising that for Derrida the question of sexual 
difference is a philosophical one. His concern as I have already made 
clear in chapter one is with presence and in particular the role and 
illusion of presence as a founding moment in philosophical thinking. 
However Derrida brings to this concern a focus on the ways in which 
the phallus is privileged as a mark of presence. Hence his 
disagreement with Lacan in 'The Purveyor of Truth' (reprinted in 
Derrida 1987c). Thus the logocentrism of Of Grammatology becomes 
phallogocentrism in Margins of Philosophy and Dissemination to 
indicate that intertwined with the privileging of the logos as presence 
is a privileging of the phallus as a mark of presence. Derrida 
demonstrates that the phallus and the logos are indissociable and as 
Peggy Kamuff puts it "thereby [it] indicates a certain sexual scene 
behind or before - but always within - the scene of philosophy" 
(Kamuff 1991: 314). 
Of course Derrida is not the only one to use metaphors of woman 
and/or the feminine as signs of difference or otherness. As Braidotti 
(1991) points out, woman is but one of a number of 'others' such as the 
body, the senses, or emotions endemic to philosophical debate about 
difference begun by Hegel but perhaps rooted in Kant or even 
Descartes. Indeed Braidotti suggests that woman as the sign for 
immanence, matter, that which is amorphous and inanimate is one of 
60 
the central themes of philosophical modernity. In the current 
uncertainty of contemporary life and thought "the signifiers 'woman' 
and 'the feminine' are privileged metaphors for the crisis of rational 
and masculine values" (Braidotti, 1989: 89). Derrida therefore is not the 
only one to have sexualized the question of difference and make of the 
feminine a generalised philosophical term. Braidotti (1991) traces the 
origin of this concern with the feminine to the crisis of metaphysics, 
classical rationality and philosophical discourse. 6 Indeed, as she 
argues, these have provided what Foucault might have called the 
conditions of possibility for the current theoretical interest in the 
feminine. Thus: 
In the transition form the ideas of the death of man to the 
emergence of a feminine problematic in philosophy, 
fundamental traits of the patriarchal system become manifest: its 
chronic inability to recognize a state of flow, fluidity 
incompleteness, inconclusiveness and the relational bond to the 
other. And so there emerge images of the feminine, or the 
becoming woman to compensate for the void left by the loss of 
ontological security after the exhaustion of the classical subject. 
(Braidotti 1991: 140) 
And so the trouble begins. This philosophical concern with sexual 
difference seems far removed from feminist concerns with sexual 
difference. Derrida's concern with woman, to reiterate, is as a trope for 
writing in the service of the critique of metaphysics and the Cartesian 
founding subject. He uses it to reveal the violence and dissimulation 
involved in the maintenance of the illusion of the centred, fully- 
knowing subject, logocentrism and the patriarchal symbolic order; and 
6 Braidotti (1991) situates Derrida among Deleuze, Lyotard and Foucault. 
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thereby reveals the ground of metaphysics to be undecidable. The 
question then becomes: what relevance does this concern with sexual 
difference have for specifically feminist enterprises? 
Foregrounding the centrality of sexual difference as a philosophical 
question would seem to be in keeping with feminist questions 
concerning, inter alia: 
(a) The exclusion of women from the philosophical tradition. (Indeed 
Penny Deutscher (1997) brings to bear the insights of Derrida and 
Butler on the instability of gender and applies them to the history of 
philosophy. ) 
(b) Mainstream insistence to the contrary. In Britain for example 
gender /sexual difference is a less than 'proper' philosophical concern, 
of relevance only for the mundane and women trouble-makers. This 
is evidenced by the fact that an interest in (say) feminist epistemology is 
taken as a sign of a lack of philosophical rigour - (note the space on the 
RAE panel where the feminist epistemologist should be. )7 
Does Derrida's greatest significance for feminism then lie in his 
insistence on the centrality of sexual difference and its significance as a 
philosophical question? As others have pointed out what is to be 
gained from a theoretical position rooted in deconstruction that is not 
available to a kind of feminism rooted in modern political thought is 
this posing of the question of sexual difference as a philosophical one. 
This is an important element. What renders it problematic however 
for many feminists, to reiterate, is an apparent separation from 'real 
life' women in the world that accompanies Derrida's (male) 
appropriation of 'woman' and the 'feminine'. Moreover, an even 
7This aporia is currently being addressed for the coming RAE. 
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more problematic aspect is that it is also accompanied by what Penny 
Deutscher (1997) refers to as a kind of 'constitutive instability' and 
Nancy Holland (1985) refers to as kind of 'a sexual undecidability' at 
the heart of what is conceived as the Western philosophical tradition. 
This poses taxing, if not intractable problems for feminists seeking to 
expose the 'truth' of sexual difference and associatedly, the experiences 
of women. Therefore to suggest that this concern with sexual difference 
makes Derrida's engagement with the canonical texts in the history of 
Western philosophy implicitly 'feminist', as Nancy Holland (1985) 
does, is a somewhat contentious claim, with few other adherents, and 
it is not one with which I am going to engage here. 8 My concern, in 
any case, is not so much with Derrida's own work per se, as in feminist 
appropriations of the insights and strategies to be gleaned from it and 
from what is more broadly referred to as 'deconstruction'. However, 
although my particular concern is with the role of constitutive 
instability in the production of subjectivity and, relatedly, sexual 
difference, gender and the body, it is worth examining Derrida's use of 
the figure of woman and metaphors of femininity to see what all the 
hostility is about. 
The Becoming Woman and Metaphors of Femininity 
I will begin by examining one aspect of deconstruction that many 
feminists consider to be the most problematic. Derrida's catachretic use 
811 is however worth recounting her point. She focuses on Derrida's engagement with 
Heidegger's 'The Origin of the Work of Art' in 'Restitutions' in The Truth in Painting 
(Derrida 1987b) as a means of demonstrating her point. She emphasises that here 
Derrida is suggesting that it is precisely because Heidegger "does not depart 
from the 
metaphysical tradition in his treatment of women that he in some ways still remains 
within that tradition" (p. 223). Her argument is that the undecidability that 
Derrida 
consistently highlights in the texts of the metaphysical tradition, 
from Plato onwards, 
is partly a sexual undecidability and it is this that makes 
his work feminist. 
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of the term 'woman', i. e. his use of the term woman as a metaphor for 
which there is no literal referent, and his use (from 1981 onwards) of 
metaphors of femininity and associated hinge words such as hymen, 
invagination etc. 9 I do this through a principle focus on, and close 
reading of, Derrida's reading of Nietzsche and 'Woman' in Spurs. 
Focusing on Rosi Braidotti (1991) and Kelly Oliver (1995) I consider 
arguments that Derrida's turn to the 'becoming woman' of philosophy, 
despite opening up philosophy to its hitherto excluded 'others' - "the 
body, unconscious, non-meaning, even the feminine" is Kelly Oliver's 
list (Oliver 1995: xi) - nevertheless still precludes the feminine voice or 
subject position. 
Braidotti and Oliver are but two examples of the many feminists who 
have taken exception to Derrida's use of the figure of woman in this 
way. The main problems stem from a concern with the implications of 
this use of 'woman' for the concrete bodies in the world to whom the 
category 'woman' is applied - i. e. the, albeit diverse, subjects of 
feminism. What are the implications for both the historical experience 
of women in the world and for a specifically feminist politics? Is this as 
Braidotti (1991) argues, yet another form of 'unacknowledged 
masculinism' which paradoxically serves to maintain the exclusion of 
women from philosophy? How useful then is this concern with sexual 
difference and what are the implications of following Derrida's 
displacement of traditional epistemological assumptions as a means of 
reconceptualising the feminine in non-dualistic terms? 
10 Moreover 
and perhaps most importantly in the light of these issues, is the use of 
the trope of 'woman' in this way a necessary aspect of deconstruction? 
9 In Dissemination for example he uses the figure of the hymen and invagination. See 
Cornell (1991) for a useful discussion of Derrida's use of these terms. 
10 This is a strategy advocated by Susan Hekman (1995). 
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Other crucial questions are: What becomes of the feminine when it is 
turned into a generalized philosophical term? What are the 
implications for female subjectivity and for affirming the feminine in 
sexual difference? Is Derrida's use of the becoming woman a form of 
appropriation? Does identifying the undecidable with woman and the 
feminine position them outside philosophy, as Oliver (1995) argues 
and if so in what sense does it preclude a speaking position for 
women? Is it the case as Oliver also argues that despite his overt 
attempts to avoid it Derrida remains caught within the logic of 
castration, in which everything is defined in terms of the masculine (p. 
xv)? 
In order to address these questions and the arguments of Oliver and 
Braidotti I will now turn to Spurs/Eperons (Derrida 1979) to examine 
what Derrida means by writing like a woman. 
Spurs/Eperons 
One of the things Derrida does in Spurs, as Spivak (1984) points out, is 
to follow Nietzsche in expounding the stereotypical, patriarchal view 
of the feminine as that which is elusive. He seizes on that now surely 
infamous, contextless fragment of Nietzsche's writing considered 
posthumously, 'I have forgotten my umbrella' to exemplify the point 
that without a context it is simply not possible to decide what it means 
or meant. He then uses this as a metonym for all meaning and, again 
following Nietzsche, exemplifies this undecidability 'as that which is 
ultimately elusive, undecidable, etc., as a metaphor for undecidability. 
Thus Derrida uses this notion of woman as his model for 'writing' as 
in his extended sense (as discussed in chapter 1), or, as 
Teresa de 
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Lauretis puts it, "for the critical operation of questioning, doubting, or 
deconstructing all truths" (De Lauretis, 1987: 48). In other words the 
'becoming woman'. 
Hence although Spurs is basically a discussion of Nietzsche's texts and 
Heidegger's interpretation of them, Derrida announces in the opening 
lines that his subject is woman. What he means however is 
undecidability. Woman is posed as the figure for undecidability. 
Derrida wants to show that there is no such 'thing' as woman and 
focuses on the multitude of meanings of woman in Nietzsche's 
writings to do so. He adds to this a discussion of the undecidabilty of 
the meaning of these texts themselves, as indeed any texts, to show that 
not only is the meaning of woman undecidable, indeterminate, non- 
essential, so too is the meaning of man and of sexual difference itself, 
even while, (most significantly for me) "all of ontology nonetheless, 
with its inspection, appropriation, identification and verification of 
identity, has resulted in concealing, even as it presupposes it, this 
undecidability" (Derrida 1979: 103-4). 
So although one theme might seem to be Nietzsche's famous 
positioning of woman as 'the untruth of truth' Derrida's stylistic 
ruminations are not so much about revealing the truth of woman, 
what woman 'is', as examining the undecidability of the category and 
the impropriety of this as a question. This is an important point and 
one that is sometimes missed, especially where Derrida's position 
is 
confused with Nietzsche's. It is particularly important 
in connection 
with the analysis of propriation to which I will come a 
little later. For 
now I want to examine Oliver's argument. 
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Oliver's Argument 
Oliver discusses Derrida in a seminal work that places him in the 
context of Nitezsche and Freud, and argues that certain of Derrida's and 
indeed Nietzsche's rhetorical strategies serve to exclude the feminine 
and woman. This is because they close off the possibility of a specifically 
feminine other. She argues that they like Freud "at a crucial point.. .f all 
back into a phallocentric discursive economy that excludes any active 
participation by the feminine or woman" (Oliver 1995: xii). Hence 
identifying the undecidable with woman and the feminine situates 
both outside of the discourse of philosophy. Not only is man posed as 
the subject, i. e. a masculine subject, and woman as an object, i. e. a 
feminine object but she argues, this is an intrinsic rather than 
contingent aspect. This is evidenced by the way each addresses a 
masculine audience. 11 Oliver also argues that, like Nietzsche, 
"Derrida's strategies of self parody are strategies of self-violence that 
feminise philosophy by emasculating it and in so doing presume that 
the feminine is merely the lack of the masculine" (Oliver 1995: xii). In 
other words becoming woman for Derrida, adopting Nietzsche's 
strategy of self-parody redescribed as autocastration, in this view 
involves adopting reading and writing strategies that are feminised by 
means of emasculation and self-violence. This results in taking the 
place of the feminine. 
In other words Oliver argues that Derrida's use of the figure of 
woman in Spurs would seem to be a(n phallocratic) act of 
appropriation. This results in both precluding the possibility of 
11 Note it is not my concern to compare Derrida's position with Nietszche's and /or 
Freud's here. I simply mention this to situate Oliver's argument. See Oliver 1995. 
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alternative ways of doing philosophy and continuing to exclude a 
specifically feminine 'other'. The point for Oliver is that 
acknowledging the feminine other of philosophy in this way involves 
a "double murder-suicide"; the feminine cannot be acknowledged 
without also being annihilated (p. xiv). 
However, as I have argued above, Derrida uses the figure of woman as 
a metaphor for writing and dif fe ra n ce, etc. - in other words as a 
metaphor for indeterminacy non-conceptuality and the non-truth of 
truth - and therefore as a means of subverting logocentrism. It is true, 
as Braidotti suggests, that his use of the feminine is not about the 
feminine personified in female bodies. Derrida uses the notion of 
'becoming woman' strategically, as a means of adopting a philosophic 
stance from which to disrupt phallogocentrism. Phallogocentrism is 
based on determinacy, foundationalism, universal truth and 
unequivocal meaning, sustained through various acts of naming and 
appropriation in a (phallic) logic of non-contradiction that involves 
(masculine) identity and sameness and suppresses difference and 
contradiction. Therefore a process of questioning that determinacy by 
revealing it to be illusory, as deconstructive strategies do, undermines 
and subverts it. One of the ways Derrida does this is to 'write like a 
woman'. 
Braidotti 
Braidotti argues that Derrida's notion of the 'becoming woman' of 
philosophy that he develops in Spurs/Eperons is but "the most striking 
example of metaphorization of the feminine with a view to better 
assimilate it to a falsely neutral mode of thinking" (Braidotti 1991: 98). 
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And it is that I want to consider next. Although it seems to me that 
this accusation of aspirations to a 'false neutrality' do not take account 
of the radical nature of what is involved in the deconstructive process, 
this line of argument does find resonance with many feminists and 
identifies what in fact is problematic for feminism. 
For Derrida, as indeed Braidotti acknowledges, it is the absence of any 
symbolic representation of woman or the feminine in the symbolic 
order that renders them viable counter-strategies with which to 
destabilise the symbolic. In other words he uses the term woman as a 
metaphor for undecidability to illustrate the illusory nature of 
phallogocentrism and contra Lacan challenge phallogocentric 
metaphysics. Woman is reinscribed to name the precondition for the 
functioning of the phallogocentric symbolic order and notions such as 
becoming woman and metaphors of femininity are used as a means of 
subverting the binary logic of non-contradiction on which logocentric 
closure is based. 
However Braidotti arrives at her conclusion by positing this notion of 
'woman' only in Derrida's earlier works. Drawing on Spivak (1984) 
she identifies two phases in Derrida's thought on the question of what 
she refers to as 'the receding origin' and the 'sexuation of the subject' 
and draws out their respective implications for his view of the 
feminine and Woman. The first is found in his earlier works (where 
and indeed because of it, he takes issue with Jacques Lacan and 
psychoanalysis) 12. The figure of woman is used as a necessary alterity 
12"The Purveyor of Truth' Yale French Studies, 52,51-113 (first published in 1975 as 
'La factueur de la verit(-', Poetique, 21, pp. 96-147) also reprinted in The Post Card: 
From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1987c). Derrida discusses Lacan in 'La Lettre volee', 
Ecrits, Paris Seuil, 1966, vol. 1, pp. 19-78, translated as 'Seminar on "The purloined 
letter"', Yale French Studies, 48 (1972), pp. 39-72. Also see Spivak 1984 'Love me love 
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and as such the precondition for logocentrism: "it is the sign of the 
false necessity that allows the symbolic order to function along 
phallogocentric lines" (Braidotti (1991: 101). This acknowledges the 
sexuation of the subject and the importance of sexual difference. In the 
second, influenced more by Heidegger, Derrida posits the originary 
moment, that is the origin of the subject, in terms of ontological 
difference. However, here, following Heidegger, ontological difference 
is distinguished from sexual difference. Hence the subject is 
desexualized as sexual difference is regarded as derivative rather than 
constitutive of the subject. It is only the first phase then, Braidotti 
argues, that results in valorizing the feminine as a counter-strategy. 
The second involves both a celebration of the feminine and an attack 
on feminist positions. In other words it is the second phase where 
Derrida is influenced by Heidegger that Bradiotti finds suspect and 
denounces as falsely neutral. It seems to Braidotti that what is 
involved here is a kind of 'double-dealing'. Derrida both posits the 
feminine as a metaphor for deconstruction and the becoming woman 
of philosophy as a stance or (non) place of enunciation from which he 
as a male philosopher can attempt to disrupt the phallocentric 
tradition. Yet he simultaneously locates feminism itself within that 
very phallocratic order the 'becoming woman' seeks to disrupt. 13 
What Braidotti finds problematic about Derrida's Heidegger and this 
distinction between what for Heidegger is ontological difference and 
sexual difference is that it involves assuming a certain neutrality, such 
my ombre, eile' Diacritics, 1/4 (Winter 1984), pp. 19-36 who discusses this. See 
Braidotti (1991: 98-108) for a helpful discussion of Derrida's debate with Lacan; see 
also chapter 4 and 5). 
13 For discussions of Derrida's notorious anti-feminism see for example 
'Choreographies', Derrida and Christie Macdonald (1982) and/or 'Women in the 
Beehive' Derrida (1987) 
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that the sexuation of the subject is differentiated from the 
subjectification of the subject, thereby "postulating a neither masculine 
nor feminine as a space which can be thought and envisaged" 
(Braidotti 1991: 106). However it seems to me that Braidotti is here 
confusing Derrida's approach with Heidegger's. For example in 
Derrida's analysis of Heidegger in a number of places Derrida takes 
Heidegger to task precisely for neglecting sexual difference14. For 
Derrida, as suggested for example in Spurs, the question of sexual 
difference is undecidable - even as in all ontology it is presumed to be 
both decidable and decided. That is his point. His work, in making the 
question of sexual difference a philosophical question, attempts to 
undo that decision or at least examine the elements that enter into its 
production. It also thus pre-empts the rendering of sexual difference as 
derivative of ontological questions that, he argues, is characteristic of 
phallogocentrism. Moreover because of this, and Derrida's insistence 
on an originary difference in opposition to the phallogocentric positing 
of an originary unity or sameness, he does not posit an originary unity 
or neutrality before sexual difference. His concern is with the way that 
sexual difference is presented in (negative) binary terms in 
phallogocentrism. What he picks up on in a positive way in 
Heidegger's distinction between sexual difference and ontological 
difference in his discussion in 'Geschlechte' which is, as Peggy Kamuff 
puts it "a sense of neuter which is not simply negative (neither... nor) 
and which therefore does not imply an absence of sex. What is 
neutralized is sexual difference as a binary pair" (Kamuff 1991: 379). 
Derrida embraces this as a move towards thinking sexual difference in 
terms of multiplicity and dispersion, avoiding the negativity associated 
14 See for example 'Geschlechte: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference'(Derrida 
1983); 'Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing' in The Truth in Painting (Derrida 1987b). 
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with duality and phallogocentrism; not as a means of rendering sexual 
difference derivative of ontological difference. 
However despite these criticisms Braidotti is right to argue that 
Derrida's sexualization of difference does not relate directly to concrete 
bodies in the world and so it is worth considering her concern that this 
therefore marks a significant divergence from feminists approaches to 
the question of sexual difference. 
For Braidotti, if the metaphor bears no relation to 'real-life' women, it 
is suspect. Not only is it not helpful to women but there is something 
pernicious about its use in this way. What it amounts to is a 
furtherance of the masculinist discourse of philosophy -a system 
which she reminds us is 'both closed and foreclosed to women'. Not 
only does it lead to Derrida's now infamous anti-feminism but it 
serves to further the interests of philosophy at the expense of the 
interests of women. 
There are two related points to be made here. The first is that the 
different phases of deconstruction that Braidotti identifies invoke a 
chronology that is misleading. For, as Derrida reminds us in Positions, 
his work is not to be conceived in terms of linearity but rather more 
like a web, contrapuntally. The second and related point is that it is 
possibly more useful to see these two phases in terms of the two phases 
of deconstruction: reversal and displacement (which Derrida also 
reminds us are not to be conceived of chronologically but rather 
structurally). While reversing the male/female dichotomy and 
revalorizing the feminine may well be a politically necessary strategy, 
as Derrida himself admits in his discussion with Christie Macdonald in 
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'Choreographies', it cannot succeed as a goal in itself as some radical 
feminist thought would have it. This is because this would be to 
remain within the binary logic of logocentrism and perpetuate the 
hierarchies that defined women and all things feminine as inferior in 
the first place and which is not a contingent aspect but actually integral 
to logocentrism. What is required for radical change, then, is a 
transformation of the logic (paralogics), of the structures of thought 
themselves. Hence the need for displacement via what Derrida terms 
the logic of supplementarity or supplementary logic that inhabits such 
notions as becoming woman, and his other feminine metaphors. 
Thus Derrida's use of feminine terms such as hymen, invagination 
etc. is not to reverse the privileging of the masculine in order to 
privilege the feminine as in a hysterocentric or vaginocentric 
strategy. 15 He uses them rather as 'hinge' words that demonstrate a 
paradoxical, supplementary logic at work. Supplementary logic is a key 
theme in Derrida's critique of presence in Of Grammatology. It 
involve the demonstration of it work in key texts that would seem to 
deny it (e. g. in relation to Plato, Levi-Strauss and Rouasseau). Aspects 
that are taken to be derivative or supplementary are revealed to be 
rather intrinsic. In relation to binary logic this means that rather than 
either term being autonomous or whole in itself and oppositional they 
are in fact relational. Each depends for its meaning on the other and 
on the exclusion or suppression of that which would contradict this 
logic. This then displaces the binary logic of non-contradiction that 
characterises phallogocentrism. The significance of the notion of 
supplementary logic is that it is not just the binaries that are 
undermined but the logic on which they are based. Through this is 
15 See Jardine (1985) and Holland (1985) respectively. 
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revealed the violence, exclusion and dissimulation that is necessary to 
the notions of plenitude, presence, identity, subject/ object dichotomy 
etc. that characterize logocentrism. To give an example to clarify this in 
relation to my discussion of the use of feminine metaphors and hinge 
words, in his discussion of Mallarme in 'The Double Session' in 
Dissemination, Derrida uses the term 'hymen' as a hinge word, as a 
means of deconstructing the binary and/or logic of opposition, because 
it is a fusion, a both/ and. It is what he terms a 'medium' in that it 
embraces both the terms of an opposition - in this case inside/ outside - 
and thereby confuses them. This then is not to replace one binary 
concept with another which would simply repeat the phallocratic 
gesture. It is rather to replace the unitary with the disseminated in 
which there is always an excess, that which spills over, which cannot be 
captured. That is "the always already divided generation of meaning" 
(Derrida 1993: 268). The same is true of the use of the notion of 
becoming woman, which, in naming woman as excess displaces the 
notion of unitary truth. Thus Derrida is aiming at displacement and 
his anti-feminism stems from a perceived need to move beyond 
logocentric closure (whether phallic or hysterocentric since both feed 
on posing sexual difference in oppositional terms) to posing sexual 
difference in non-dualistic, more fluid terms within an alternative 
structure of logic 
Furthermore, in examining the ways in which woman and the 
feminine are represented and repressed, they become a disruptive 
force 
in what Derrida characterizes in Spurs as 'affirmative 
deconstruction'. 
It is affirmative in that the deconstruction of the man/woman 
opposition in Nietzsche's texts opens it up to the undecidability of 
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what is proper to either and the possibilities this brings for 
understanding sexual difference in non-oppositional terms. 
Derrida provides an allegorical reading of the feminine then to open 
the possibility of moving beyond a binary understanding of sexual 
difference which, he argues, structures western thought and practice. 
This involves gesturing towards the possibility of thinking sexual 
difference otherwise. For Derrida it has to be a matter of gesturing, an 
opening onto, because the aim is not simply to replace one concept 
with another, or reverse existing hierarchies within the existing 
conceptual structure - characterized here as logocentrism and 
elsewhere as phallogocentrism - but to actually disrupt the conceptual 
structure itself. As it is not possible to simply step outside it and adopt 
a neutral, asexual, gender free position, since such a position always 
bears the masculine hallmark even while it effaces it, the aim is to 
mime the feminine strategically in order to reveal the limits of 
logocentrism and phallogocentric categories. In so doing it provides 
the space for future possibilities, as yet unknown and unknowable 
'revolutions as yet to come' as he puts it in Limited Inc. (p. 243)16. 
Spivak and the Question of Propriation 
If I turn now to Spivak (1989) in Deconstruction and Feminism again' 
it might shed further light on this area. Spivak, who is often described 
as "a Marxist feminist deconstructivist" (Spivak 1987: ix ) argues that 
"feminism should keep to the critical ways of deconstruction but give 
up its attachment to that specific name for the problem/ solution of 
16 Spivak (1980) discuses this idea in relation to iterability, citation, and the 
performative role of language in the context of the Derrida - 
Searle debate. 
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founded programs" Spivak 1989: 206ß. In this view she, like Braidotti, 
finds Derrida's use of the figure of woman in this way to be 
'unacknowledged masculinism' but nevertheless stresses the need to 
negotiate with deconstruction (and other aspects of European anti- 
humanist thought such as Nietzsche). Her argument centers around a 
discussion of 'propriation' in both Derrida and the Nietzsche of 
Derrida's interpretation in Spurs. 17 
Propriation is one of the main themes in Spurs. Indeed it is one of the 
main themes in Derrida's work generally and here, as indeed 
elsewhere, it is tied to the question of sexual difference. Derrida takes 
issue with Heidegger's notion of Being - Dasein - as neutral, prior to 
sexual difference, and his distinction between ontological difference 
and sexual difference, through a discussion of the question of 
propriation. Derrida argues that Heidegger's view of sexual difference 
is based on a process of propriation because the very possibility of 
sexual difference, and indeed ontological difference, involves the 
question of the proper. The question of the proper is therefore prior to 
both. Furthermore in each case it is undecidable. 
Spivak argues that Derrida's use of the figure of woman then can be 
seen as an act of nami ng that is not an act of propriation in the usual 
phallocratic sense. Displacing and reinscribing the term 'woman' as a 
mark in the chain d1ffe ra nce, writing etc. (that is as a non-concepts in 
17 Spivak refers to Derrida's 'non-concepts' writing, woman as 'names of 'the 
problem/ solution of founded programs'. She explains: 'I put it so awkwardly because 
so-called 'political' academics will still insist that writing is only script and make the 
blindingly brilliant critique that Derrida ignores mothers talking to infants" (Spivak 
1989: 206) She acknowledges that where she went wrong in 'Displacement' was in not 
recognizing the significance of this act of naming. Thus "I missed the fact that in 
Derrida's reading of Nietzsche in Spurs there is an insistence that 'woman' in that text 
was a concept-metaphor that was also a name marking the pre-ontological as 
propriation in sexual difference" (p. 206). 
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the sense that it involves the play of absence and presence and is never 
present to itself) is an attempt to avoid the violence, appropriation and 
expropriation which characterizes the phallocratic act of naming. 
She warns here against making the same mistake that she herself made 
earlier. That is, despite a strong tendency to the contrary, 
deconstruction should not be read only as a narrative of the de- 
decentred subject. It also needs to be recognised as a morphology. The 
main focus of deconstruction as a morphology is the graphematic 
structure. This is the structure of constant deferral and displacement 
and of repetition at the origin of meaning that is repressed in 
phallogocentrism. Derrida uses the term woman as he does others, e. g. 
differance, trace, writing etc., as names for this graphematic structure in 
which all names are catachretic. They have to be, precisely because 
they are produced in a process of deferral and deferment and in which 
there simply is no one to one referent or reference. Deconstruction 
then involves more, or rather even other than, the decentring of the 
subject. It is rather about the production of the subject as centred. 
Indeed as I discussed in chapter one, describing the implications of the 
deconstruction of the classical subject of modernity as decentred has 
had problematic implications, most particularly a tendency to associate 
it somehow with the dissolution or denial of the subject. Derrida takes 
issue with these implications in a number of places. For example in an 
eighties interview entitled "'Eating Well", or the calculation of the 
subject' (Derrida 1991) he denies that the deconstruction of subjectivity 
involves the dissolution of the subject. Spivak, a little later, sums up 
the issues well: 
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You see, deconstruction is not an exposure of error. As Derrida 
says, and now I am quoting, "Logocentrism is not a pathology, " it 
is the thing that enables us - except, if because it enables us, we 
say that it is correct, it would be a mistake. That is all he is saying. 
So that, in fact all he looks at is the way in which the subject 
centres itself. He is not decentring the subject. There is no way in 
which a subject can be anything but centred. But the fact that the 
subject is centred begins with [that] kind of unendorsable error. 
That doesn't mean that the subject can be decentred. There is no 
such thing as the decentred subject..... [For] he is describing the 
necessary centring of a subject in terms of a para-centrality that 
cannot be yet makes the centring of being possible' Therefore, 
'Feminism must negotiate with the structures of 
phallocentrism, because in fact that is what enables us. 
(Spivak 1990, p. 146-7)18 
And it is the problem of how to do this that is the chief concern of this 
thesis. 
Importantly then, what I think this means is that this does not stop 
others from using the processes and strategies of deconstruction any 
more than it prevents us from challenging those existing 
understandings of what it is to be feminine (or masculine), i. e. . the 
historically and culturally specific content of the metaphor. Indeed 
note, we can both challenge this unacknowledged masculinism and 
that specific content via those very processes and strategies themselves. 
Nevertheless there remains the problem of the relationship between 
the 'becoming woman' in deconstruction and women as embodied 
18 For further discussion of the deconstruction of the subject see Cadava et al (1991) 
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beings. As Kirby puts it with reference to Spivak's argument "I am not 
convinced that the name 'woman' can be thought of as just a name, a 
catachresis without a literal referent. I have tried to argue that this 
name, albeit a wrong name, is never immaterial. For if women matter 
at all, it is as this word's embodied realisation" (Kirby 1991: 100). 
However I would add to this problematic two deconstructive points 
gleaned from the above analysis of Spurs. First, the fact that there is 
no literal referent of the category woman is a function of the 
graphematic structure of sense and reference and an associated inability 
of categories to fully capture what is in an essential sense. Second, if 
the question of what woman 'is' is undecidable this then raises the 
issue of what goes into the production of woman as this words 
embodied realisation. At the same time it is true that individual 
women are produced and experience themselves and their identities 
within particular locations within the confines, or what Judith Butler 
would call constitutive constraint, of that words performativity. Hence 
the significance of the materiality of the signifier. 'Woman' then 
becomes not so much a 'wrong' name, as Kirby suggests, (what would 
be a 'right' one? ) as perhaps a harmful one. 
The discussion of Butler and 'injurious speech' in chapter 5 further 
illuminates this point. However, for now, one way of thinking 
through this problem it seems to me is to set it in the context of the 
problem of affirming the feminine. For deconstructive feminisms the 
key to the question of sexual difference lies in revaluing and affirming 
the feminine in non-phallic terms and the main problem within this is 
how to do so without succumbing to essentialism. Perhaps the answer 
to Braidotti's and Kirby's point about the feminine in deconstruction 
not being tied to real-life women is that not tying the feminine to real- 
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life women avoids attributing to female bodies/ subjects a "humanist 
essence of womanhood". 19 It allows us on the one hand to 
deconstruct the symbolic operations at work in the 
exclusion/ denigration of the feminine en route to its revaluation. 
Deconstruction is vital here. We also need to deconstruct the processes 
involved in the construction of femininity and masculinity and 
challenge the power relations that these differences underpin. This 
involves deconstructing is the processes involved in both defining 
certain attributes as feminine and others as masculine, and their 
inscription on the bodies and identities of individual men and women. 
This will reveal the power relations involved and in so doing open up 
the possibility for resistance, challenge and transformation. (These 
power relations are inherent within the discursive practices that 
structure our lives and are constitutive of our being as women or 
indeed as men. ) 
This brings me back to the initial point I raised at the start of this 
chapter concerning the threat to women's sense of ourselves as women 
that accompanies the critique of identity categories involved in 
deconstruction. Indeed it is this that makes the whole problem of 
rethinking sexual difference, posing it 'otherwise', so intractable and 
apparently politically unpropritious for women. 
Materiality and Ideality 
What is at issue in the debates of the previous section is the distinction 
between materiality and ideality, meaning and reference, theory and 
practice. This distinction has been an important aspect 
in the 
19Qjjs Weedon uses this phrase (1987: 81). 
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continued occlusion of sexual difference, gender and the body from 
philosophical significance and the realm of pure reason, pure 
consciousness and theory, or whatever. It has also been an important 
aspect in feminist reluctance to embrace Derridian insights. To fully 
appreciate the significance of deconstruction and deconstructive 
strategies for feminists concerned with gender/ sexual difference and 
the body involves accepting the significance of the deconstruction of 
the reference/ meaning dichotomy (see chapters 3 and 5 for further 
discussion on this matter). This distinction neglects the effects of the 
materiality of meaning. That is it does not accommodate the impact of 
meaning (words, signifiers, discourses, frameworks of thinking etc. ) on 
materiality ('things). 
What is being contested in the deconstructive move is the idea that 
there is a referent that stands outside of the system of meaning and in 
some way renders those meanings true or false; that there is an 
unmediated reality that meaning refers to and that a distinction can be 
made between objects in the world and the system of meaning through 
which we make sense of them. In structuralist terms this is the 
distinction between the sign and the signifier on the one hand and the 
referent on the other. In deconstruction this distinction is rejected. 
Indeed this is the defining characteristic that marks the move from 
structuralism to poststructuralism (which could be said to be 
deconstruction's theoretical allegiance, as it were). 20 The argument 
201t is not my concern to debate the relative merits of the various approaches embraced 
within the term poststructuralism or to debate its meaning in any 
depth. It is rather my 
aim to demonstrate the merits of approaching the question of theorising gender and 
the 
body from a feminist perspective building on and adapting insights taken from the 
work of Jacques Derrida. His work often attracts the 
label poststructuralist and I have 
no argument to make against that. Nor do I consider the question of postmodernism, 
either in terms of an epochal shift 
from the modern to the postmodern, or in terms of the 
philosophical underpinnings of this putative shift. 
Again, I am interested in the 
insights to be gleaned from Derrida's work, not broad-based categories to describe it. 
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from poststructuralism is that reality, the referent, is socially 
constructed, produced through meanings, which themselves have a 
materiality: the materiality of the signifier. 
From a deconstructive perspective the focus would be on the way that 
objects, and subjects, in the world (in this case the body, sex, gender, the 
'I' that founds the Cartesian subject) come to be through those systems 
of meaning. This is because the basic premise is not simply the 
Kantian idea that we cannot have access to an unmediated reality (or 
materiality) it is rather that there is no unmediated reality. Reality is 
interpretation all the way down. It is mediated through language even 
as, in Derridian terms, reality is never fully captured by language. 
Hence what is described as the failure of representation. 
Derrida develops his analysis of the way this works through the 
performativity of language: performative acts bring into being, that 
which they name. I will discuss this in more detail in chapters 4 and 5. 
For now I want to emphasise that a highly significant aspect of this 
though, for me and for my argument in this thesis, is that this is not a 
to to lTsi ng gesture. It involves acknowledging also the ultimate failure 
of representation, in this case the performative and, relatedly, 
acknowledging that there is an originary violence at work in the 
production of meaning. (This also relates to the analysis of dif fe ra nce 
and dissemination discussed in chapter 1). If these insights are applied 
to the concerns of this chapter it becomes clear that the 
reference/ meaning dichotomy is inadequate to understanding the 
production of gendered subjectivities, embodied men and women, and 
the ways in which these aspects are intrinsically interwoven with 
racial, class and a myriad other socially produced bodily inscriptions. 
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Indeed Spivak (1987,1989) turns to deconstruction in order to avoid 
essentialist notions of women. Moreover, pace other widespread 
(mis)understandings of deconstruction, she demonstrates that, far from 
precluding attention to experience, deconstructive strategies actually 
enable attention to be paid to the experience of specifically female 
bodies. Thus Spivak uses deconstruction as a means of attending to the 
corporeal specificity of specifically female bodies whilst simultaneously 
avoiding essentialism yet retaining an economic analysis. The point is 
that essentialist notions of women are rejected since the meaning of 
'woman' is produced within an unstable process of deferral and 
deferment rather than by any originary, essential moment. Moreover, 
understanding the production of meaning in this way, she argues, 
enables attention to mediating factors in women's experiences of their 
own bodies and the functions of this for multinational capitalism For 
example Spivak demonstrates the role male censorship plays in 
women's experience of their bodies in relation to the practice of 
clitoridectomy and other practices of female genital mutilation. In 
'French Feminism in an International Frame' she tries to 'bridge the 
gap' between the apparently abstract speculations of French 'feminists' 
Cixous, Kristeva and Irigaray and the materiality of patriarchal 
capitalist social organisation and practices (Spivak 1987). She does this 
by discussing the parallels between practices of clioridectomy and other 
forms of female genital mutilation in Third world countries and the 
theoretical effacement of the clitoris in Western discourses on sexuality 
and femininity that the feminists she discusses attempt 
in different 
ways to reclaim. These discourses, it is argued, structure the social 
organisation, institutions and practices that support contemporary 
multinational capitalism. 
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One of the ways they do this is though 'the uterine norm of 
womanhood'. Spivak argues that this 'uterine norm of womanhood' 
is based on the effacement of the clitoris as either the site or the 
possibility of women's autonomous sexuality; and womanhood. She 
discerns a uterine social organization at work which is explained as 
"the arrangement of the world in terms of the reproduction of future 
generations, where the uterus is the chief agent and means of 
production" (p. 152). This arrangement cannot simply be written off 
and replaced with clitoral social organization, rather it needs to be 
situated so that its dependence on the exclusion of a clitoral 
organization is understood. Moreover, she argues, "Investigation of 
the effacement of the clitoris - where clitoridectomy is a metonym for 
women's definition as 'legal object as subject of reproduction' would 
persistently seek to de-normalize the uterine social organization" 
(p. 153). 
She argues that this uterine norm of womanhood supports the 'phallic 
norm of capitalism' (p. 153) thus capitalist economics hinges on home- 
ownership and the nuclear family in the West whilst, 
At the other end of the spectrum, it is this ideologico-material 
repression of the clitoris as the signifier of the sexed subject that 
operates the specific oppression of women, as the lowest level of 
the cheap labour that the multi-national corporations employ by 
remote control in the abstraction of absolute surplus-value in 
the less developed countries. (Spivak 1987: 153) 
Her point is that clitoridectomy is presupposed by both patriarchy and 
the family. Therefore in her view, in order to work 'against sexism 
and for feminism' feminists need to develop 
heterogenous sex 
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analyses so that the suppression of women in excess (the clitoris, sexual 
desire, fulfillment outside, beyond, alongside reproductive sexual 
relations ) is "pursued in all its 'historical', 'political', and social 
dimensions" and in so doing undo the ideologico-material opposition. 
To put this another way, as Bennett (1992) does "the issue of 
clitoridectomy - whether taken literally or figuratively, whether 
performed on the body or through language - is consequently the place 
where politics and theory come together" (Bennett 1993: 11). However 
although I would agree that the theoretical and practical effacement of 
the clitoris is of significance for feminist analyses and investigating this 
effacement is perhaps a necessary endeavour in revisioning female 
sexuality and subjectivity and indeed the category woman. I would 
also argue that this is but one strategy among others in developing a 
theory of embodied subjectivity that can and does, take account of 
sexual difference. Furthermore, the trouble is that to simply replace 
the phallus with the clitoris as a physical site of female sexual agency, 
as Bennett seems to suggest, is to continue to speak in phallic terms. A 
dualistic understanding of sexuality and sexual difference is retained 
along with the male focus on the end result, i. e. orgasm, rather than 
the whole multitude of events that are involved in female sexuality, 
erotic experience and desire. 
Gender/Beyond Gender 
Having examined the main problems associated with Derrida's use of 
the feminine, and the implications of deconstructive strategies for the 
theory/practice distinction, I now want to consider the implications of 
the undecidabilty of women for feminist use of the category woman. 
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Of particular concern is whether this radical anti-essentialism requires 
a move beyond gender and/or the abandonment of woman as a generic 
term. This involves examining how these issues impact on debates 
within feminism around the difficulties inherent in the use of category 
woman, and the move beyond gender that relinquishing this category 
would involve. 
The use of woman as generic category has for some time proved 
problematic for feminist praxis. For example, Elizabeth Spelman (1988) 
in her seminal contribution to feminist theory argues forcefully against 
homogenizing the category woman. She cites Gwendoline Brooks 
saying "The juice from tomatoes is not called merely juice. It is always 
called TOMATO juice" (Spelman 1988: 187, original emphases) Her 
point is that there simply is no such thing as the essential woman. To 
think in terms of generic women is simply to perpetuate the kind of 
hierarchies and exclusions that accompanied the notion of generic 
man. Indeed, whereas in this case generic man turned out to be white 
middle-class western men; generic woman on closer analysis is 
identifiable as white, middle-class western' woman. so excluding all 
those that need(ed) a qualifier- 'Black' women, 'Hispanic' women, 
'Asian American' women, 'poor' women are examples Spelman cites 
in her critique of this additive view. Her argument recalls early 
feminist attempts to redress the occlusion of women in this way and 
which soon implied the need for wholesale transformation 
conceptually, methodologically, epistemologically. This is similar to 
what has happened with the question of gender and the category 
woman. Many feminists insist it is politically necessary to unite 
around the category woman and construe such challenges to it in often 
hostile, or at least negative, terms as politically disabling. However it 
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seems to me that if we accept the insights of deconstruction about the 
construction of meaning and subjectivity, we can have a way of 
thinking 'woman' without essentialising or biologising the category. 
Hence, deconstruction highlights the difficulties inherent in 'knowing' 
women. Spurs, for example, as I have discussed above, renders the 
category of woman undecidable. Perhaps more importantly it also 
marks the uncontainability of women in the category woman and 
involves the displacement of metaphysical dualisms such as 
man/ woman. But this is not to say that the use of the category woman 
is necessarily eliminated altogether, as for example Scholes (1994) 
argues in a discussion of Spurs. Scholes is led to this conclusion by 
arguing that to do away with essences altogether precludes the use of 
man and woman as ideal types since we could no longer distinguish 
man and woman in those terms. However the point I would want to 
make is that exposing the social production and construction of 
supposedly essential characteristics in both an empirical sense and a 
conceptual sense undermines phallocratric notions of essentialism and 
paves the way for their disruption and displacement while 
simultaneously revealing the violence and gender hierarchy that 
pervades and produces such notions. Their root is thus exposed as 
lying not in absolutes and universals, in neutral 'facts' or theories, but 
rather in patriarchal phallogocentrism. Furthermore, although 
abandoning the category woman is one option, I agree rather with 
Judith Butler (1993) and Diane Elam (1994) that it is more useful to use 
it while holding it open to inspection and analysing what is involved 
in its construction and attribution to certain bodies. Indeed, Elam also 
rejects an earlier argument of Scholes' that deconstruction 
is 
incompatible with feminism as feminism is based on precisely the kind 
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of class concept (i. e. woman) that deconstruction 'does away with' in 
favour of the view that "feminist analysis must be a deconstruction of 
representation that keeps the category of women incessantly in 
question, as a permanently contested site of meaning" (Elam 1994: 41). 
Indeed I would say rather use it under erasure. 
Elam is also right to point out, following Cornell (1991), that critics of 
Derrida sometimes confuse Derrida's reading of Nietzsche in Spurs 
with an adoption of Nietzsche's position. Whereas Derrida's point in 
Spurs is not simply that woman names the non-truth of truth as 
Nietzsche suggests but rather that "woman cannot be contained by any 
definition, including Nietzsche's name for her as the non-truth of 
truth" Elam 1994: 39 citing Cornell 1991). Elam's own criticism of 
Derrida stems from a rather different direction and one which she 
argues Cornell neglects. That is that 
Derrida's text moves between woman and women .... 
Derrida 
thus insists on the indeterminacy of woman in the singular, 
while at the same time proposing that women can be adequately 
determined by this single figure. Woman is indeterminate, 
according to Derrida, but all women fall under the singular 
rubric of woman. Derrida is cutting corners here in a way which 
marks a limitation to his concern for feminism. 
(Elam 1994: 40) 
Her point is that understanding the writing of women's histories as 
progressing ever further towards the ultimate truth of women is 
problematic, if not in fact untenable. This is because there is no 
ultimate endpoint and no determinate truth. Any history of women 
must therefore take into account methodologically the deconstructive 
insight concerning the radical indeterminacy of women. 
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However she argues that although Derrida is right in stressing the 
diffusion of feminine identity, and the irreducible and incalculable, he 
fails to consider adequately how such issues could be understood in 
historical narratives which are of necessity temporal. Her own 
suggestion is that since writing women's histories in the past, present 
or simple future tense involves grounding them in the truth of 
women, the future anterior should rather be employed. This is in 
order to "expose the political question of what women will have been 
and thus destabilise any claim to positive knowledge or restrictions on 
the non-category of women" (Elam 1994: 41). 
This works because the future anterior both embraces radical 
uncertainty and its own transformation. As such it involves both a 
rewriting and the suggestion that it is also 'itself always already to be 
rewritten'. When written in the future anterior history becomes "a 
message that is handed over to an unknown addressee and accepts that 
its meaning in part will have to depend upon that addressee. History 
written for a public that will have to rewrite it ceaselessly" (Elam 1994: 
41). For Elam this is a way of keeping the category of woman in 
question as a site of meanings. 
The advantage of this position is that we can focus on the ways in 
which heterosexually informed gender ascriptions are not only 
imposed on individual women and men, girls and boys on the basis of 
medically assigned sexual categories but also importantly structure 
knowledge, social and scientific western thought and practices. We can 
then see that political action does not require mobilising around the 
category woman at all levels. Nevertheless we can mobilize around 
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the category women if we want to providing we remember what is 
involved in the construction of that category (as Butler argues in 
Bodies That Matter). Furthermore to do so is perhaps a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for social transformation and change. Party 
political activism is necessary at the legal level but alone it will do little 
in itself to overcome gender-based inequalities. What is also required 
as deconstruction makes clear is the subversion of the category itself 
and an end to such binary thinking. And an end, as deconstructive 
queer theorists such as Sedgwick, Fuss and Butler remind us, not just 
to sexism but to heterosexism. 
Politics of Indeterminacy: Undecidability, justice and judgment 
Another particular problem many feminists find with deconstruction 
is the apparent political inadequacy that its emphasis on undecidability 
brings in its wake, that I discused in chapter 1. Since it questions the 
political deconstruction is conceived as itself either anti- or apolitical. 
In other words it is at worst reactionary, at best simply incapable of 
(prescribing? ) concrete political practice. 21 However in 'Feminism and 
Deconstruction, again', Spivak (1989), arguing against those who would 
peremptorily dismiss deconstruction due to the lack of normative 
commitment on which to ground a politics, makes the following 
important point: 
It is not just that deconstruction cannot found a politics while 
other ways of thinking can. It is that deconstruction can make 
founded political programmes more useful by making their in- 
built problems more visible. To act is therefore not to ignore 
21 See for example Rabine (1988) Poovey (1988) Martin and Mohanty (1988). 
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deconstruction, but actively to transgress it without giving it up. 
(Spivak 1989: 206). 
Diane Elam also stresses the process and what she calls the 'abyssal 
scene' of deconstruction, and makes a similar point which recalls my 
argument in chapter 1.22 She argues for the compatability of 
feminism and deconstruction and furthermore, locates this 
compatability in a politics of indeterminacy. This, she insists, does not 
entail an inability to act or a 'paralysing relatavism' but rather a call for 
ethical judgments. She argues: 
Instead of thinking of deconstruction and feminism as 
epistemological theories or political discourses which elucidate 
the functions of reason or the irrational, we need to think their 
relationship within the realm of ethics. (Elam 1990: 304) 
Deconstruction does not provide normative grounds for ethical 
judgments as in a politics of determinacy but such grounds have been 
revealed as illusory. Ethical judgments are in fact groundless. 
However, not in the sense of being without cause or purpose, but 
rather in the Wittgensteinian sense that grounds themselves can have 
no grounds. Epistemologically there can be no grounds for certainty. 
Elam quotes Wittgenstein in On Certainty: "If the true is what is 
grounded then the ground is not true nor yet false" (Elam 1990: 304-5). 
Her point is that both deconstruction and feminism make us aware 
that although ethical judgments are necessary - since an ethical system 
is intrinsic to civil society - they are also precarious, part of a never- 
ending (infinite) (abyssal) process. Elam's answer, then, to the 
perceived limitations of a politics of indeterminacy is to insist that 
22 See MOP for a discussion of the abyss. Elam argues this with reference to Derrida's 
deconstruction of democracy in The Other Heading (Derrida 1992) and Spivak's (1980) 
discussion of Limited Inc in 'Revolutions that as yet have no model: Derrida's Limited 
Inc '. 
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deconstruction does not preclude the possibility of deciding, so much as 
highlight what is involved (and excluded) in the production of the 
decision. It is not so much a question of moving beyond 
deconstruction to make ethical judgments as a question of how 
deconstruction obliges us to judge and act without certainty, and with 
responsibility. If the politics of determinacy was illusory there would 
be no point in replacing it with yet another politics of determinacy. 
Hence she argues "To avoid a paralyzing relativism -I can't decide 
therefore I can't act - the politics of undecidability must, in some way 
engage with ethics and consider obligations and responsibilities. " 
(Elam 1994: 87). 23 
This is not traditional ethics however. Ethics is posed in the sense of an 
'ethical activism' which, she argues, is far removed from Kantian 
ethics which is based on a notion of the autonomous subject as free 
agent and from pragmatist ethics and moral philosophy. Ethical 
activism is however intrinsically political although the political 
becomes 'a foundationless activity of judgment'. "[T]he ethics of 
deconstruction and feminism is an ethical activism which requires that 
judgments be made, yet which does not supply the means of 
legitimating those judgments. No recourse to self-present subjects, 
natural rights, or transcendental truths... " (Elam 1994: 88). 
Also involved in this argument is a distinction between undecidability 
and indeterminacy. This is a useful distinction to note. Elam makes it 
since she advocates a position of indeterminacy with regard to the 
category woman and a politics of indeterminacy and she wants to show 
23 See Dronsfield and Midgely (1997) for a discussion of The Responsibilities of 
Deconstruction, which includes an interview with Derrida in 1993 entitled 'On 
Responsibility'. 
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her agreement with Derrida here despite this by situating her 
understanding of indeterminacy within Derrida's understanding of 
undecidability. At the same time she wants to refute feminist 
disavowals of a politics of indeterminacy. Elam recalls Derrida's (1988) 
insistence in "Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion" in Limited 
Inc that his analyses of undecidability do not involve some "vague 
'indeterminacy"'. She cites Derrida thus: 
Undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between 
possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These 
possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined 
situations (for example discursive - syntactical or rhetorical - but 
also political, ethical, etc. ). They are pragmatically determined. 
The analyses that I have devoted to undecidability concern just 
these determinations and these definitions, not at all some 
vague 'indeterminacy'. I say 'undecidability' rather than 
'indeterminacy' because I am interested more in relations of 
force, in differences of force, in everything that allows, precisely, 
determinations in given situations to be stabilized through a 
decision of writing (in the broad sense I give to this word, which 
also includes political action and experience in general). 
(Derrida 1988: 148 cited in Elam 1994: 83, original emphasis)24 
Derrida is thus emphasising the undecidabilty of determinations as 
Elam puts it, hence the political appeal of this notion of undecidability 
for her. Applied to women it gets at the way that there simply is no 
essential woman, women are multiply determined in an undecidable 
and open-ended way. It is this that provides the basis for what Elam 
24 For a discussion of deconstruction and pragmatism involving Derrida, Rorty, 
Critchley, Laclau and Mouffe see Simon Critchley, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau 
and Richard Rorty (eds) (1996) Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism, edited by Chantal 
Mouffe, Routledge, London and New York. 
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refers to as a kind of freedom in such a feminist politics. (Butler to 
whom I turn in later chapters would call it agency. ) The notion of 
freedom however is revised. The subjective autonomy of a Kantian 
notion is rejected. This is rather the freedom of 'a collective 
uncertainty, a groundless solidarity' (p. 84). It is precisely the 
undecidability of women that unites women. "The specificity of 
feminism is thus its insistence that the politics of undecidabilty (among 
multiple determinations) must be understood from a standpoint of 
indeterminacy, of political possibilities" (Elam 1994: 84). Ultimately 
then Elam argues that politics is about handling differences in the 
context of something like Lyotard's differend, and becomes in Derrida's 
terms (in The Other Heading) a duty in the sense of an obligation to the 
other25. A politics of undecidabilty in this sense does not, as critics 
often contend, involve a refusal to make decisions, but it does involve 
a refusal to ground those decisions in universal laws. In order to avoid 
the paralysis of relativism, in light of the loss of universal laws, it 
necessarily involves an engagement with ethics, and obligations and 
responsibilities. (p87)26. 
25 Derrida (1992b) discusses this understanding of the political as ethical in The 
Other Heading' in the context of Europe and democracy and memory. He discusses the 
question of justice in 'Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of Authority"' in D 
Cornell, M Rosenfeld and DG Carlson (eds) Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice, London and New York: Routledge. In this essay Derrida posits justice as the 
undeconstructable conditions of possibility for deconstruction. Unlike the law which, in 
this view, is and must necessarily remain deconstructable. See Critchley in Critchley 
et al 1996. 
26This notion of ethics is not that of traditional moral philosophy which is based on an 
autonomous subject. For useful and illuminating discussions of the utility of 
deconstructive ethics for feminists concerned with sexual difference and/or women's 
bodies see Drucilla Cornell (1991), Cornell et al (eds) 1992, Rosalyn Diprose (1994). 
Also Simon Critchley (1992) The Ethics of Deconstruction, who, like Cornell but 
without her feminist perspective, discusses the relationship between Levinasian ethics 
and the ethics of deconstruction. For Derrida on responsibility see Dronsfield and 
Midgely (eds) (1997) 'Responsibilities of Deconstruction', special edition of PLI 
Warwick Journal of Philosophy. 
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The Trouble with Nominalism 
Having examined the political implications of undecidability for 
feminist practice I will conclude this chapter by turning to the problem 
of nominalism. For many feminists the undecidability that is 
involved in deconstruction entails some form of nominalism. Linda 
Alcoff (1988) adopted this view arguing that neither undecidability nor 
nominalism can be useful for feminism. In her view, undecidability 
must necessarily lead to some sort of negative position and 
nominalism can only result in occluding gender once again. However, 
I think there is a problem with Alcoff's construal of the implications of 
what she identifies as the nominalism inherent in this view of the 
subject, namely a "rejection of subjectivity" (Alcoff 1988: 421) and the 
assumption that there is or could be a positive conception of the 
category woman that 'is immune to deconstruction'. Thus she says: "If 
the category 'woman' is fundamentally undecidable, then we can offer 
no positive conception of it that is immune to deconstruction, and we 
are left with a feminism that can only be deconstructive and, thus, 
nominalist once again" (Alcoff 1988: 420). Alcoff admits that "The 
feminist appropriation of post-structuralism has provided suggestive 
insights on the construction of female and male subjectivity and has 
issued a crucial warning against creating a feminism that reinvokes 
the mechanisms of oppressive power. " But she goes on to argue that it 
nevertheless "limits feminism to the negative tactics of reaction and 
deconstruction and endangers the attack against classical liberalism by 
discrediting the notion of an epistemologically significant, specific 
subjectivity" (Alcoff 1988: 421). Thus she wants to retain some post- 
structuralist insights but rejects what she sees as a nominalist position 
on gender. 
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There are a number of issues here. One is that to dismiss this view of 
the subject as mere nominalism seems to me to entail an inadequate 
conception of both deconstruction and the performativity of language. 
To argue that gender is constructed in a deconstructive approach is not 
to reduce it all to words. Nor is it to deny the constitutive role gender 
plays in human subjectivity or to imply that this involves some sort of 
everyday optionality. Indeed precisely the opposite is the case as my 
discussions in Part 2 will make clear. It is rather to show that gender, 
far from being an essential attribute, in some sense caused by the body, 
is rather constructed through significatory practices involving a 
relational process of deferment and differentiation and power 
relations. But I will not pre-empt my later discussion here, suffice it to 
say, for now, that such charges of nominalism are also reminiscent of 
similar readings (in my view misreadings) of Foucault as presenting 
some sort of linguistic monism and they relate to the main issue that 
dominates this thesis and rejections of deconstruction as divorced from 
'the real world': the issue of the relationship between reference and 
reality, language and materiality. The argument from those advocating 
a deconstructive approach is summed up by Drucilla Cornell in Beyond 
Accommodation, thus:, 
the deconstruction of a strong sense of reference, in which 
representation finally yields to the real, does not at all deny 
reference, but only argues of the way in which reference 'takes 
place' once the relationship between Sinn und Bedeuteung is 
correctly understood. Technically, then it would be a mistake to 
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confuse Derrida's position with nominalism. 'Reality' is not just 
a name we give it. (Cornell 1991: 85) 27 
However the whole issue of the relationship between language and/or 
representation and matter and/ or reality is complex. As it is crucial to 
the argument of this thesis, it is a matter to which I return again and 
again. (For example in chapter 3 it arises in the context of an 
examination of the implications of the deconstruction of the 
biology /culture binary opposition for understanding the sex /gender 
distinction and the body; in chapter 4 in the context of the comparison 
between Foucault's approach and Derrida's; in chapter 5 in relation to 
Butler's notion of performativity and in relation to 'materialist' 
feminist's rejection of such approaches). For now I merely want to 
emphasise once again the point that Derrida's or indeed 
deconstruction's, 'linguisticismt - the understanding of 'textuality' and 
its role in the constitution of 'reality', subjectivity, meaning - does not 
entail either a rejection of the real world or a reduction of 'things' to 
'words'. It is rather that it parallels the Wittgensteinian insight that in 
marking the limits of 'our' world language paradoxically "both gives 
us our world and yet keeps us from being imprisoned in it" (p. 76); and 
extends it by demonstrating the workings of pallogocentrism within 
this paradox (e. g. in 'The Facteur de la Verite' in Derrida 1987c), as 
Cornell argues. 
27 Cornell also goes on to argue "Put in his own language, the historical burden of our 
situatedness' which Derrida calls palaeonomy, would forbid Spivak's poststructuralist 
nominalism" (Cornell 1991: 85). This would seem to contradict my point taken 
from 
Spivak earlier. However if this is taken in the context of Derrida's analysis of 
propriation and in particular the propriation involved in phallocentrism and 
especially the Lacanian propriation of woman and 
her identification with castration 
in the symbolic, the further point Derrida makes in Spurs concerning the undecidablity 
of woman and ultimate 
irzappropriation of the term or stereotype within 
phallogocentrism, can be seen. 
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Another issue is that to understand deconstruction as simply negative 
is a gross injustice if not an out and out misreading. As I have shown 
in chapter 1, and earlier in this chapter in the section on political 
implications, deconstruction may be 'abyssal'. It may involve an 
endless process, but it is not entirely negative. It is often construed in 
this way by its detractors, it is true, but that tends to be rather because it 
challenges the grounds for certainty on which they vainly seek to cling, 
rather than because of any intrinsic negativity in deconstruction. 
Indeed one of the main themes of this thesis concerns the positive 
possibilities for feminist gender/body theory of the destabilisation that 
attracts this negative label (as discussed in Part 2). It is of particular 
value in terms of rethinking the materiality of the body and rethinking 
embodied subjectivity in a way that both acknowledges the salience of 
the body yet avoids biological determinism. 
Finally, while the very notion of an epistemologically significant 
subject is part and parcel of that very liberalism Alcoff wants to attack, 
the deconstruction of the notions of essential identity and authentic 
core as repressed by society involves a focus on the production of our 
sense of identity and authentic core that can in itself be liberating. 
Although this is, indeed, often taken to be a pessimistic view because it 
challenges the notion of repression, and its correlates modernist ideals 
of freedom and liberation, it need not necessarily be pessimistic 
precisely because it avoids any form of essentialism, and opens up 
'repressive' categories, to the possibility of resistance and change. 
Indeed, the possibility of resistance and change in a deconstructive 
approach is another important theme that resonates in all the chapters 
of this thesis. Again, I will say more about these possibilities in the 
specific context of the body and subjectivity in Part 2. 
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'The Violence of Rhetoric' 
Teresa de Lauretis (1987) is also concerned, though in a different way, 
with the limitations of deconstruction's 'abyssal indeterminacy' for 
feminism. Although she has now moved on to produce a seminal 
psychoanalytically based account of the production of lesbian desire this 
early discussion of deconstruction's limitations can serve as an 
example for general feminist objections. Her focus is on its perceived 
inadequacy in accounting for gender. Thus she argues: "For the female 
subject, finally, gender marks the limit of deconstruction, the rocky bed 
(so to speak) of the 'abyss of meaning"' (de Lauretis 1987: 48) For 
deconstruction with its emphasis on 'the violence of rhetoric', to use 
De Lauretis' phrase, and its abyssal indeterminacy cannot take account 
of gender. Since it operates at the level of rhetoric deconstruction is 
thus, in this interpretation, divorced from "history, practices and the 
imbrication of meaning with experience" (De Lauretis 1987: 32). 
In other words for De Lauretis deconstruction is after all but a form of 
ahistorical formalism. Hence, concerned with developing a theory of 
"the female sexed or the female embodied social subject" (de Lauretis 
1990: 267) de Lauretis is scathing of those who would embrace post- 
structuralist theories. 28 But is it fair to say that deconstruction cannot 
adequately account for gender for these reasons? This concern with, 
and rejection of, deconstruction as about abyssal indeterminacy or 
28 Here de Lauretis turns to C. S. Pierce and semiotics as a means of examining the 
production of subjectivity in a way that takes account of what she sees as the mutually 
constitutive 'inner and outer worlds of subjectivity' see 'The Violence of 
Rhetoric' in De 
Lauretis (1987). Although a discussion of this is outside the bounds of this chapter, I 
would just like to point out here that this view involves the assumption of an 
independent reality that has directly referential effects. Such an assumption is 
rejected and undermined in Derrida's work. 
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undecidability misses entirely the point that it is not that 
deconstruction itself produces this state of indeterminacy but rather 
that the process of deconstruction, by focusing on the margins, the 
strategies, the violence and exclusions at work in the construction of 
determinacy reveals the illusory nature of grounded foundations, 
essences, and binary oppositions. This brings me back to Spivak's point 
regarding the perceived inadequacy of deconstruction. It is not just that 
deconstruction leads to radical indeterminacy while other ways of 
thinking do not; it is that deconstruction makes us aware of how that 
determinacy is produced, in this case, in accounting for gender. 
Although deconstruction does not provide feminism with a way of 
affirming female subjectivity or of establishing women's self- 
representation- whatever that may be - it does nevertheless, give us a 
way of understanding the indeterminacy of gender/ sexual difference 
even while it is constitutive of our being, and of analysing how, despite 
its undecidability, gender/ sexual difference is constructed as ontological 
difference within phallogocentrism, and therefore it is important to the 
whole task. It may not provide an alternative articulation of woman 
but it does provide the space for alternative ways of understanding the 
production of gendered subjectivity. In this way deconstruction can 
help us attend to the hitherto excluded matter of (gendered) corporeal 
specificity. In Part 2I will develop these arguments in relation to 
contemporary feminist concerns to rethink the materiality of the sexed 
and gendered body and its relationship to subjectivity. 
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Conclusion 
The main concerns of this chapter have been to examine the 
implications of the critique of identity categories, and the radical anti- 
essentialism that is entailed in this, for a feminist understanding of the 
category woman and for the 'real' world of women. This is of 
particular importance as a negative view of these implications, and the 
threat that they pose to women's sense of ourselves as women, is the 
biggest stumbling block to a feminist appreciation of deconstructive 
insights. 
This has involved a number of related strands, the most important of 
which pertain to feminist concerns about Derrida's use of the feminine 
and the category woman. I have argued that although his use of these 
metaphors may seem inimicable to women's interests he is at the same 
time trying to demonstrate the undecidability of sexual difference; to 
challenge its status as an ontological category; and to highlight the 
salience of the dissimulation of the significance of sexual difference for 
the Western philosophical tradition (and for the metaphysics of 
presence). I have argued that all of this is of enormous significance for 
both our understanding of the category woman and for 'real' women 
in the world. It does not necessarily entail abandoning the use of the 
category woman as a generic term, but it does involve guarding against 
the naturalization of the category and keeping its meaning open as a 
constantly contested site. 
I have also argued that appreciating this involves rethinking the 
materiality/ ideality, reference/ representation distinction (a theme I 
introduced in chapter 1) and relatedly the theory/practice distinction. 
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This is the second strand in my argument in this chapter. I have 
argued that these distinctions have been important aspects in the both 
the somatophobia that pervades the Western philosophical tradition 
and the reluctance of many feminists to embrace Derridian insights. 
These distinctions neglect the materiality of meaning or language and 
deconstruction helps us to see that. I drew on Spivak, who 
demonstrates the significance of this for understanding practices of 
female genital mutilation in Third world countries. She indicates their 
relation to the theoretical effacement of the clitoris in the discourses on 
sexuality and femininity that structure contemporary multinational 
capitalism. This is an example of the relevance of deconstructive 
insights for 'real life' women. 
The third strand concerns another theme introduced in chapter 1 and 
that resonates through all the chapters: the political implications of a 
deconstructive approach. In this chapter I have argued for the political 
utility of the undecidability and radical anti-essentialism involved for 
feminists concerned with the question of gender and sexual difference. 
The very fact of the undecidability of the category woman provides a 
kind of 'groundless solidarity' that unites women and that provides 
the possibilities for political action. This also involved examining the 
distinction between indeterminacy and undecidability to argue that a 
politics of undecidabilty does not involve a crippling relativism, and 
an inability to make judgments, as its detractors suggest, 
because it 
removes the grounds provided by universal laws. It is rather that, 
in 
recognising that those grounds were in fact illusory, a politics of 
undecidabilty demands an engagement with ethics and responsibilities 
in the making of judgments and decisions once grounded 
in universal 
laws. Further to this, I have argued that the undecidability of the 
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category women does not necessarily entail jettisoning the category 
altogether. What is required is rather to use it under erasure and to 
maintain a constant vigilance around its production as a determinate 
category. 
Finally, I have examined and rejected claims that deconstruction is 
both negative and nominalist and as such cannot account for gender. 
This latter is a frequent criticism of deconstructive insights and it is 
another theme that resonates through all the chapters. It also relates to 
the second strand of my argument here because accepting the rejection 
of these claims involves accepting the deconstruction of the 
reference / representation distinction to accommodate the materiality of 
language, and then applying it to the problematic of gender and sexual 
difference. I begin to do this here, but I develop these arguments 
further in relation to the body in Part 2. 
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PART 2 
THE BODY 
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The main concern of Part 2 of this thesis is to apply the deconstructive 
insights discussed in Part 1 to the substantive area of the Body. I want 
to show how these insights can usefully inform feminist theories of 
embodied subjectivity. In particular, the attempt to rethink the 
materiality of corporeality and the relationship between subjectivity, 
corporeality and sexual difference. This involves particular attention to 
two aspects of Derrida's work that have been the focus of Part 1. These 
concern the undecidability of sexual difference and the critique of its 
status as an ontological category; and the deconstruction of the 
materiality/ ideality and real/ representation distinctions and the 
challenge this presents to the status of materiality as something which 
stands outside significatory frameworks and shapes them. It also 
involves developing Derrida's notion of language and writing in the 
context of his critique of speech act theory and generalisation of the 
performative effects of language. This is considered in relation to 
issues of resistance and change and a comparison is made with 
Foucault's notion of discourse. 
Many of the themes highlighted in Part 1 continue to inform the 
debates, and the issues which generate them, in Part 2. These include: 
the status of the real and/or the material in an approach informed by 
deconstructive insights; the charge of linguistic reductionism in an 
account that privileges the materiality of signification; the political 
implications of the critique of identity categories and undecidability; 
the question of whether a deconstructive approach results in 
frivolous 
play rather than serious critique; and the possibility of change and 
transformation 
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In order to demonstrate the relevance of deconstructive insights and 
the utility of the possibilities they present I focus on Butler's account of 
the performative production of embodied subjectivity. This also serves 
to demonstrate the limitations of feminist accounts which debunk the 
claims to materialism in deconstructive approaches because they 
privilege the materiality of signification, and insist, instead, that their 
own approach is the truly materialist. 
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Chapter 3 
Subjectivity, Sexual Difference and Corporeality 
In the 1990s feminist concerns with subjectivity have focused on the 
problematic of the body and sexual difference. The failure of the liberal 
paradigm to render women fully human, in a system of representation 
in which the abstract, gender-neutral, human being on which it is 
based transpires to be in fact male, suggests that rather than effacing 
women's corporeal specificity, what is required, after all, is to 
acknowledge it. Subjectivity, it seems, is irreducibly tied to the 
specificities of sexed bodies. 
However this focus on corporeality does not imply an attempt to tie 
bodies to their biology. Rather, contemporary feminist theories of the 
body or, more inclusively, bodies, concerned with the problematic of 
sexual difference, address the problem of how to avoid such 
reductionism. They want to avoid tying women to their essential 
natures, rooted in either biology or the psyche, whilst still insisting on 
the salience of the sexed body to subjectivity. 
1 As Diane Elam puts it, 
"The body must not be taken as the ground of thought, but nonetheless 
the body's inescapability must be affirmed" (Elam 1994: 174). This then 
involves rethinking corporeality and rethinking the materiality of that 
corporeality. The problem, is how to do that. 
Traditional 
1 For an overview of feminist thinking around the 
body see Grosz (1994: 15-19). Grosz 
discerns three broad categories; egalitarian, social constructionist and sexual 
difference 
theorists. Irigaray, Cixous, Spivak, Gallop, Gatens, Kirby, 
Butler, Schor, Wittig are 
listed as examples of sexual 
difference theorists who move beyond the essentialism vs 
construction opposition and 
in various ways attempt to avoid the mind/ body dualism. 
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phenomenological approaches to the body have without exception 
neglected the sexed/ gendered specificity of bodies. 2 How then are we to 
rethink corporeality in order to take account of sexual difference? How 
are we to think the materiality of the always already sexed / gendered 
body? How are we to think of sexual difference in non-oppositional, 
non-binary terms: as something other than simply a matter of two 
oppositional identities, male and female. How are we to think of it as 
both essential, as in inescapable, yet not fixed, cultural rather than 
natural, yet also material? This all involves rethinking the relation 
between the cultural and the natural, representation and the objects of 
representation, reference and materiality. 
Moreover all this impinges on the Irigarayan problematic of how to 
establish a speaking position for women and in particular what it 
means to say that one is 'speaking as a woman'. Feminist critiques of 
contemporary attempts by male philosophers to revalue the 
philosophical 'feminine' by speaking as a woman (e. g. Deleuze and 
Derrida) demonstrate that speaking as a woman from a subject position 
that is in fact that of a man, is simply not the same as speaking as a 
woman from the subject position of a woman. 3 This raises the 
question of how to establish such a subject position and whether it 
requires an autonomous female sexuality. 
The earliest attempts to establish a speaking position for women (as 
opposed to just Woman) through 'writing the body' came of course 
from the ecriture feminine camp, widely maligned, misunderstood 
and criticised, in particular on the grounds of its biological 
2 Grosz (1994) for example demonstrates this with reference to the work of Foucault, 
Merleau-Ponty, Lingis, and Deleuze and Guattari, among others. 
3See for example Braidotti (1991 and 1994). 
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essentialism, as well as its apparent obscurity, abstruseness and political 
inadequacy. As a result of this questioning, so-called 'French 
Feminism', especially the theories of Irigaray, has increasingly been re- 
evaluated by Anglo-American feminists and others, concerned with 
the social constitution of sexed embodiment, and the possibilities for 
change this both implies and denies. They attempt to accommodate 
two key points - the Freudian insight that subjectivity is always sexed, 
and the Lacanian insight that sexed identifications are made through 
entry into the symbolic order - with phenomenological theories of the 
body, whilst also attempting to avoid the masculinism at the heart of 
these insights. They argue, for example, that underlying Lacan's 
account of the (albeit shifting) discursive positioning of sexed 
identifications is a male-female structure, a hierarchical gender 
dichotomy, which necessarily devalues and/or excludes the feminine 
perceived in phallic terms as merely a lack. The point is that sexuality, 
in Freudian terms, is always defined in terms of masculine sexuality. 
Hence the call for an autonomous sexuality for women. Moreover if 
these insights are linked to Foucauldian notions of the body and 
sexuality, disciplinary technologies, bio-power etc. (adapted to feminist 
concerns and thereby cleansed of their androcentrism) feminist theory 
is pushed towards a move beyond the essentialism versus construction 
opposition. This move renders more appealing Irigaray's step of 
accepting the Freudian basic insight, but rejecting the accompanying 
definition of sexuality in masculine terms and therefore attempting to 
affirm the feminine in sexual difference. Indeed it is this that sets the 
context (implicitly if not explicitly) for more recent turns to the 
problematic of corporeality, or embodiment and sexual 
difference 
which I consider in this chapter through a focus on 
Grosz, Braidotti 
and Butler. 
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The work of theses three theorists marks a significant move for both 
Anglo-American feminism and philosophy in their attempts to 
rethink corporeality beyond sex /gender, essentialism / construction, 
biology /culture oppositions. For all three, rethinking the body to 
recognise the salience of sexual difference and the embodied roots of 
subjectivity requires change at the level of the representation. This 
stems from a shared recognition that dualisms such as 
reference/ representation, empirical/ symbolic are but misleading 
dichotomies that generate conceptualizations that fail to capture the 
complexity of the matter. All three want to escape phallogocentric 
categories and modes of thought. They all recognise that this involves 
changing more than just the content but the whole framework, the 
very logic that sustains the thought. Such change is necessary to the 
affirmation of both the feminine in general and female subjectivity in 
particular. The most significant difference between these three 
theorists, however, stems from the extent to which this is perceived to 
involve some kind of reconstructive project around the bodies of 
women. In particular, whether it entails the construction of an 
autonomous sexual economy for women as Braidotti and Grosz 
suggest, and which is of course Irigaray's move and that of her 
followers; or whether it is more fruitful to concentrate on rethinking 
reference and materiality as Butler does. Butler's focus is rather on the 
political effects of grounding the category of woman in the materiality 
of bodies and posing the materiality of sex as causal. 
She argues that 
one of the effects of this is the production of the 
duality of bodies that 
sustains reproductive sexuality as a compulsory order. 
(Which is why 
she is interested in, and a contributor to, what 
has come to be known as 
'Queer Theory'. ) 
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These are the issues that I interrogate in this chapter. Beginning, then 
with Elizabeth Grosz. 
Grosz: Volatile Bodies 
In Volatile Bodies Elizabeth Grosz (1994) argues that recognising the 
centrality of the body to subjectivity requires rethinking corporeality 
beyond Cartesian dualism (both mind/body and subject/ object) and the 
biologism to which it gives rise. She also argues that the Cartesian 
paradigm in neglecting the issue of sexual difference has resulted in a 
view of women's bodies in terms of a natural inequality and facilitated 
women's exclusion from intellectual and cultural life. 4 The ultimate 
aim therefore, for Grosz, is a reconstructive project around women's 
bodies and their self representation: to rethink women's corporeality as 
autonomous and active. This project is based on articulating the 
particularities of women's bodies and their differences from, as well as 
their similarities to, men's bodies. Grosz argues that this requires a 
reinscription and transformation not only of women's bodies but of 
men's as well. However before I examine in detail the precise nature 
of this reconstructive project around the specificities of women's 
bodies, I want to say something more about the understanding of both 
corporeality and of sexual difference that is involved. 
4She argues that Cartesian dualism which pervades modern thought and provides the 
frameworks, either negatively or positively, for conceiving subjectivity and knowledge, 
gives rise to a notion of the body as either an object for the natural sciences, a tool or 
instrument of consciousness, an "animating subjectivity" or a signifying medium/ vehicle 
of expression. None of these understandings of the body serve the interests of feminist 
theory since they all serve to collude in the social devaluing of women's bodies that 
accompanies women's oppression. 
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This focus on sexed corporeal specificity, involves an attempt to 
rethink the body away from essentialist, universalizing, ahistorical 
understandings of human nature or human being or woman/ women. 
At the same time it demonstrates how these understandings have 
served in phallocentric logocentrism, in traditional philosophy and in 
intellectual and cultural history to dissimulating an always present 
sexual difference, and mask the maleness of the apparently neutral 
'Subject' - 'Man'. Although this insistence on the centrality of the body 
to subjectivity requires a focus on the specificities of sexed corporeality 
it is not, to reiterate, a means of fixing human nature in biology as 
biology itself becomes a matter of construction and production. 
Corporeality 
Bodies, Grosz argues "are not only inscribed, marked engraved, by 
social processes external to them but are the products, the direct effects, 
of the very social construction of nature itself" (p. x, my emphasis). She 
goes on, "it is not simply that the body is represented in a variety of 
ways according to historical, social, and cultural exigencies while it 
remains basically the same; these factors actively produce the body as a 
body of a determinate type" (p. x). The idea of a real material body that 
stands outside cultural inscriptions is therefore rejected. Bodies, she 
argues, are literally constituted by cultural inscriptions. They have an 
"organic openness to cultural completion" as an essential aspect of 
their being and therefore "must take the social order as their 
productive nucleus. Part of their own "nature" is an organic or 
ontological "incompleteness" or lack of finality, an amenability to 
social completion, social ordering and organization" (p. xi). 
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However, in insisting on this rethinking of the materiality of bodies 
beyond any sort of binary distinction between an independent real and 
a social construction of that (albeit unknowable) independent real she 
is not saying that bodies do not matter at all. Indeed although she 
insists that there is no body as such but rather only culturally and 
historically, racially and sexually specific bodies, Grosz aims to get away 
from the notion of bodies as inert, passive products of cultural 
inscription. She argues rather that "They function interactively and 
productively. They act and react. They generate what is new, 
surprising, unpredictable" (p. xi). 
To accord bodies this possibility while yet remaining inseparable from 
cultural inscriptions Grosz starts from the premise that animate bodies, 
albeit material objects in a sense, nevertheless, "are objects necessarily 
different from other objects; they are materialities that are 
uncontainable in physicalist terms alone" (p. xi). She attempts to 
conceive of corporeal specificity in terms of a kind of non-physicalist 
and non-reductionist materialism that includes attention to sexual 
difference. 
Her attempt to redefine the body outside of traditional philosophical or 
feminist frameworks and avoiding any form of dualism then involves 
an inversion of the emphasis on minds and its associated aspects 
(consciousness, psyche, interiority etc. ) She argues, "The wager is that 
all the effects of subjectivity, all the significant facets and complexities 
of subjects, can be as adequately explained using the subjects 
corporeality as a framework as it would be using consciousness or the 
unconscious" (Grosz 1994: vii). Her point is that 
if depth and 
interiority are seen as effects rather than causes - effects that 
is "of 
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inscriptions and transformations of the subjects corporeal surface" (p. 
vii) - it can be seen that "Bodies have all the explanatory power of 
minds" (p. vii). And more for attention to corporeal specificity in this 
way involves attention to sexual difference in a way that explanations 
of subjectivity in terms of minds does not. 
Indeed this is more than simply an inversions since the focus on 
corporeality here attempts to avoid the dualisms that inhere in 
explanations of minds and involves the radical rethinking of both 
bodies and minds. Grosz also rejects monist models which attribute the 
differing aspects of mind and body to a singular substance. To avoid 
either of these positions in her characterisation of subjectivity and the 
mind/body relation she draws on Lacan's analogy of the Möbius strip. 
(Many of Derrida's terms similarly problematise the inside /outside 
relation, e. g. invagination, parergenon, chiasmus etc. ) 
The Möbius Strip 
Grosz finds the model of the Mobius strip, an inverted three- 
dimensional figure of eight, a useful way of characterising the 
mind /body relation as somewhere between the traditional alternatives 
of seeing them as two distinct substances or in terms of one dual aspect 
substance. 
The Mobius strip has the advantage of showing the inflection of 
mind into body and body into mind, the ways in which, through 
a kind of twisting or inversion, one side becomes another. This 
model also provides a way of problematising and rethinking the 
relations between the outside of the subject, its psychical interior 
ad its corporeal exterior, by showing not their fundamental 
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identity or reducibility but the torsion of the one into the other, 
the passage, vector, or uncontrollable drift of the inside into the 
outside and the outside into the inside. 
(Grosz 1994: xii). 
She aims to demonstrate both the necessary dependence of a psychical 
interiority on a corporeal exteriority and the relation of mind and body 
without presuming either identity or radical disjunction. 
Moreover in arguing for the primacy of corporeality and a model of 
subjectivity in terms of surface rather than latency or depth she does 
not want to abandon altogether notions such as agency, reflection or 
consciousness. She rather wants to refigure them retaining a notion of 
interiority as well as exteriority. 
Grosz sums up her framework in the conclusion to Volatile Bodies as 
attempting to accommodate both the interior or psychological aspects 
of subjectivity and surface inscriptions of bodies. And at the same time 
resisting dualism and monism whilst still incorporating a minimum 
of two, not necessarily complementary, surfaces which relate in a kind 
of power relation. (She does not explicitly develop this point about 
power. ) 
Biology 
To reiterate then, this insistence on the centrality of the body to 
subjectivity is not a means of fixing human nature in biology, it is 
rather the opposite, an attempt, "to extricate it from the mire of 
biologism" (Grosz 1994: 188). Grosz wants to rethink the body outside 
the confines of an ahistorical, universal biology conceived as the raw 
material of culture, avoiding the constraints that place it in opposition 
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to the mind (the mental or conceptual), and to rethink its ontological 
status as passive and inert. Her point is that "The body as much as the 
psyche or the subject is a cultural and historical product" (Grosz 
1994: 187). 
She thus turns to the work of various male theorists e. g. Freud, Lacan, 
Merleau-Ponty, the theorists of body image, Nietzsche, Foucault, 
Lingis, and Deleuze and Guattari who, broadly speaking and in various 
ways, present the body and indeed nature itself as pliable, incomplete 
"whose determinate form is provided not simply by biology but 
through the interaction of modes of psychical and physical inscription 
and the provision of a set of limiting codes" (Grosz 1994: 187). These 
codes do not present fixed limits since we simply do not know what 
those limits are or how they can be extended or overcome. By this she 
means that although there are some things that bodies cannot do, such 
as fly, and there are certain environmental features that their survival 
requires, bodies capacities are increasingly enhanced through the use of 
prosthetics. 
Her argument is well summed up in this rather long quote: 
It is not adequate to simply dismiss the category of nature 
outright, to completely retranscribe it without residue into the 
cultural: this in itself is the monist or logocentric gesture par 
excellence. Instead, the interimplication of the natural and the 
social or cultural needs further investigation - the hole in nature 
that allows cultural seepage or production must provide 
something like a natural condition for cultural production: but 
in turn the cultural too must be seen in its limitations, as a kind 
of insufficiency that requires natural supplementation. Culture 
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itself can only have meaning and value in terms of its own 
other(s): when these are obliterated - as tends to occur within the 
problematic of social constructionism - culture in effect takes on 
all the immutable fixed characteristics attributed to the natural 
order. Nature may not be understood as an origin or as an 
invariable template but as materiality in the most general sense, 
as destination (with all the impossibilities, since Derrida, that 
this term implies). Their relation is neither a dialectic (in which 
case there is the possibility of supercession of the binary terms) 
nor a relation of identity but is marked by the interval, by pure 
difference. (Grosz 1994: 21) 
Sexual Difference 
The main concern in this refiguring of bodies then is the problematic 
of sexual difference. In focusing on corporeality Grosz emphasises the 
salience, the effectivity of sexuality both as what she terms a volatile, 
uncontainable concept and as a determinate type of body. Thus she not 
only argues that bodies are always sexually specific but she says of 
sexuality, 
As a determinate type of body, as sexually specific, it infects all 
the activities of the sexes, underlying our understanding of the 
world well beyond the domain of sexual relations or the concrete 
relations constituting sexual difference. Our conceptions of 
reality, knowledge, truth, politics, ethics and aesthetics are all 
effects of sexually specific -and thus far in our history, usually 
male - bodies, and are all thus implicated in the power structures 
which feminists have described as patriarchal, the structures 
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which govern the relations between the sexes. (Grosz 1994: viii- 
ix) 
Indeed this refiguring of corporeality, subjectivity and sexual difference 
has profound epistemological implications, not least in our conception 
of biology. However for now I want to consider what she means by 
sexual difference. 
Sexual Difference and the Ontological Status of the Sexed Body 
As others have pointed out in phallogocentrism sexual difference is 
deemed derivative of human being. This allows for the notion of an 
abstract, gender-neutral human being that underpins phallogocentric 
thought but which feminist analyses repeatedly reveal to be rather an 
idealized male body from which female bodies then become a 
deviation. It is as if male bodies can somehow transcend their 
immanence in biology, 'nature' and sexed specificity, while female 
bodies cannot. So, as Grosz argues, to insist instead that sexual 
difference is not derivative, that there simply is no neutral being from 
which to measure the yardstick of sexual difference, then becomes both 
an ontological question and an epistemological one. However, does 
this mean to say then that sexual difference is ontological difference as 
indeed Braidotti (discussed in the next section) claims? And if so how 
is this so? What does it mean to say that bodies are, in fact sexually 
marked from the beginning? Can bodies be sexually marked from the 
beginning without entailing some form of essentialism? How can we 
think sexual difference as constitutive without being determining, 
unless we posit some essential form of sexual difference overlaid 
by 
culture? Indeed insisting on sexual difference as ontological 
difference 
entails such questions as: 
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Are sexually neutral, indeterminate, or hermaphroditic bodies 
inscribed to produce the sexually specific forms with which we 
are familiar? Or do bodies, all bodies (even non-human bodies, 
it must be presumed), have a sexually specific dimension 
(whether it be male or female or hermaphroditic) which is 
psychically and culturally inscribed according to its morphology? 
In other words, is sexual difference primary and sexual 
inscription a cultural overlay or rewriting of an ontologically 
prior differentiation? Or is sexual differentiation a product of 
the various forms of inscription of culturally specific bodies? Do 
inscriptions produce sexual differentiation? Or does sexual 
difference imply a differential node of inscription? (Grosz 
1994: 189) 
However, as Grosz herself notes in a footnote, Derrida's notion of 
inscription or the trace pre-empts the question of whether or not sexual 
difference implies a differential mode of inscription. For the trace 
precedes nature and culture in that it is: 
not more natural than cultural, not more physical than 
psychical, biological than spiritual. It is that starting from which 
a becoming unmotivated of the sign, and with it all the ulterior 
oppositions between Physis and its other is possible. (Derrida 
1976: 48 quoted in Grosz 1994: 226) 
Hence, for Grosz the question becomes: "My question to Derrida, then, 
is whether the trace itself is marked by or the mark of sexual difference. 
What is the relation between the trace and sexual difference? " (Grosz 
1994: 226, fn 1). But I would rather suggest that this question is simply 
undecidable. The ontological status of sexual difference is undecidable. 
However the point is that sexual difference functions within 
119 
logocentrism as an ontological category. Therefore I find I have to 
agree with Robyn Ferrell's pertinent point: "The challenge that 
deconstruction puts to feminism is to show cause why it is not a 
condition of its theory that the truth of sexual difference be declared 
found" (Ferrell 1991: 181. original emphasis). The question of sexual 
difference then is not a metaphysical question because it need not 
involve speculating about what is in an essential sense or the actual 
nature of things beyond appearances etc. but rather asks about how 
sexual difference functions as ontological difference within 
phallogocentricism. The point is that while the former (essences etc. ) 
are simply undecidable, deconstruction demonstrates that what can be 
got at are the forces in operation in creating the illusion of decidability. 
Deconstructing the conditions of possibility in this way reveals the 
violence and exclusions upon which the binarised version of sexual 
difference is established and opens the space for the possibility of 
disruption and displacement - what Derrida might call sexual 
difference otherwise. 
Instead, however, Grosz poses sexual difference in terms of Saussure's 
pure difference, as itself ungraspable never present, but nevertheless 
originary, the conditions of possibility, the ground which makes 
possible sexual identities (and their external relations). At the same 
time it is this alterity that is "the very possibility and process of 
embodiment" ( Grosz 1994: 209). Moreover, "it conditions but is also a 
product of the pliability or plasticity of bodies which makes them other 
than themselves, other than their "nature" their functions and 
identities. " (p. 209? ) Thus, "Sexual difference is the horizon that cannot 
appear in its own terms but is implied in the very possibility of an 
entity, an identity a subject, an other and their relations. 
" (Grosz 1994: 
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209). This leads her to argue that since it is originary and constitutive 
sexual difference is not so much ontological as pre-ontological and for 
that matter pre-epistemological. The point being that in making 
possible what exists it therefore precedes ontology while at the same 
time, in necessarily pre-existing and conditioning what we know, it 
precedes epistemology. 
However Grosz also suggests that although she wants to tie subjectivity 
to the sexed specificity of bodies she does not want to tie it to two 
determinate types of sexual identity. Instead she sees sexual difference 
as an alterity that is both inside and outside the subject. Hence she 
seeks the "traces and residues" of sexual difference (p. 208) as, "a 
difference impossible to unify, impossible to separate from its various 
others and impossible to seal off in clear cut terms' (p. 208). Indeed, 
"Once the subject is no longer seen as an entity - whether psychical or 
corporeal but fundamentally an effect of the pure difference that 
constitutes all modes of materiality, new terms need to be sought by 
which to rethink this alterity within and outside the subject. ' (Grosz 
1994: 208) That is sexual difference. 
The point she makes here is that if subjects are viewed in this way, as 
constituted in and through difference, then there can be said to be two 
kinds of violence at work . 
One is necessary and enabling. This is the 
constitutive violence of differentiation entailed in sexual difference, of 
the ineliminable differentiation of existence and becoming. The other 
is that which produces identity and sameness through the effacement 
of one group in order to incorporate them as inferior versions of the 
same. (She gives the example of women in patriarchies). This 
violence is both "wanton and gratuitous", and historical and cultural. 
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This being so such violence can be transformed through the counter- 
violence of resistance - as in the reinscription and transformation of 
women's bodies. 
Change and Transformation: Bodily Fluids 
Grosz suggests that the disassociation of men from their corporeal 
specificity has led to the aporia of the particularities of the male body. 
She argues that in order for women to be accorded bodily and sexual 
autonomy men must also acknowledge their corporeal and sexual 
specificity. To make this argument she examines the 'corporeal styles, 
ontological structure and lived realities' of sexually different bodies, 
focusing on bodily fluids. She draws on Kristeva in Powers of Horror 
and her discussion of Mary Douglas 'Purity and Danger. Douglas' 
sociological and anthropological perspective is translated into a 
psychological and subjective one by Kristeva who, employing her 
notion of horror, is concerned to delineate the cultural significance of 
bodily orifices, secretions and boundaries. 
However Grosz criticizes Douglas for failing to examine the models of 
male and female physiology she is using. She points out, 
But hydraulic models of absorption, of incorporation, are all 
culturally validated representations of that may make sense 
in 
our culture but are by no means inevitable. They all share the 
characteristic of establishing male sexuality and corporeality as 
the singular form, which is inadequate in establishing a 
symmetrical female sexuality and body morphology... 
Douglas 
view is by no means alien to or even very 
far from dominant 
biological models today. (Grosz 1994: 196) 
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She agrees with Douglas that sexed bodies and their fluids are never 
lived unmediated by cultural representations. But she takes this point 
further, pointing out the lack of a dual sexual symmetry in existing, 
patriarchal models of the body. It is this lack of a dual sexual symmetry 
that is a significant feature for Grosz. It is exemplified in the 
differential representation of women's and men's body fluids and the 
fact that women's body fluids are regarded as contaminating for men in 
a way that men's bodily fluids are not for women. Therefore to further 
her aim of establishing an autonomous sexuality and body morphology 
for women - one that does not involve positioning their bodies and 
sexualities in terms of a heterosexual structuring of male desire that 
sets them in a relation of passive dependence and secondariness - 
requires a rewriting of the Oedipalized body. However Grosz also 
points out that she is not suggesting a voluntaristic changing of the 
deepest structure of the unconscious. This she insists not required, 
even if it were possible. 
Indeed the main problem with psychoanalysis at this level is precisely 
that it does not provide a way of transforming the structure of power 
relations between the sexes. This, Grosz argues, requires the 
transformation of the "sexually binarised body" (Grosz 1994: 202) which 
requires that men also make changes in their sexual horizons. 
She 
remarks on the significance of the alternative attitudes of some gay 
men to their bodies and suggests that different sexual practices produce 
different types of body. The point is that patriarchal, or as Grosz puts 
it 
"phallicized", masculinity involves the constitution of an 
'impermeable body' that does not admit of the notion of flow as a two- 
way process. It is this view of the 
body that needs to be rethought. 
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Grosz suggests gay men in some sense move towards this since they do 
receive flow, as well as transmit it. 
A body that is permeable, that transmits in a circuit, that opens 
itself up rather than seals itself off, is prepared to respond as well 
as initiate, that does not revile its masculinity (as the transsexual 
commonly does), or virilize it (as a number of gay men as well as 
heterosexuals, tend to) would involve a quite radical rethinking 
of male sexual morphology. (Grosz 1994: 201) 
She suggests this is partly being done in light of dangers of AIDS 
leading to a focus on possibilities of non-phallicizes male sexual 
pleasure. 
Rather than a psychoanalytic approach as a means to effect change, 
therefore, Grosz suggests a more phenomenological approach. Though 
she does insist that this approach is not incompatible with 
psychoanalysis. This involves a "tracing of the kinds of libidinal 
pathway across women's bodies that various corporeal flows make 
possible and in turn respond to" (Grosz 1994: 203). 
Women's Bodies Inscribed as a Mode of Seepage 
Grosz suggests rather than simply a lack, as in psychoanalytic terms 
women's bodies are constructed in terms of leakage and flow. An 
'uncontrollable seeping liquid' that is formless while engulfing all 
form. In other words as lacking self-containment in a way that 
threatens all order. Though note she goes on to qualify, "I am not 
suggesting that this is how women are, that it 
is their ontological 
status. Instead my hypothesis is that women's corporeality 
is inscribed 
as a mode of seepage"(Grosz 1994: 203? 
). Moreover, she points out that 
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she is not hereby suggesting that women have been in some sense 
desolidified. It is rather to insist that although women as human 
beings belong to the same genus as men and as such have the same 
degree of solidity, yet as women they are represented in terms of 
seepage and liquidity, and they 'live themselves' in these terms. 
To make her point she draws on Iris Marion Young's 
phenomenological study of experience of having breasts and, in 
particular, examines her use of Irigaray's 'metaphorics of fluidity' 
which aims to undermine what she describes as the 'mechanics of 
solids'. The latter supports Cartesian dualism and metaphysics of 
realism as in the mind body opposition and in the binarization of 
existence that is entailed in the subject /object distinction. The 
metaphorics of fluidity challenges this ontology and enables the 
rewriting of male corporeality as well as female. It is stressed that this 
emphasis on fluidity is not about emphasising the fluidity of female 
bodies as opposed to the solidity of male bodies. It is rather an 
alternative, non-phallocratic way of conceptualizing bodies and 
existence. Grosz quotes Young, "As far as I am concerned, it is not at all 
a matter of making a claim about women's biology or bodies, for 
conceptualized in a radically different way, men's bodies are at least as 
fluid as women's. The point is that a metaphysics of self -identical 
objects has clear ties to the domination of nature in which the 
domination of women has been implicated because culture has 
projected onto us identification with the abject body" 
(Young 1990: 192- 
3 quoted in Grosz 1994: 205). Since women's bodies are represented 
in 
terms of flows and seepages part of establishing a dual sexual symmetry 
in which the specificities of male bodies are recognized 
involves men 
taking "responsibility for and pleasure in the forms of seepage that are 
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their own. "(Grosz 1994: 202) Rather than simply reducing them to by 
products of pleasure and raw materials of reproduction as in the model 
of an impermeable (solid) male body and permeable (fluid) female 
body. 
Problems with this account 
To reiterate, the ultimate aim for Grosz then is a reconstructive project 
around women's bodies, to establish independence and autonomy for 
women that is precluded in patriarchal frameworks. She argues that 
an autonomous notion of female subjectivity, sexuality, corporeality 
and their self representation requires the articulation of the 
peculiarities of women's bodies and their differences from, as well as 
their similarities to, men's bodies. However it is this notion of 
'women's autonomous self-representation' that presents the greatest 
problem for this account. For not only does the insistence that she 
does not mean to imply two disparate identities in sexual difference sit 
uneasily with Grosz' focus on male and female bodies and 
reconstructive project around women, surely demanding autonomy 
and self representation for women in this way remains stuck, 
ultimately in the dichotomies of binary thinking. Although it is 
argued that cultural marks of sexual difference are biologically 
arbitrary, sexual difference is nevertheless deemed irreducible, marked 
by 'irremediable' distance (p. 208). It is thus simply assumed sub species 
aeternitas.. Moreover it seems it is the body that marks this 
irreducibility. This involves colluding in binary thinking rather than 
challenging it and it does tie women to their biology - however 
understood. 
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Moreover despite an expressed intention to avoid the 'mire of 
biologism', this focus on women's bodies as the route to knowled ge 
about/ of/ produced by women may indeed suggest a need to rethink 
the metaphors and concepts that shape our understanding of the body, 
but it nevertheless ultimately falls prey to the sort of criticisms that can 
be leveled at all 'maternal thinkers': not all women live their bodies as 
a mode of seepage e. g. the contraceptive pill enables the cessation of 
menstrual flow, post-menopausal women also 'dry up'; neither young 
women nor old women ovulate or menstruate. Why then should this 
transient feature of the reproductive cycle be the defining one? So I 
would argue that while it is one thing, and a good thing as a means of 
challenging patriarchal (and heterosexist) assumptions, to point out the 
power relations and gender politics of encoding women's bodies as a 
mode of seepage. It is also homogenizing, constraining, exclusionary 
and oppressive, to build a politics of women's self-representation 
around such a conceptual framework and such metaphors - as if that 
were the basis of the 'essential' self, rather than that such a framework 
is itself produced as the basis of the female-self in heterosexist 
phallogocentrism. Indeed Grosz' insistence that male to female 
transsexuals are not women because they cannot 'feel' like women is 
based on this sort of essentialist view of the link between body 
processes, however conceived, and sex/gender; a link that has its roots 
in heterosexist patriarchal frameworks. This view is also 
problematised by the fact that many male to female transsexuals go 
through radical surgery precisely because (they say) they do feel 
like a 
woman. Hence the rejection of male to female transsexuals as women 
highlights much of what is problematic about this approach. That such 
bodies are not considered entitled to be included in the category 
woman but seen rather as 'posing women' 
indicates that a kind of 
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(binary) bodily givenness is involved. So despite Grosz' attempt to 
rethink the sex /gender distinction and the recognigtion of the 
biological body as a mediated, indeed culturally constituted matter, her 
notion of the female body rests on the givenness of sexual difference: 
and that givenness accepts the binarisation of existence. The question 
that remains then is this: Given these insights regarding the social 
constitution of the body, is there a way of rethinking the body within 
the problematic of sexual difference that does not simply accept it as 
given? Is there a way of addressing the project of sexual difference 
without relying on the notion of the female body given in its folds and 
fluids? Rosi Braidotti, to whom I turn next, employs what she 
considers to be a form of strategic essentialism around the body in 
order to establish a form of 'female corporeal materialism' but she does 
not ground her project in the specificities of bodily flows and fluids in 
the way that Grosz does. 
Rosi Braidotti: Nomadism and the Body 
Like Grosz, Braidotti is similarly concerned with rethinking the 
materiality of the body outside of the material/ ideal, biological/ cultural 
dualisms in order to both recognize and rethink the bodily roots of 
subjectivity and to acknowledge the salience of sexual difference 
without rendering that difference in and of itself determinative. She 
also wants to rethink subjectivity in the light of the demise of the 
rationalist/ naturalist paradigm, and the generic humanist 
founding 
subject that accompanied it, in order to affirm a specifically 
female 
subjectivity. 
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She too aims to develop alternative frameworks within which to 
conceive/theorise subjectivity in general and female subjectivity in 
particular. Frameworks that allow or indeed require, attention to 
sexed/ gendered bodies whilst avoiding (mysogynistic) phallogocentric, 
metaphysical dualisms. They need to enable a rethinking of the unity 
of the subject and establishing a place of enunciation for female 
embodied subjects which is excluded and/or denied in phallocentrism. 
However unlike Grosz, who acknowledges but does not draw out the 
deconstructive problematic which underlies her project, Braidotti 
explicitly builds on the insights of postsructuralism while avoiding 
what she sees as its inherent masculinism. However it is not to 
Derrida that she turns in this project but rather to Deleuze who, unlike 
Derrida, does explicitly focus on the body. Underpinning her 
rethinking of the bodily roots of subjectivity is a tripartite view of the 
body as the site in which the physical, the symbolic and the sociological 
overlap. The body is understood in the Deleuzian sense of "a libidinal 
surface, field of forces, threshold of transcendence" (p. 184) The 
materiality of the body is posed as a "substratum of living matter 
endowed with memory" (p. 165), "pure flows of energy" (p. 165) but 
nevertheless always encoded in language although, importantly, never 
fully captured in language. That is it always exceeds representation. 
Thus, although the self is " an entity endowed with identity... anchored 
in this living matter" (p. 165) nevertheless, there simply is no 
subjectivity outside sexuality and language. 
The Politics of Ontological Difference 
Braidotti's point is that once we stop equating subjectivity with rational 
consciousness and recognise its bodily roots, that 
is once we recognize 
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that subjects are always embodied, then affectivity and sexuality 
become salient. For embodied beings in the world are corporeal and as 
such are both sentient and always already sexed. To be is to be either a 
man or a woman. Acknowledging her debt to Naomi Schor she 
argues, "'[Bjeing a woman' is always already there as the ontological 
precondition for my existential becoming as a subject" (Braidotti 1994: 
187-8) 
So, for Braidotti the starting point of the redefinition of female 
subjectivity is the fact of being a woman. Sexual difference is a fact. It 
is ontological. In this sense it is constitutive of our being. However it 
is not determinative in itself. "Being a woman is not a predication of a 
prescriptive essence, it is not a causal proposition capable of 
predetermining the outcome of each individual identity. It rather 
pertains to the facticity of my being" (1994: 188). 
Thus like Grosz, she argues that she is not tying women and men to 
some sort of essential nature. Any apparent human nature is a 
cultural artefact. Nevertheless she does argue for some sort of strategic 
essentialism. In making her case for some form of strategic 
essentialism or as she puts it "essentialism with a difference" (1994: 
186). She argues that this is necessary to provide the common 
epistemological and ethical grounds for feminism as a political practice. 
Since, her argument goes the "I" of the speaking subject is always 
already sexed, subjectivity is always already sexed and it is this that 
generates a common political and epistemological consensus among 
women: and yet importantly it does not deny the differences 
between 
them. Indeed, 
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[T]he affirmation of differences within joins up with a collective 
recognition of the differences between all of us and the male 
subjects. The recognition of the sameness of our gender, all 
other differences taken into account, is a sufficient and necessary 
condition to make explicit a bond among women that is more 
than the ethics of solidarity and altogether other than the 
sharing of common interests. Once this common bond is 
established and the epistemological common grounds of the 
feminist community are recognized, the basis is set for the 
elaboration of other values, of different representations of our 
common difference. (Braidotti 1994: 186) 
Thus Braidotti does not find it problematic to continue using the 
category woman in this way. Indeed she finds it essential. For, in her 
view, the transformations of the notion of subjectivity required in 
order to affirm the positivity of sexual difference and female feminist 
subjects and to develop a place of enunciation for speaking as a woman 
requires collective political action. As in her nomadic project. She 
insists that the notion of community is central to the whole project of 
redefining female subjectivity. She stresses the continuum of women's 
experiences (following Adrienne Rich). It is this that provides both a 
basis for a common bond among women and the conditions of 
possibility in which that redefinition will work. For Braidotti the 
communal bond comes first and it is the ethical that defines the 
political. Hence she speaks of an ontological move forward by which a 
politically enforced collective subject, 
the "we women" of the women's movement can empower the 
subjective becoming of each one of us "I, woman"... It is an act of 
self-legitimation whereby the she-self blends her ontological 
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desire to be, with the conscious willful becoming of a collective 
political movement (Braidotti 1994: 200). 
Note moreover, she separates subjectivity (will) and identity (desire). 
Identity she sees as involving intensive, unconscious processes 
whereas political subjectivity is a conscious and willful position. Thus 
her nomadic project is based on a politics of location that involves 
addressing both these aspects. Political subjectivity is posed in terms of 
sites of resistance and identity is formulated in terms of a set of 
identifications. Thus she argues that questions concerning what a self, 
in fact, is become questions of identity. But, at the same time, "The 
affirmation of my subjectivity need not give a propositional content to 
my sense of identity: I do not have to define the signifier woman in 
order to assert it as the speaking subject of my discourse" (Braidotti 
1994: 186). 
Change and Transformation 
Politically, Braidotti's point is that exposing the illusion of ontological 
foundations, substantive notions of the subject, the contingency and 
transience of identity do not preclude political action or social criticism 
or, as some would argue, feminism. Nevertheless it does involve a 
radical revisioning of social change, which, significantly, also involves 
psychic change. Thus Braidotti wants to establish a symbolic system for 
women and to escape phallogocentric gender dualism but she does not 
regard this as simply achievable by volition. (This is similar to the 
point in Butler and gender as performance performativity that I discuss 
in chapter 5. ) Braidotti argues the need to address all levels that are 
involved in the constitution of female feminist subjectivity, in 
particular she specifies the levels of identity, unconscious 
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identifications and desire. She argues that her nomadic project enables 
this thus helping to identify the steps en route to the way beyond 
phallogocentric gender dualism. Thus change requires the 
construction of new forms of desiring, embodied subjects. This 
involves addressing both conscious and unconscious desire and the 
imaginary relations that structure our being. It also involves bringing 
an intensive approach to the political realm. One that poses desire in 
the Nietzschean, Deleuzian sense which recognises that voluntary 
choices are not simply transparent self-evident and rational but 
multilayered and embodied. 
The notion of the nomad enables attention to multiple levels of 
experience and axes of differentiation in the constitution of 
subjectivity, e. g. class, race, 'ethnicity' gender, age etc. in the 
constitution of subjectivity. When adapted to feminist concerns it 
enables the prioritising of sexual difference. 
Problems with this account 
So Braidotti rejects debates about causality in favour of a political 
project of around the facticity of difference. She wants to embrace 
sexual difference but turn it into a strength rather than a weakness. 
This involves rejecting the negativity associated with sexual difference 
and instead affirming its positivity as a means of empowering women 
in the world. Indeed this concern with women in the world leads her 
to reject philosophical considerations of 'becoming woman', as in 
Derrida's work, as inimical to feminist goals since they are not 
concerned with 'real life' women, as I discussed in chapter 2. 
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This highlights some of the problems with this approach. Underlying 
Braidotti's project is a basic view of women as the empirical referents 
of the signifier 'woman' that is very problematic. To return to my 
arguments in chapter 2, whilst for Braidotti talk of women and 
becoming woman and femininity is rejected unless directly related to 
'real-life' women in the world, I would argue that the insights gleaned 
form the use of feminine metaphors in Derridian morphology can be 
applied to develop an understanding of the construction of 'real life' 
sexed and gendered beings - women - in all their diversity. Further to 
this, I would add that although it is developed at the formal level in 
fact deconstruction is operable and in operation at the empirical level. 
Indeed this is precisely the kind of binary distinction 
(formal/ empirical) that becomes inadequate in understanding social 
life and the individuals who comprise it when the insights of 
deconstruction into meaning and reference, which I discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2, are embraced. Moreover not only is it the case that 
there is no presence, no plenitude: that the notion of any direct 
reference to a phenomenal (never mind noumenal) world becomes 
problematic and, together with the notion of unmediated experience, 
tied to the impossible dream of plenitude. It is also the case that 
deconstruction can help us to access those very mediations through 
which particular experiences become possible. It can help us to address 
the whole gamut of experiences that coalesce/ overlap/ intersect to 
constitute the process of subjectivity and the production of female and 
male subjects It can also help us to engage with the cultural imaginary 
that provides their implicit and explicit conditions of possibility. 
The major problems with Braidotti's project, I would argue, therefore 
stem from her grounding of feminism in the sexed specificity of the 
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female body as the basis of the original naming in order to provide the 
basis for the 'epistemological community of women'. She does not do 
this through grounding her project in the specificities of women's 
bodies (i. e. bodily fluids etc. ) in the way that Grosz does. Rather, in 
simply accepting the category woman, albeit as open until we fill it, she 
leaves unexamined how the category is ascribed: she doesn't tell us 
how to understand what makes all the bodies female or all the people 
women, she simply assumes that there is something that does. Indeed 
Braidotti's acceptance of women as the empirical referents of the 
category woman involves an acceptance of binary sexual difference and 
a certain givenness about the relationship between this givenness and 
the biological body, (albeit mediated and rethought in Deleuzian terms 
of intensities, capacities and flows). Hence, although the questioning of 
the content of the category woman is a welcome factor along with the 
recognition of the mediation of bodily being, ultimately the account is 
flawed in that sexual difference is simply assumed, despite an avowed 
intent to rethink the sexed specificity of the body. Raising sexual 
difference as an issue in thinking corporeality and (the meaning of) the 
materiality of that corporeality is a vital feminist move, but the project 
around sexual difference in this account ultimately falls prey to the 
very binary thinking it is trying to avoid. As in Grosz and Irigarary, the 
Lacanian framework shapes the project resulting in the reworking of 
one of the binary pairs rather than undermining the binarization of 
existence that this framework colludes in. Therefore although 
Braidotti's project at first sight seems to be going to shed light onto the 
problematic of rethinking corporeality - she does after all suggest that it 
amounts to a form of 'female corporeal materialism' - ultimately, in 
simply assuming the female body, its contribution is limited. 
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This brings me back then to the question: Is there a way of addressing 
the project of sexual difference without actually making the kind of 
assumptions about the body that sexual difference theorists such as 
Grosz and Braidotti, following Irigaray, rely on? 
Judith Butler to whom I turn next does not make such assumptions. 
Instead, the deconstructive move that Butler makes involves accepting 
materiality as constructed, in any significant sense, all the way down. 
Following Butler, and drawing on Derrida, I argue that if the insights of 
deconstruction regarding the deconstruction of the material/ideal 
distinction are applied to the problematic of sex / gender and the body, 
this provides a way of rethinking the materiality of the body within the 
problematic of embodied subjectivity. It enables acceptance of feminist 
insights concerning the salience of gender and acknowledging the 
specificity of sex / gendered bodies whilst avoiding the essentialism / 
anti-essentialism, construction/ not construction dichotomies. 
Judith Butler: From Construction to Materialization 
As I pointed out in the last section, Braidotti's project involves a 
problematic acceptance of women as the empirical referents of the 
signifier woman, as the basis of feminism. Butler, however, does not 
share this view of women or Bradiotti's view of feminism. Indeed it is 
precisely the reification of the referents of the category woman that 
Butler would aim to avoid as inimical to a feminist emancipatory 
project. Her focus, to reiterate, is rather on the political effects of 
grounding the category of woman in the materiality of women's 
bodies 
and posing the materiality of sex as causal. 
Moreover although Butler 
argues against the need to ground 
feminism in the particularites of 
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women's bodies, she does not reject any use of the category woman 
altogether. She accepts the political necessity for feminists to speak as 
women but she does insist on understanding this category as a site of 
potential contest, open to alternative configurations. In this way then 
the category woman is more usefully both put to use and opened up to 
scrutiny. 
Materiality 
In Bodies that Matter Butler reconsiders the materiality of the body in 
response to criticisms of the notion of the body that she developed 
earlier in Gender Trouble. In the latter, following Nietzsche and 
Foucault, she developed a view of the body as a construction, a product 
of the effects of power; she was then criticised for neglecting what is 
deemed to be the materiality of the body. In Bodies that Matter she 
addresses that this criticism. She argues that thinking the materiality 
of the body requires avoiding the sex /gender distinction and 
rethinking the meaning of construction beyond that implied in the 
dichotomies of essentialism and or materialism versus construction. 
She argues that to posit materiality and construction as oppositional 
serves to conceal the matrix of power that actually produces this 
particular understanding of construction. Hence she advocates 
persuing a critical genealogy of the concept of materiality rather than 
an acceptance of the irreducibility of the material. 
5 
5She argues that materiality is constituted through an exclusion and 
degradation of 
the feminine. She does this through a comparison of Aristotle in De Anitna- for whom 
"matter is potentiality [dynaneos], form actuality" (Aristotle cited in Butler 
1993: 33) - 
focusing on his distinction between body and soul, and Foucault and then turning 
to 
Irigaray who deconstructs the concept of materiality in Plato's 
form/ matter distinction. 
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Matter is reconceived, "not as a site or surface, but as a process of 
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of 
boundary, fixity and surface we call matter. ' (Butler 1993: 9, original 
emphasis) The focus here is thus the process of the body's 
materialization. The 'matter' of bodies becomes an effect of the 
dynamic of power, "such that the matter of bodies will be indissociable 
from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the 
signification of those material effects" (Butler 1993: 2). This 
reconceptualisation of materialization allows Butler to focus on the 
way the category of sex is not immutable, as in Grosz and Bradiotti, and 
as it is in Irigaray. It is rather produced as a normative but nevertheless 
constitutive constraint through which bodies are materialized. Since 
in this view matter is posed as an effect of power, Butler argues, 
We may seek to return to matter as prior to discourse to ground 
our claims about sexual difference only to discover that matter is 
fully sedimented with discourses on sex and sexuality that 
prefigure and constrain the uses to which that term can be put. 
(Butler 1993: 29) 
Since, for Butler, the category of sex is always reinscribed as gender but 
nevertheless is "presumed as the irreducible point of departure for the 
various cultural constructions it has come to bear" (p. 28) she argues 
that this presumption of the materiality of sex underpins feminist 
epistemologies, ethics and various analyses of gender. Whereas 
in a 
typical deconstructive move Butler says she rather wants to displace 
the terms of the debate by asking a different question. Thus, 
"I want to 
ask how and why 'materiality" has become a sign of 
irreducibility, that 
is, how is it that the materiality of sex is understood as that which only 
bears cultural constructions and therefore cannot 
be a construction? " 
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(Butler 1993: 28 original emphasis). This questioning helps to render 
visible the matrix of power that produces the view of materiality in 
prevailing views of construction as something that stands outside of 
this process. 
Political Significance 
Butler's concern is thus with the political significance of the 
production and regulation of the matter of bodies. She is concerned to 
deconstruct the notions of the body and materiality in order, "to 
displace them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as 
instruments of oppressive power' (Butler 1993: 17). So to pose the 
question in terms of discourse or construction versus materiality, as 
her critics do, is to miss the critical point. Her critical/ political point is 
that deconstructing the materiality of bodies, "provides the conditions 
to mobilize the signifier in the service of an alternative production" 
(17). Hence to deconstruct the category of sex in this way is not to 
"question the urgency or credibility of sex or violence as political issues, 
but rather show that the way their very materiality is circumscribed is 
fully political" (1992: 19). Indeed Butler explains the political 
significance of this by referring to the legal restrictions on what does 
and does not count as rape or evidence or the effects of violence etc. 
She examines the role of the category of sex as a principle of production 
and regulation rather than merely one of representation. Therefore 
she advocates putting the categories of sex and violence into quotation 
marks in order to denaturalize them and indicate that they are sites of 
political debate. 6 
6 Butler discusses the use of poststructuralism for considering violence to women's 
bodies 
in 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of Postmodernism' 
(see in 
particular p. 17-19) which forms the introduction to 
Feminists Theorise the Political, 
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Is materiality then a linguistic product? 
Butler however is not arguing for some kind of linguistic monism, any 
more than Derrida as I have argued in Part 1. Her argument is not that 
the materiality of bodies is nothing but a linguistic product but rather 
that the concept of materiality is inescapably bound up with 
signification. Butler's point on this matter is that , 
"To posit by way of 
language a materiality outside of language is still to posit that 
materiality, and the materiality so posited will retain that positing as its 
constitutive condition" (Butler 1993: 30). 
Problem of Reference 
This view of materiality challenges traditional understandings of the 
meaning of reference which are simply not complex enough. Indeed 
traditional understandings of reference and materiality have been 
generally undermined by poststructuralist insights into meaning and 
knowing, truth and knowledge. Thus Butler, for example, argues on 
this point in the context of the body: 
To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it 
originates, causes or exhaustively composes that which it 
concedes; rather it is to claim that there is no reference to a pure 
body which is not at the same time further formation of that 
body. In this sense the linguistic capacity to refer to sexed bodies 
is not denied, but the very meaning of "referentiality" is altered. 
(Butler 1992) See also Sharon Marcus, 'Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A theory and 
Politics of Rape' which Butler refers to and which is in the same collection) 
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In philosophical terms the constative claim is always to some 
degree performative. (Butler 1993: 10-11) 
Hence Butler argues that the claim that she does not take account of the 
materiality of the body rests on the assumption of a metaphysical 
opposition between materialism and idealism which is undermined in 
a poststructuralist understanding of the performativity of discourse as 
it operates in the materialization of sex. Moreover she insists that she 
is not defending constructivism per se but rather interrogating the 
erasures and exclusions that constitute its limits. What she is doing 
then, she argues, is questioning materiality as a presupposition. Thus 
she is not so much disputing the materiality of the body as providing a 
genealogy of the "normative conditions under which the materiality of 
the body is framed and formed, and, in particular how it is formed 
through differential categories of sex" (p. 17). 
Biology 
As more and more research points to the productive rather than 
descriptive role of biology/ science, while at the same time feminists 
insist on the facticity of sexed / gendered bodies, it becomes clear that 
conceptualizing construction as something in opposition to 
essentialism or extraneous to an object is not really adequate.? 
However, one might question whether Butler provides an adequate 
way of thinking of the materiality of the body. Does her account 
deal 
adequately with 'biology', with, as Kirby puts it in another context, 
"the 
peristaltic movements of the viscera, the mitosis of cells, the electrical 
activity that plays across a synapse, the itinerary of a virus, and so on" 
7See for example Oudshoorn (1994) in physics, Armstrong 
(1987) in medical sociology 
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(Kirby 1991b : 13). Kirby highlights the inadequacy of suggesting that 
anatomy is simply inseparable from its interpretation. She argues that 
this involves viewing the body as either a tabula rasa a or as pre- 
existing and then entering the field of language, as in psychoanalytic 
accounts. However, it seems to me, it is not that anatomy is simply 
inseparable from its interpretation. The crucial point is well made by 
Butler thus: 
For surely bodies live and die; eat and sleep; feel pain, pleasure; 
endure illness and violence; and these 'facts', one might 
skeptically proclaim, cannot be dismissed as mere construction. 
Surely there must be some kind of necessity that accompanies 
these primary and irrefutable experiences. And surely there is. 
But their irrefutablity in no way implies what it might mean to 
affirm them and through what discursive means. 
(Butler 1993: xi) 
Those very peristaltic juices may well exceed their interpretation. 
Indeed this point is there in both Nietzsche and Foucault but it is 
perhaps made most explicitly in Derrida who is at pains to point out 
that materiality is never fully captured in interpretation. Indeed, that 
is his critical point. 8 Furthermore Derridian deconstruction and in 
particular differance provide a view of reference and materiality that 
avoids the separation of text (reference) and extra-textual real 
(materiality) which can usefully be applied here. 
Deconstruction, Reference and Bodies 
Deconstruction renders problematic the concept of materiality but this 
does not entail an incipient idealism or denial of the material. Indeed 
8Butler's relation to Foucault will be examined in chapter 4. 
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again the point is that the material is rendered problematic in the sense 
that the view of meaning and the productivity of language within 
deconstruction undermines the binary opposition (as indeed all binary 
oppositions) between the real and the ideal, the material and its 
representation. This does not involve a denial of the material so much 
as an insistence on the materiality of representation (or in more 
technical terms 'the signifier' or signification). The point is that in 
diffe ra n ce the material does not stand in opposition to something ideal 
but yet there is always a material excess, as I made clear in chapter 1. 
Representation produces rather than captures the 'real" or the material 
and there is always an excess to representation. Ultimately what this 
amounts to, as Derrida explains in Positions, is a rejection not so much 
of matter per se as a rejection of matter in the logocentric sense as 
foundational in the sense of presence, reality, or any kind of 
transcendental signified (Derrida 1981 : 65). 9 
If these insights are applied to the matter of bodies the following 
implications ensue: If the matter of bodies is seen as itself a matter of 
production rather than as a predetermining given this paves the way to 
begin to think about what goes into the production of bodies as male 
and female subjects; and to focus on the social institutions, practices 
and knowledges (such as biology) that produce sex and gender as causes 
rather than effects. We can deconstruct the processes, representations 
and symbolic framework that pervade the cultural imaginary, through 
which we are constituted and through which we constitute 
9 Derrida also discusses the problem of reference and rejects charges that deconstruction 
involves the suspension of reference, see the interview with Richard Kearney in 
Kearney (1984), Kirby (1991a, 1991b, ) and Ferrell (1991) also discuss the question of 
reference and materiality in relation to Derrida. 
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ourselves-10 For, as Rosalyn Diprose puts it, as the body always refers 
beyond itself, the production of bodies is also always incomplete. 
Moreover, precisely because the production of difference is always 
unfinished and partial "sexed bodies are always open to other 
possibilities beyond those which position woman as other to man. 
Even though there is no "outside" the social text, this does not 
preclude the possibility of change' (Diprose 1994: 80). 
But where does social change come from in this case? This is a 
question I examine in relation to Butler in chapter 5, and to some 
extent in chapter 4 where it is also considered in relation to Derrida and 
Foucault. I raise it here to emphasise that it is an integral part of 
feminists concerns in rethinking corporeality and recognising sexed 
subjectivity as embodied. Indeed I have demonstrated that their view 
on this highlights significant differences in the work of the three 
theorists discussed in this chapter. 
Conclusion 
The main concern of this chapter has been to consider the problem of 
how to rethink the materiality of the body in such a way as to 
acknowledge both the bodily roots of subjectivity and the sexed 
specificity of bodies without according women some sort of essential 
nature. However the rethinking of the materiality of the body has been 
shown to be somewhat problematic in the work of both Braidotti and 
Grosz. This is because for them this rethinking involves retaining a 
10 (Mis)understanding deconstruction as being about pure textuality or in operation only 
at the formal level gives rise to the view that deconstruction is not able to be concerned 
with bodies. For bodies are deemed material entities. This then again feeds into the 
problem of reference and relatedly of materiality. For a discussion of the apparent 
neglect of embodiment in deconstruction see Diprose (1994: 77-81). 
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binary notion of sexual difference around which to build a 
reconstructive project based on the bodies of women. The problems 
identified in this regard stem from the fact that their respective projects 
thus remain caught within a Lacanian framework, even while 
explicitly attempting to resist it and to follow instead the logic of the 
way difference works within deconstruction. It is because they remain 
caught within this Lacanian framework that the only possible response 
to the effacement of women in sexual difference seems to be to 
reconstruct that effaced element, which is, after all half of a binary pair. 
Following Butler, and drawing on Derrida, I have argued that this is 
not the only response to the question of sexual difference, nor is it the 
most fruitful. Indeed, one implication of the argument put forward in 
this thesis is that such a move would not be successful as it serves to 
perpetuate the binary thinking on which phallogocentrism is based. I 
have argued rather that establishing and affirming female subjectivity 
alongside male subjectivity requires an end to binary thinking on 
sexual difference, since it is this that sustains gender hierarchies. It 
involves taking care not to reifying a binary notion of sexual difference. 
Which is why I find Judith Butler's problematic, and the rethinking of 
the body that it involves, more helpful. I have argued for applying the 
insights of deconstruction regarding the deconstruction of the 
material / reference distinction to the problematic of sex/gender and the 
body. This provides a way of rethinking the materiality of the body 
within the problematic of embodied subjectivity accepting feminist 
insights concerning the salience of gender and acknowledging the 
specificity of sex/ gendered bodies. At the same time the binarization of 
existence and essentialism / anti-essentialism, construction/ not 
construction dichotomies are avoided. It can also accommodate queer 
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theorists insights concerning the salience of (hetero)sex, as I 
demonstrate in chapter 5. Butler argues that the focus needs to be on 
the heterosexualizing imperative of the symbolic order and that "we 
must begin to think the convergence and reciprocal formation of 
various irnaginaries, and that sexual difference is nether more primary 
than other forms of social difference, nor is its formation 
understandable outside of a complex mapping of social power" (Butler 
1995: 142). In which case striving towards establishing an autonomous 
female sexuality, although perhaps a necessary strategy from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, is not necessarily helpful. Moreover 
Butler's notion of the abject, which is only touched on in this chapter is 
important for moving beyond the Lacanian notion of symbolic and 
imaginary that is foundational to much feminist theorizing about 
sexual difference and subjectivity, as chapter 4 demonstrates. 
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Chapter 4 
Derrida and Foucault: Writing and Discourse 
Michel Foucault did not have much to say on the topic of sexual 
difference. Nevertheless his work on sex, sexuality and the body, has 
proved very useful, in various ways to both feminist and 'queer' 
projects. Indeed his genealogical method and concepts of discourse and 
power provide the starting point for Butler's reformulation of 
corporeality that I discuss in chapter 3 and her notion of performativity 
that I discuss in chapter 5.1 Further to this, and despite their early 
public disagreements, Foucault's work shares a number of similarities 
with Derrida's. 2 For example they share a similar theoretical 
orientation at the heart of which is a concern with, and critique of, 
representation. Foucault also views language as something other than 
a mere tool of expression and as in some way constitutive of reality and 
the individuals who comprise it. He, like Derrida, seems to find it 
difficult to define his projects and is reluctant to characterise them. 
Foucault, for example, never accepted the label poststructuralist or 
postmodern though that is how his work is often characterised by 
others. 3 Indeed he, like Derrida, was reluctant to adopt any labels. 
They have both been influenced by Nietzsche and Foucault's work, like 
1Foucault's work is often divided into three periods by commentators and by Foucault 
himself; archaeology; genealogy and ethics. My focus here is on his genealogical 
period since this involved an explicit focus on the body; and it is this focus that has 
been particularly productive for feminist projects. 
2For details of the Derrida Foucault 'debate' in the 1960s and early 1970s see for 
example Boyne (1990), Braidotti (1991), Deridda (1996) for his own postscript, Howells 
(1999), 
3 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) describe Foucault's work as moving 'beyond structuralism 
and hermeneutics'. 
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Derrida's, involves a critique of metaphysical dualism's and of the 
concepts of causality, identity, the humanist subject, and absolute truth. 
In his work, as in Derrida's neither the social nor the natural world, 
possess any kind of fixed essential meaning that language is used as a 
tool to express (though logocentrism functions as if it does). And, 
Foucault, like Derrida is concerned with change and transformation, 
wanting to develop the positive rather than negative implications of 
these insights. He advocates strategies of permanent critique for 
similar reasons to Derrida and he too is accused of relativism, nihilism 
and political inadequacy (misguidedly as I argue). 
Nevertheless, as far as feminist projects go, Foucault's work is often 
taken to be more relevant then Derrida's and tends to meet with less 
hostility. This work is of undoubted value in bringing the kind of 
insights that Derrida makes to bear in the understanding of the body, 
and in giving it a focus of attention that is absent in Derrida's own 
work. However, it is my contention that his work is nevertheless 
fraught with obstacles around the question of resistance and change in 
a way that Derrida's is not. In this chapter I want to examine the 
relative merits of Foucault's notion of 'discourse' and Derrida's notion 
of 'writing' and their divergent (as well as similar) theoretical 
antecedents, in order to demonstrate this. 
As I have shown, Derrida's focus is on language and 'writing' and 
demonstrating the instability of meaning: that it is part of a context 
dependent process of infinite referral, an inescapable (structural) 
process of interpretation. To recap briefly, meaning is therefore 
multiple and open to challenge and change. It is not something whose 
truth can be fixed once and for all and we cannot have direct 
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unmediated knowledge of the world or even ourselves. The correlate 
of this is that knowledge, truth, subjectivity and/or consciousness 
become accessible only through significatory frameworks and as such 
become cultural products. They are not natural (since the natural is 
also a systemic production) self-evident or self-identical. In this view, 
language plays a constitutive rather than simply expressive role in the 
creation of both meaning and human subjectivity; and in how we 
understand both our world, and the social relations on which it is 
predicated, and ourselves as subjects. This involves a critique of the 
Cartesian founding subject then as a conscious entity who can stand 
outside culture and nature and observe the world (and 'his' body) 
neutrally and discover the/its truth. Moreover, for Derrida the fixing 
of meaning is an effect of representation. It is both temporary and 
retrospective. Applied to the body it thus follows that biology does not 
fix the meaning of the body, although logocentric representations may 
act as if this were the case. 
Simplifying matters somewhat, it could be said that Foucault provides 
a way of understanding how language operates in these ways in his 
theory of discourse and his radical reconceptualisation of power and 
knowledge4. However, it seems to me that this view stems from the 
fact that Derrida's interest in language and the production of meaning 
takes for its main focus the ways that this works in philosophical texts. 
Although concerned with the implications of his work for subjectivity, 
and increasingly ethics and politics, 5 his focus continues to be on 
philosophical texts, rather than social practices, unlike Foucault. 
4Chris Weedon (1987,1997) suggests this 
5See for example The Politics of Friendship (1997), first published in French as 
Politiqiies de l'amitie Paris: Galilee 1994; Interview On Responsibility' May 1993 
reproduced in Dronsfield and Midgley (1997)Adieii to Levinas (1999) 
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Foucault's work is more explicitly oriented to a critique of knowledge 
and power and he takes as his focus the production of knowledge in 
the human sciences and the implications of this for social practices. He 
wants to demonstrate the complicity of the human sciences in power 
relations and the subjection/ subjectification of subjects and thereby 
challenge the view that the these disciplines are progressively 
producing emancipatory knowledge or truths for the good of mankind 
(sic). His work therefore has a more obvious practical applicability. 
Further to this, although Foucault's work is also considered difficult to 
access, Derrida's work, especially his early works often involve a 
playful textual speculation that belies the seriousness of his projects, as 
I discuss in chapter 1. This can be a stumbling block to an appreciation 
of the seriousness of Derrida's projects and results in the charge that 
they lack philosophical rigour, never mind practical applicability. 6 
However, to recap my earlier discussion, the playfulness in question 
comes from a concern to demonstrate the play of meaning and 
language in these texts and the significance of this for the role of 
meanings and language in the constitution of reality, and the 
individuals (as both subjects and objects) who comprise it. The 
perceived lack of (philosophical or practical) relevance of this emphasis 
on 'textuality' stems from an association of it with words and/or 
language that are somehow divorced form reality, the material world, 
and matter such that they become relegated solely to the realm of the 
6See for example Habermas (1989), Rorty (1989), among many others. Though it is also 
interesting to note that Habermas has been widely criticised for not reading the works 
he criticises in their entirety and for relying on secondary sources rather than Derrida's 
own texts. 
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playful. If these points are missed the crucial point of Derrida's work is 
lost. 
The crucial point to grasp is that in Derrida's formulation of textuality, 
textuality is the material world, reality, matter, as I have been at pains 
to demonstrate in chapter 1. 'Writing', it is to be remembered, is 
extended from its restricted (logocentric, phonocentric) sense of marks 
on a page, to a general sense in which all of social reality is comprised 
of texts because there simply is no meaning outside of interpretation; 
and as such it is open to deconstruction. (This even applies to our 
most intimate experiences of our own bodies and identities, as I 
demonstrate in chapter 2, in relation to Spivak and practices of female 
genital mutilation). This is the crucial point in all of Derrida's work, 
and it is on acceptance of this 'fact' that his arguments stand or fall, and 
a deconstructive approach is appreciated or not. 7 This is not to deny 
however that Derrida's own work does in fact focus in the main on 
philosophical texts; it is rather to emphasise the significance of this 
work when its insights are applied to the problematic of corporeality, 
subjectivity and sexual difference. Indeed, more than this, it is to argue 
that it is Derrida's notion of writing that gives his work the edge over 
Foucault's. For, not only does this involve the critical engagement 
with the ontology of sexual difference that I have argued can be so 
useful to feminist theory, (in chapters 2 and 3) it is precisely because of 
this view of language and writing that Derrida is able to avoid the 
7See Ann Game (1992) for an interesting example of someone who does take this insight 
seriously and demonstrates the practical value of it in the empirical context of 
sociological inquiry. You can't get much more practical or empirical than sociological 
inquiry. Like a number of others in the late 1980s and early 1990s Game is especially 
concerned with the role of desire in the production of sociological 'facts' and the ways 
in which this and the body have been neglected in this discipline. Where her work 
has the edge, it seems to me, is that she fully appreciates the utility of a 
deconstructive approach for empirical inquiry. 
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ultimate determinism that, despite his best intentions, haunts 
Foucault's genealogy and notion of discourse. 
Moreover, Derrida comes to this view of language and writing because 
his work and his (non)concepts both engage with and are informed by 
structural linguistics and psychoanalysis (amongst other things) in a 
way that Foucault's is not. Indeed, Foucault views psychoanalysis as 
part of the very disciplinary framework that sustains the repressive 
hypothesis that his genealogical inquiries aim to debunk. 
Having thus set the context for this debate, I will begin the discussion 
by setting out the main elements of Foucault's view of discourse as 
applied to the body, followed by a brief assessment of the benefits of this 
for feminist projects. I will then go on to further develop Derrida's 
view of writing in the context of his critique of Austin's speech act 
theory and his (Derrida's) generalisation of the performative effects of 
language, which referred to in chapter 1 but did not discuss in detail. 
Finally, I will set these insights in the contexts of Butler's critique of the 
heterosexualising imperative in the Lacanian symbolic framework in 
order to demonstrate the positive implications for feminist 
body/ gender theory. 
Foucault: Discourse, Genealogy, Power 
In order to appreciate the insights and implications of Foucault's 
notion of discourse, we need to begin with his radical 
reconceptualisation of power that accompanied his shift from 
archaeological to genealogical inquiry in what might be described as his 
Nietzschean turn in the 1970s. I will consider this in some detail as it is 
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difficulties concerning the workings of power that render his notion of 
the discursive production of bodies and subjects so problematic as well 
as so fruitful. It is argued that it is these that ultimately undermine the 
possibilities for resistance, despite, to reiterate, Foucault's own best 
intentions. 
Foucault's radical reconceptualisation of power has had profound 
implications for our most basic assumptions including our view of 
identity, sexuality, knowledge, truth, political action and ourselves. It 
involves a rejection of the prevailing negative juridico-political model 
in which power operates principally through repression and on which 
both liberalism and Marxism are based, as well as much contemporary 
feminism. 8 Hence, the state, the law and the overall unity of 
domination are not given at the outset, Foucault argues in the History 
of Sexuality, Volume 1, but are rather 'only the terminal forms power 
takes" (p. 29). Power, he argues, does not emanate from a central point, 
or from the top down, whether from a state, sovereign or whatever; it 
cannot be seized. He proposed an alternative view of power as 
positive, creative, strategic and technical, as well as relational and 
always implying resistance; and in which power and knowledge are 
interdependent. 
This view involves an increased focus on the body as the site of the 
exercise of power, the nodal point of discourses of power/knowledge. 
The repressive hypothesis in which sexuality is seen as something 
which is innate but repressed is rejected. Sexuality, far from being the 
innate repressed product of biology, or Freudian drives, becomes an 
historical and cultural product. It becomes a primary locus of power 
8See also my discussion of Ebert in chapter 5 
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and social control in contemporary society, constituting subjects by 
exercising control on and through their bodies. 
Power relations then, are like spiralling networks that spread 
throughout society. They are not external to, but immanent within, 
other relations of all kinds, whether they are economic, sexual, 
knowledge-related or whatever. Hence, (and this is a point particularly 
pertinent for feminist analyses of male power) there is no monocausal 
root of power and any analysis needs to focus on specific domains in 
which power is exercised, in historical situations. So, rather than 
seeking to locate the source of power, the focus should be on its role in 
the production of reality, truth and human subjects and the practices 
that constitute these. What is needed therefore, in this view, is not a 
metacritique of power but a 'microphysics' of power, to focus on the 
specific mechanisms through which it operates in the capillaries; the 
concrete detail, techniques, tactics and strategies of power - all of which 
are neglected in the juridico-political model. 
Significantly then, Foucault's concern is not with the 'what' of power, 
the grand explanation, but with the 'how' of power, how it operates. 
His interest stems not form an interest in power per se but form his 
attempt, as he puts it in 'The Subject and Power', "to create a history of 
the different modes by which in our culture human beings are made 
subjects" (Foucault 1982: 208). Hence he does not ask what power is 
but 
rather how is it exercised. 
What he proposes therefore, is not really a theory of power, but rather a 
Imicrophysics of power', 'an analytic of power relations' in order to 
provide a grid of analysis to make possible the analysis of 
the 
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"multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organisation" (Foucault 1978: 
92). He wants to analyse the specific domains formed by power and in 
particular to focus on the specificity of its material bodily forms. 
His focus on the body as the intersection of power/knowledge and 
discourse, in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1 (his genealogies) reveals what he terms 'bio-power' to be the 
pervasive organising principle in the modern age in Western society. 
In contrast to the overtly violent monarchical power of the classical 
age, bio-power is an apparently benevolent but nevertheless more 
effective insidious form of social control aimed at the production of 
useful but also 'docile' individuals. Indeed his central thesis in these 
two works is that power relations are constitutive of the social realm 
and that they work on and through the bodies of individuals. He is 
concerned to examine the construction of particular types of subjects 
and subjectivity through the operations of particular regimes of 
power /knowledge that work in disciplinary fashion on and through 
the body. The focus of analysis is the discursive field - penology in 
Discipline and Punish and sexuality in The History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1. Discursive fields can be thought of as competing 
frameworks in the production of meaning and the organisation of 
social reality ad the institutions, practices, and processes that comprise 
it. These set the conditions of possibility for whatever can be said, or 
thought, or done in any particular context, at any particular time. 
Importantly however, bio-power in its two modalities - the social body 
and the control of populations, and sexuality - regulates and controls, 
not through repression but through the incitement of desires, self- 
surveillance and confession. It is through these that individuals come 
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to know themselves and the truth of their sexuality, police themselves 
and measure themselves against a standard normalcy. 
The implication however, is not that power never operates as a 
repressive force but rather that to equate power only with repression is 
inadequate. It cannot capture the complexity of contemporary power 
relations and their role in the constitution of individuals as subjects. A 
particularly significant defining feature of Foucault's conception of 
power relations outlined in the History of Sexuality Volume 1 is that 
they are "both intentional and non-subjective" (p. 94), "strategies 
without strategists, which condition the battle in each micro-context" 
(p. 94). (War is a frequent metaphor for power here, emphasising the 
role of struggle and force involved in the exercise of power relations). 
Moreover, Foucault argues, "There is no power that is exercised 
without a series of aims and objectives" (p. 95) 
Significantly, he continues: 
But this does not mean that it results from the choice or 
decisions of an individual subject; let us not look for the 
headquarters that presides over its rationality, neither the caste 
which governs, nor those who make the most important 
economic decisions direct the entire network of power that 
functions in society.. . 
The logic is perfectly clear, the aims 
decipherable and yet it is often the case there is no-one there to 
have invented them, and few who can be said to have 
formulated them. (Foucault 1978: 95) 
Therefore, importantly for feminism, and against those who would 
deny it, Foucault's view of power does involve patterns and tendencies 
of historical movement. 
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An analytics of power then reveals that power is everywhere, and as 
such, serves not only as a critique of the juridico-political model of 
power that Foucault rejects, but also serves to refute any notions of 
liberation - whether they are political or sexual - that promise a realm 
free of the hold of power. However, although his critics9 argue that in 
so posing power everywhere he also poses it as nowhere and thus 
precludes effective opposition; Foucault himself poses the very 
different view that, being everywhere it must be opposed everywhere. 
Moreover, as he points out in the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, 
where there is power there is also necessarily resistance. To say that 
power is inescapable, he argues, is to misunderstand the relational 
character of power relationships. "Their existence depends on a 
multiplicity of points of resistance ... 
The points of resistance are 
present everywhere in the power network (Foucault 1978: 95). The 
crucial point, however, is that "there is no single locus of great Refusal, 
no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary" (Foucault 1978: 95) Moreover although there are 
occasional 'radical ruptures': 
[M]ore often we are dealing with mobile transitory points of 
resistance, producing cleavages in society that shift about, 
fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across 
individuals themselves, cutting them up and remoulding them, 
marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and in 
their minds. (Foucault 1978: 96) 
Hence, state power is not the starting point of the analysis for Foucault, 
nor is it the strategic point of resistance, because, as he argues 
it is 
dependent on the knowledge claims of the human sciences which 
9See for example Merquior (1985), Dews (1987), Hartsock (1990). 
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coordinate power relations into patterns of domination which work 
through the establishment of dominant discourses and disciplinary 
power. It is dependent on the micro-mechanisms of power which are 
consolidated and co-ordinated by the institutions, practices and 
knowledge claims of the disciplines which are essential to it. The way 
to resistance therefore is rather through the micro-mechanisms that 
make up the web of power relations: discourses and discursive 
practices. 
Similarly, if the ubiquity of male dominance, or the dominance of the 
male which is not quite the same thing, is dependent on the 
multiplicity of power relations, manifested in discursive practices, on a 
multiplicity of sites and if those power relations are inherently 
unstable and themselves imply resistance, what feminists require are 
the tools to analyse and unmask these mechanisms of male power 
inherent in those relations of force; and thereby reveal the workings of 
power in operation in otherwise undreamed of arenas. (Indeed one of 
the secrets of power's success, Foucault argues, is that it masks its own 
operation. ) This will help reveal possibilities for resistance. In other 
words what is required is genealogy; the methodological counterpart to 
Foucault's radical reconceptualisation of power. 
Discourse 
However, before moving on to a discussion of Foucault's genealogy, I 
would first like to say something about his notion of discourse. Power 
and knowledge then, are intrinsically related and are expressed in 
discourses. The production of knowledge is not a matter of discovering 
the truth about reality since there is no truth about reality outside of 
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our discourses that is waiting to be discovered. Truth and falsity do not 
depend on any absolute standard but on acceptance of the facts entailed 
in the discourses on which particular truths are based. Foucault tries to 
avoid the discursive / non-discursive dichotomy in his insistence that 
discourses are characterised by the creation of both power/ knowledge 
(regimes of truth) and subjects and objects, and that all knowledge is 
discursive practice. These practices are both productive of networks of 
power and knowledge and at the same time, produced within such 
networks. 
Discourses, then in Foucault's work, are clearly more than simply the 
spoken or written word, or language in the sense of communication. 
They provide the conditions of possibility for whatever can be said or 
thought or done. They produce 'facts' or 'truths' and they have a 
normative function in that they set the parameters of normalcy and 
define what does or does not constitute truth. In a sense then 
discourses provide the framework, the logic that underpins particular 
institutions, practices and subjectivities. Foucault turns to genealogy as 
a means of looking for the play of power in all discourses; a means of 
analysing how individuals are both (discursively) constituted and 
(discursively) constitute themselves as human subjects 
Genealogy 
Genealogy is both a method of investigation, involving historical 
analysis and critique, and a tool of resistance. Through this Foucault 
aims to highlight the anonymous historical processes through which 
our identities and sense of self are constructed. Genealogy highlights 
the role of the body within this as a target for the controlling and 
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simultaneously productive forces by means of which these processes 
work; through which they are experienced individually. It is an 
attempt to bring to awareness the forces that constitute us and define 
the range of possibilities for us in particular contexts. Though note not 
in the sense of the self-consciousness equated with the Cartesian 
subject. It is rather a means of highlighting and examining historically 
changeable practices and understandings in order to free us from 
them. 10 The aim, nevertheless, is to foster resistance. 
Foucault's genealogy takes as its starting point Nietzsche's crucial 
insight that "things have no essence or that their essence is fabricated 
piecemeal from alien forms". Genealogy rests on the assumption that 
there are no laws, fixed essences or metaphysical finality. There is no 
fixed reality available to us, everything is historical and contextual. 
Any sense of fixed identity is exposed as an illusion, for "Nothing in 
man (sic) not even his body - is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis 
for self-recognition or for understanding other men" (Foucault 1977d: 
153). 
Focusing on the body as the nodal point through which 
power /knowledge operates in its discursive production, Foucault as a 
genealogist traces the elements of a 'political technology' of sex and 
traces them back in time in order to produce what he refers to in 
Discipline and Punish as a 'history of the present' (p. 10). Note 
however, that he eschews all notions of progressive or teleological 
history and orthodox historiography. He does not aim to project 
contemporary meanings backwards, he rather seeks the conditions of 
10See David Hoy (1986) 
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possibility -a prioris, exclusions and repressions - that serve to produce 
those current meanings. 
Hence the genealogist is, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) suggest, a 
diagnostician who focuses on the relations of power/knowledge and 
the body in contemporary society and reveals the fundamental 
contingency, discontinuity, and ignoble origins of traditional 
teleological history, knowledge and the human subject. The 'Man' of 
Western humanism is thus revealed to be a conceptual abstraction 
with no basis in fact and the human sciences are undermined. Truth 
and knowledge are inextricably bound up with power. As Foucault 
argues in 'Truth and Power', "A 'regime of truth' is not established by 
an ever closer approximation to the truth since "'Truth' is linked in a 
circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, 
and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it" (Foucault 
1984: 74). Hence "The political question, to sum up, is not error, 
illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology. It is truth itself. Hence 
the importance of Nietzsche" (Foucault, 1984: 75). 
Foucault explicitly rejects the concept of ideology because of its 
implication in the idea that there could be a realm free of ideology and 
power, pure non-ideological understandings of social relations etc. For 
Foucault this is simply not possible. (Neither is it possible for Derrida 
if we take ideology to be synonymous with error and its removal a 
matter of freedom and liberation to some pure realm of presence. ) 
The human sciences are not simply describing the world and the 
subjects in it but are rather normalising, normative and exclusionary - 
excluding as deviants those who do not conform. The power relations 
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that are intrinsic to them involve the subjugation of alternative, local 
and fragmented knowledges. These are part of the resistance and 
struggle that characterises all knowledge production. Genealogies 
involve 'a painstaking rediscovery' of those struggles, the 'rude 
memory' of their conflicts and a critique of the essentialism of 
totalising theories. As Foucault puts it, genealogy 
should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical 
knowledge from subjection, to render them, that is, capable of 
opposition, and struggle against the coercion of unitary formal 
and scientific discourses. It is based on a reactivation of local 
knowledges - of minor knowledges as Deleuze might call them - 
in opposition to the scientific hierarchisation of knowledge and 
the effects intrinsic to their power. (Foucault, 1980: 85) 
Foucauldian genealogy then involves uncovering the constitutive 
effects of power with the aim of creating the space in which to resist it 
and thus aiding the expression of those whose knowledge and 
experiences are suppressed in the dominant disciplinary discourses. 
Disciplinary Power and the Body 
Disciplinary power takes the form of knowledge produced in the 
human sciences and the emergence of disciplinary techniques and 
practices such as those in medicine, psychiatry, criminology and 
institutions such as hospitals and asylums which define who is sick or 
deviant or mad. Thus in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 Foucault 
outlines how medical, psychiatric, welfare and legal discourses 
combine to construct homosexuality as a defining characteristic of 
certain types of person. In the 19th century there had 
been a search for 
the scientific truth of about sexuality and although the sexual 
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behaviour was nit new a new category of sexuality (and identity was 
created) The homosexual personality as sick and perverted was thus a 
construct of the emerging discourses. Homosexuals were identified, 
categorised, labelled and excluded from normal social interaction. 
Thus sexuality is proposed as a 'technology of sex' not a property of 
bodies or something that exists in human beings. It is the product of a 
complex political technology. This means that it is the product of 
various institutionalised discourses, knowledges, and the practices that 
pervade our everyday lives. Human sciences, such as medicine and 
psychoanalysis, play a powerful normalising role in the contemporary 
constitution of bodies. 
For Foucault then the body is a cultural and historical construct. Even 
in its materiality or corporeality it is inseparable from the power 
relations that constitute it. There is no pre-discursive body. In 
'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' the body is described as 
[T]he inscribed surface of events (traced by language and 
dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the 
illusion of a substantial unity) and a volume in perpetual 
disintegration. Genealogy as an analysis of descent is thus 
situated within the body and history. Its task is to expose a body 
totally imprinted by history and the processes of history's 
destruction of the body. (Foucault 1977d: 148) 
It is worth noting however, that although Foucault posits the 
body as 
the 'inscribed surface of events' he would, nevertheless, refuse the 
duality of corporeal exteriority and psychological interiority. 
It is 
precisely such distinctions that his account 
is attempting to avoid, 
along with other binary oppositions such as science/ideology; 
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discursive/non-discursive that I mentioned earlier. His work like 
Derrida's involves the displacement of such dualisms. 
Feminism and Foucault 
Now, in considering the limitations of this account, let me turn more 
specifically to the implications involved for feminism. This has been 
discussed in a number of places and I will merely summarise the issues 
here. 11 
One of the most pressing concerns in contemporary feminist body 
theory, as I have discussed in chapter 3, is to find a way of rethinking 
the materiality of the body in its corporeal and sexed specificity, 
without simultaneously tying women to their biology. Despite his 
own lack of attention to sexual difference, Foucault's account clearly 
provides a means of thinking the body without recourse to biological 
foundations and so it would seem to present a useful contribution to 
this endeavour. Further to this Foucault's genealogical method 
provides tools of historical analysis and critique that, adapted to 
feminist concerns, have proved very useful for feminists. His work 
has paved the way for feminists to demonstrate the crucial role of the 
construction of gender- based inequalities, rooted in biological 
attributes, in the legitimation and perpetuation of hierarchies that are 
social, rather than natural in origin. 
Indeed, many feminists have recognised the potential of a feminist 
appropriation of Foucault and have produced what Jana 
Sawicki refers 
11See for example McNay (1992), Ramazanoglu (1993) 
Sheldrick (1997) and early 
accounts such as Diamond and Quimby 
(eds) (1988), Bartky (1988). 
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to, in Disciplining Foucault, as "path breaking and provocative social 
and cultural criticism" (1991: 95). For example despite his own 
androcentrism and associated 'gender blindness' a number of feminists 
have analysed gender as the product of various discourses and political 
technologies of the body. Their analyses of anorexia nervosa, the social 
construction of femininity and masculinity, sexuality and the politics 
of sexual difference, the politics of needs have been produced in this 
way, and as such, have made a major contribution to feminist gender 
theory. 
Sawicki (1991) suggests that such appropriations have taken two main 
forms. One involves highlighting forms of domination by employing 
Foucault's analysis of disciplinary power in order to isolate the 
disciplinary mechanisms involved in the production of women's 
bodies (and men's). The other entails a focus on the possibilities for 
resistance, presented in such analyses, which identify sites of resistance 
and struggle. The argument is that although Foucault himself focuses 
on dominant discourses and disciplinary technologies of the body (and 
soul) in his characterisation of bio-power in Discipline and Punish and 
The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, it is nevertheless possible to adapt 
his form of genealogical critique to feminist concerns, and focus instead 
on sites of resistance and struggle. Indeed Sawicki (1991) goes so far as 
to argue that work done in these two areas has not only had profound 
implications for contemporary feminism but that an appropriation of 
Foucault's genealogy is essential to feminism12. 
Indeed one of the strengths of his work, for those who seek to 
appropriate it, clearly lies in the possibilities it presents for resistance to 
12She rethinks this view later, see Sawicki (1994) 
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domination. In keeping with these sentiments it is argued that 
Foucault sought to establish two principle theses. 13 These are that we 
can discuss resistance to oppression without recourse to metacritiques 
of power; and that we can discuss subjects and action without reference 
to a Cartesian constituting subject. These are indeed significant moves 
for feminist theory and they are in keeping with the deconstructive 
insights I have been discussing in this thesis. However it is precisely 
around this question of resistance that the major shortcomings of 
Foucault's work centre, although not all of the criticisms that are made 
of his work in this regard have equal validity. 
One set of criticisms that I would want to reject, centre around similar 
criticisms that I have discussed in relation to Derrida: accusations that 
his theoretical approach entails relativism, nihilism and political 
inadequacy because it undermines both the grounds for political action, 
or critique, and the constituting humanist subject who would 
undertake it. Another similar set of criticisms to this, which are again 
rather like criticisms made of deconstructive insights, centre on the 
(supposedly) negative concept of freedom and liberation that his work 
entails and which is deemed to undermine feminism as an 
emancipatory project. Here the problem centres on the concepts of 
freedom and liberation themselves and associated ideas about what an 
emancipatory project would, could or should involve. Again I am 
persuaded more by the counter-argument that it is not freedom and 
liberation themselves that Foucault rejects. It is rather the particular 
construction of those concepts in liberalism humanism and 
Marxism, 
and their feminist variants, including certain 
forms of radical 
feminism which seek to celebrate women's essential natures. 
As 
13See Susan Hekman (1990). 
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Foucault's genealogies show such constructions of freedom and 
liberation have more to do with techniques of domination. Where 
they err, in particular, is in assuming that there is some essential self or 
reality to which one could be 'liberated'. As I have shown, Foucault's 
Nietzschean influence shows here. Indeed Foucault's debt to 
Nietzsche is explicit and acknowledged. His concrete genealogies accept 
Nietzsche's insight that under interpretation is only more 
interpretation. Accordingly there is no realm free of power; no 
underlying reality, essential self or pre-discursive body. As one 
sympathetic commentator observes, freedom for Foucault is not o be 
found in either self-discovery, authenticity or (alluding rather 
negatively to Derrida) the 'free play of language', but rather in a 
"constant attempt at self-disengagement and self invention" 
(Rajchman 1985: 38). Therefore, for Foucault, "Freedom does not 
basically he in discovering, or being able to determine who we are, but 
in rebelling against those ways in which we are already defined, 
categorized and classified" (Rajchman 1985: 38). (Which recalls my 
argument against nominalism in chapter 2). And this is Butler's 
move, as I discuss in chapter 5, although she finds she needs to move 
outside a Foucauldian framework to draw on Derrida and his critique 
of speech act theory to make it. 
The trouble is that although genealogy might seem to offer feminist 
appropriate tools of historical analysis there are in Foucault's work a 
number of theoretical non sequiturs: in particular the failure to 
reconcile theoretically the production of docile bodies with the 
possibility of resistance. Foucault himself was aware of these 
difficulties. Indeed perhaps because of them, he switched his attention 
from the body/ subject to the problematic of the self in his later works, 
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where he attempted to formulate an 'aesthetics of existence' leaving 
various problems in this area unanswered. 14 
The problem with resistance in his depiction of the body, the subject 
and social reality as a product a discursive effect and product of power 
relations is this: although Foucault might insist that there is no power 
without resistance and struggle and he talks about reverse discourses 
and subjugated knowledges, a significant flaw in this account is that in 
posing the body as the chief target of power relations he seems to 
portray an 'undifferentiated and uni-directional' account of power in 
which it seems to appear as "a monolithic force with an inexorable and 
monolithic grip on its subjects" (McNay 1992: 38). 
One response to this is to suggest that what his account lacks is a 
concept of the libidinal body, to act as a counter-factual to power. This 
is the suggestion that Peter Dews (1987) makes. (It is also the direction 
that Deleuze and Guattari move in, on whose work Braidotti, discussed 
in chapter 3, draws. ) However this is not the only solution. Another is 
to rethink the workings of power in the production of the body, and 
the constitution of subjectivity, through a development of the notion 
of performativity. This is Butler's move. It is precisely for these 
reasons that she adds Derrida's reworking of Austin to her otherwise 
very Foucauldian analyses. However, as I discuss Butler's moves in 
detail in chapter five I won't pre-empt that discussion here. Suffice it 
for now to say that it is because Butler wants to allow for resistance and 
change in her account of gendered embodiment - and in so doing avoid 
what she terms 'Foucault's paradox' - that she draws on and 
develops a 
number of Derridian insights concerning the nature of 
the 
14See McNay (1992), (1994), Foucualt (1985), (1986) 
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performative, in particular iterability, temporality and citationality. 
Butler applies them in her 'queer theory': that is she employs them in 
her theorisation of the body and the production or inauguration of 
embodied subjectivity. It is in order to accommodate the intransigent, 
resilient aspects of identity that she develops these insights further in 
her most recent works concerning 'the psychic life of power' and 
relatedly the workings of 'hate speech', which I also discuss in chapter 
5.15 
For now however, having laid out the main elements of Foucault's 
notion of discourse and the discursive construction of the body, and 
having discussed the implications and limitations of this for feminist 
projects, I will return to Derrida and his notion of writing in order to 
show why I think this has the edge over Foucault in allowing the 
possibility of resistance. With this aim in mind I will develop 
Derrida's notion of writing in the context of his critique of Austin's 
speech act theory and generalisation of the performative effects of 
language. 
Derrida`s Critique of Speech Act Theory and Generalisation of the 
Performative Effects of Language 
One of the major differences between Foucault's view of discourse and 
Derrida's view of 'writing' is the formers engagement with, and 
adaptation of, key concepts of Freud's work. Indeed it seems to me that 
this is what gives Derrida's work the critical edge over Foucault's. 
In 
contrast to Derrida, Foucault dismisses psychoanalysis as part of 
the 
disciplinary framework of modern societies and discusses Freud, when 
15See Butler (1997a) and (1997b) 
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he does mention him, in fairly negative terms in. 16 Although Foucault 
does afford significant insight into the notions of repression and 
liberation, his analysis is thus denied the insights to be gleaned from an 
appropriation of other aspects of Freud's work. 
Derrida is not interested in psychoanalysis as a therapeutic practice, any 
more than Foucault is. He is however interested in the philosophical 
implications of Freud's work. Moreover this engagement is hardly 
surprising, as it was Freud who first raised the possibility of the 
impossibility, so to speak, of presence for consciousness or the ego. The 
aspects of Freud's work that Derrida develops that I want to highlight 
here are his use of writing as a metaphor for the workings and content 
of the psyche, his use of the metaphor of the mystic writing pad for the 
unconscious, and repression. These have implications, in particular, 
for the fixing (or not) of meaning and the disruption of conscious 
intentions and they undermine the possibility of a self-present subject. 
They have all contributed significantly, and explicitly, to Derrida's own 
notion of writing and his critique of the speech/ writing opposition and 
the metaphysics of presence, as well as the subsequent development of 
diffe ra n ce. The first two, though not so much the notion of repression, 
have contributed to the development of Derrida' s notion of iteration. 17 
16Derrida himself also suggests that Foucault's work is limited by a lack of serious 
engagement with Freud's work, especially Beyond the Pleasure Principal, and a 
complete neglect of Lacan, in a recent essay on Foucault collected in Resistances and 
Psychoanalysis,. He suggests that Freud's view of the duality of the death drive and 
the Pleasure Principle could have been related to Foucault's own power/ pleasure 
duality. This essay was first given as a paper at a conference to celebrate the thirtieth 
anniversary of the publication of the original French version of Madness and 
Civilisation (Histoire de la folie ä 1'äge classique) in 1961, and in it he traces Freud's 
brief encounters with Freud in the course of his ouvre. (See Howells 1999). 
17See, 'Freud and the Scene of Writing' in Writing and Difference (Derrida 1978a), 
'Differance' in Margins of Philosophy (Derrida 1982). Derrida also discusses Freud 
(and Lacan), in a number of other places, including, in particular, in The Postcard: From 
Socrates to Freud and Back, (Derrida 1987), 'Psyche: Inventions of the Other', (Derrida 
1989), and Derridabase (Derrida and Bennington 1993), Resistance and Psychoanalysis. 
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These all involve important insights which he brings to bear in the 
critique of Austin's speech act theory in 'Signature, Event, Context' 
(SEC) (Derrida 1982). 
Derrida's notion of writing as a structure that is always already 
inhabited by the trace, which I discussed in chapter 1, is indebted to 
Freud18. In 'Freud and the Scene of Writing', in Writing and 
Difference, he presents a linguistic interpretation of Freud's work 
focusing on his use of the metaphor of writing for understanding the 
workings of the psyche. The Freudian notion of the unconscious as an 
absent presence, an alterity which cannot be known but which provides 
the conditions of possibility for what is known, is of particular 
significance for Derrida in deconstructing the presence/ absence 
opposition and the speech writing opposition (both of which are 
discussed in chapter 1). However where Freud takes the unconscious 
to be constituted by ideational representations of instincts or drives, for 
Derrida it is more like an empty space. Indeed he emphasises that it is 
not "a hidden, virtual or potential self-presence" (Derrida 1982: 20). It 
is rather that which provides the possibility for interpretation, for 
experience, meaning and subjectivity even as it simultaneously marks 
the impossibility of full presence in any of these arenas; all of which are 
constituted within a never ending or abyssal process of referral and 
deferral, differing and differentiation, as I have shown in chapter 1. 
To sum up then, Derrida's concern is with a kind of structural 
unconscious that is originary without either being finite or implying 
(Derrida (1998). Other works make use of psychoanalytic notions e. g. Glas (Derrida 
1986b) and/or take issue with the issue of castration e. g. Spurs (Derrida 1979). 
18 Though note that this is not a one-way process. Indeed Howells (1999) argues that it 
is deconstruction that helps illuminate Freud's notion of the trace and the unconscious, 
rather than the other way around, as well as the psychoanalytic notion of castration. 
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closure and the ways in which this subverts the possibility of conscious 
intention. Many of the concepts he develops throughout his (still 
ongoing) work involve shedding further light on the ways that this 
might (be at) work and thus further develop his critique of presence 
(e. g. differance, trace, archi-writing, iterability, citation, spacing, 
dissemination, death, the gift). That this structural unconscious does 
not imply closure is perhaps the most significant aspect that I want to 
highlight here, as it is this that provides the possibility for change and 
transformation implied in his notion of iteration, as I will show; and 
for a positive appreciation of his critique of Austin's notion of 
performative speech acts. 
In a now classic paper, reproduced in several places19 Derrida 
deconstructed the speech act theory of J. L. Austin and provoked the 
debate - if that is not too strong a term - in Glyph, with John Searle. 
However I won't go into the details of the Derrida / Searle debate here 
since my concern is not so much with the critique of Austin per se and 
Searle's defence of his work. It is rather with Derrida's own insistence 
that all language is performative and on the possibility of failure as a 
constitutive element in that (rather than a contingent aspect as Austin 
would have it). 20 My aim is to demonstrate the significance of this for 
thinking about the body and gender as performative effects; and to 
argue that this understanding of performativity can usefully be applied 
to the problematic of the body and gender and identity and help us to 
understand the role of language in the production of these categories. . 
191t was first published in French in Merges de la Philosophie in 1972 and 
in English in 
Glyph in 1977. 
20For details of the disagreement between Derrida and Searle see Limited Inc. (Derrida 
1988) and Spivak (1980). 
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To reiterate, Derrida brings the insights of Of Graininatology 
concerning the nature of language and his view of speech as 'writing' 
to bear on Austin's (1962) notion of speech act theory in How to Do 
things with Word and, importantly, further develops the notion of 
iterability. In so doing he highlights the metaphysical presuppositions 
that are involved in Austin's notion of a performative speech act. 
(This was of particular significance given the roots of Austin's speech 
act theory in Oxford ordinary language philosophy which expressly 
aimed to avoid any such metaphysical presumptions. ) Derrida 
demonstrates that Austin succumbs to the logocentric assumption that 
meaning is fixed by the intentions of the speaker (and thus discerns the 
metaphysics of presence at work in his theory). Further to this, he 
highlights and brings into question Austin view of language as only a 
matter of communication (interestingly Derrida refers to language here 
as `acts of discourse' (Derrida 1982: 321). This is in opposition to 
performative speech acts, which bring into being that which they name 
and are therefore productive. Hence his distinction between constative 
speech which is descriptive only, and as such a question of truth and 
falsity, and performative speech which is productive e. g. marrying, 
naming a ship. He also makes a further distinction in the latter 
between illocutionary speech acts and perlocutionary speech acts 
(though as I do not think this distinction is particularly relevant to my 
discussion I will not belabour this point here). 
The point is that to make this distinction Austin sets up a series of 
exclusions, based on the context of the speech and the intentions of the 
speaker. He does this to differentiate between serious speech acts that 
will be performative, and non-serious speech, such as acting, playing, 
unauthorised citing etc., which will not be performative. 
In other 
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words he thinks that articulating the context and intentions of the 
speech fixes the meaning of these speech acts and renders them 
performative (or not). The failure of a speech act to be performative is 
thus established as a contingent possibility. Derrida brings his now 
familiar critique of presence and deconstruction of the literal and the 
metaphorical to bear and demonstrates that the question of context can 
never be fixed. 21 He demonstrates that this speech act theory is based 
on (an untenable) notion of privileged access to self-present meanings 
and intentions and that the non- serious speech acts excluded as 
exceptions to the rule, and thus as contingent possibilities, are rather 
instead the model for performative utterance in general. 
In order to see this we need to move from the idea of writing in a 
traditional sense (which Austin excludes in his speech act theory) to 
Derrida's understanding of 'writing' which includes spoken as well as 
written marks (as I explained in chapter 1). This undermines the 
possibility of privileged access to self-present meanings and (the fixing 
of) intentions on which Austin's account of the successful functioning 
of performative speech relies, precisely because of its graphematic 
structure and differance. 
Indeed, Derrida claims, "Di fferance, the irreducible absence of intention 
or assistance from the performative statement, from the most event- 
like statement possible, is what as that which 'authorizes' him to posit 
the general graphematic structure of every communication" (1982: 327 
211n taking to task ordinary language philosophy in this way Derrida is accused of 
doing comparative literature rather than philosophy, though this is clearly not my 
view. Although a debate on this issue is outside of my concerns the arguments 
in this 
thesis would serve to refute such a view. 
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my emphasis). What is at stake here is the replacement of the logic of 
repetition with the graphic of iterability. 
Derrida's work in general is marked by a movement from a structuring 
logic that characterises logocentrism to a graphic or graphematic 
structuring (as discussed in chapter 1 and which bears developing 
here). Hence for example, the graphic of the trace replaces the logic of 
origin, the graphic of dif fe ra n ce replaces the logic of identity and the 
graphic of supplementarity replaces the logic of non-contradiction as 
Spivak (1980) points out. The significance of this shift and the 
meaning of the term 'graphematic', are eloquently conveyed when she 
says that these terms imply the "structure of irreducible self-alterity 
carried by the backward and forward and many-planed tracing of 
intentions in writing" (Spivak 1980: 36-7). 
Derrida employs the graphic of iterability to develop the notion of 
citation away from a mere mechanical repetition and to suggest instead 
a repeatability which implies otherness and the possibility of alteration 
within it. Iterability is an i ter-a ti o n, and as such in a typical 
deconstructive strategy it undermines the possibility of self-identity. 
Hence Derrida takes the premise that the possibility of communication 
rests on the condition that every mark, or sign, can be cited and adds to 
that the notion of iterability in order to tease out the implications of 
this citability, beyond those assumed in speech act theory. He argues 
that precisely because any mark can be cited it can 
break with every given context, and engender infinitely new 
contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not 
suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the 
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contrary that there are only contexts without any center of 
absolute anchoring. (Derrida 1982: 320)22 
Moreover, this is not the only point he makes. Significantly he goes 
on, 
This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the 
mark is not an accident or an anomaly. but is that 
(normal/ abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even 
have a so-called "normal" functioning. What would a mark be 
that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the 
way. (Derrida 1982: 321) 
Derrida's point is that if we accept the graphematic structure of all 
locution then it is marked by the absence of presence and the possibility 
of iteration (citational grafting as opposed to mechanical repetition). In 
this case not only are the impossibility of the fixing of meaning and/or 
context highlighted but the possibility of failure becomes a structural 
element (along with the possibility of the absence of speaker and 
receiver) rather than a contingent possibility as Austin suggests. 
Moreover all utterances become performative, enacting what they 
name rather than some being simply constative. 
Hence the ritual that Austin cites as the binding context (e. g. the 
marriage ceremony, the launch of a ship) is replaced by Derrida in SEC 
with the notion of iterability. Thus "Ritual is not an eventuality, but, 
as iterability, is a structural characteristic of every mark" (Derrida 1982: 
324). Or, as Butler remarks, Derrida "substitutes the term 'iterability for 
11Although the reference here is 1982 SEC was in fact first delivered as a paper at the 
Congres internationale des Societes de philosophie de langue francaise in Montreal in 
1971. It was first translated into English in Volume 1 of Gyiph in 1977 translated by 
Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman. The translation in MOP that I am citing here is 
by Alan Bass although it is the former translation that is included in Limited Inc. I 
mention this simply as a point of information and to avoid any confusion. 
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ritual, thus establishing a structural account of repetition in the place of 
a more semantically compounded sense of social ritual" (Butler 1997b: 
165). Furthermore, 
The binding power that Austin attributes to the speaker's 
intention in such illocutionary acts is more properly attributable 
to a citational force of the speaking, the iterability that establishes 
the authority of the speech act, but which establishes the non- 
circular character of that act. In this sense, every 'act' is an echo or 
citational chain, and it is its citationality that constitutes its 
performative force. (Butler 1993: 282 fn 5) 
However, before I move on to considering the implications of this 
rethinking of performativity in the context of the concerns of this 
thesis, I want to return to return to the notion of intentionality, for a 
moment. It is important to note that although Derrida himself 
performatively aims to demonstrate the difficulties inherent in 
Austin's attempt to fix the meanings of speech acts in a particular 
situation, this not to disregard altogether any notion of intention. As 
Derrida emphasises towards the end of Differance, he his not 
concluding from this that consciousness, ordinary language, presence 
and speech acts etc. do not have any kind of relative specificity, "it is 
simply that these effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to 
them term by term, but on the contrary presupposes it in dyssemtrical 
fashion, as the general space of their possibility" (Derrida 1982: 327). 
The point about intentionality in Austin's account then is that, it 
becomes a matter of self-presence as in the metaphysics of presence. 
Moreover, since for Derrida the undecidability of context is the 
condition of possibility of any mark (whether written or spoken) it also 
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involves his critique of the speech/ writing opposition and brings in 
the question of desire - the desire for mastery that characterise 
logocentrism. Indeed Derrida acknowledges that this desire may be a 
fundamental part of human communication and being. That this is so 
in no way impugns these deconstructive insights. If anything it rather 
renders them more pertinent. 
Further to this, Spivak makes the following salient point: 
Events, objects, acts, meanings - as 'intended by the ego - as well as 
intentions themselves might well be the effects of desire precisely 
to have a self-identical intention that can produce interpretations. 
This is a limit that no concept of simple intentions can cross, for 
such a desire cannot be thought in terms of a fully intending 
subject. It remains irreducibly structural. Yet, even as intention is 
situated within such limits, Derrida insists that it is these very 
limits, demarcating intention, that produce it, and allow it to 
function as such. If this point is missed, then Derrida is seen as a 
nihilist. (Spivak 1980: 32) 
And I would say that although his critics frequently miss this point, for 
his defenders and those who adapt his insights in their own projects it 
is an important aspect of their appreciation. Furthermore, as Derrida 
himself insists it is not possible to simply move beyond this 
metaphysical tradition in an act of volition; all you can do is 
deconstruct the founding elements hence: 
Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to 
another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as 
well as a non-conceptual order with which the conceptual order 
is 
articulated. For example, writing as a classical concept carries with 
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it predicates = which have been subordinated, excluded or held in 
reserve by forces and according to necessities to be analyzed. It is 
these predicates (I have mentioned some) whose force of 
generality, generalization, and generativity find themselves 
liberated, grafted onto a 'new' concept of writing which also 
corresponds to whatever has resisted the former organization of 
forces, which has constituted the remainder irreducible to the 
dominant force which organized the - to say it quickly - 
logocentric hierarchy. (Derrida 1982: 329-330) 
One response to all this is to drown in the impossibility of presence: to 
dwell on the impossibility of language, to dwell on the impossibility of 
saying anything, in an essential sense. A more fruitful response, it 
seems to me would be to focus instead on the productive power of 
language in its performativity and its materiality. And one example of 
someone who does this is Judith Butler, whose notion of 
performativity I discuss in some detail in chapter 5. 
Butler adapts this notion of performativity in precisely this way. 
Further to this, she argues that rethinking performativity in terms of 
citationality and resignification allows taking on board important 
psychoanalytic insights without succumbing to the reification of 
normative sexuality and its inherent misogyny (1993: 21). This 
approach involves rethinking the body, and specifically the matter of 
bodies, as a social construction, as I discuss in chapter 3 and will return 
to in chapter 5. It also allows her to focus on the role of the heterosexist 
imperative in all this, enabling certain sexed identifications and 
excluding others. Butler conceives of a realm of abject unintelligible 
bodies which 'don't matter' but which form a necessary constitutive 
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outside to the realm of intelligible bodies that 'do matter'. This realm 
is not conceived as a reverse discourse in a Foucauldian sense but as an 
excluded realm, which therefore represents the possibility of return as 
in a psychoanalytic model. In Bodies that Matter23 Butler discusses the 
political promise of citationality through the "contentious practices of 
'queerness"'. The aim of these is to work to "resignify the abjection of 
homosexuality into defiance and legitimacy" (Butler 1993: 21). This 
move is not presented in terms of a reverse discourse because then the 
affirmation of queerness involved would reinstate that which it sought 
to oppose - compulsory heterosexuality - by remaining within the same 
logic. Hence the political purpose of the public affirmation of queer 
practices is rather to effect "a politicization of abjection in an effort to 
rewrite the history of the term and to force it into a demanding 
resignification" (Butler 1993: 21). The aim is radical: to resignify the 
symbolic domain itself and shift the chain of possible citations "toward 
a more possible future" (Butler 1993: 22) This is clearly a 
deconstructive move and Butler is able to make it because the 
Derridian notion of performativity allows her to rethink the Lacanian 
symbolic. Rather than a quasi-permanent structure, as Lacan would 
seem to suggest, it becomes in her account the temporalised 
regularisation of signification, which "will take seriously the Lacanian 
challenge to Anglo-American accounts of gender, to consider the status 
of 'sex' as a linguistic norm but which recasts that normativity 
in 
Foucaultian terms as a regulatory ideal" (Butler 1993: 22). Thus she 
aims to challenge the "structural stasis" of normative 
heterosexuality 
in psychoanalytic accounts whilst retaining that which she sees 
as 
valuable. This too is what Derrida 
does. It allows Butler to include a 
23An earlier version of the chapter 
in which Butler discusses this was also published in 
1993 in GLQ, Vol. 1, No. 1. 
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notion of repression and foreclosure in any formative moment and 
thus take seriously the psychoanalytic concepts of repression and 
foreclosure without reifying the duality of sexual difference as both 
Freud and Lacan tend to do. To reiterate, in rethinking performativity 
in terms of citationality and resignification Butler is able to avoid 
reifying the heterosexual norm and the misogyny it entails. 
So to sum up, what Butler finds most useful about Lacan is his view of 
sex as a symbolic position. Her most salient criticism (in Bodies that 
Matter) is that this version of sex and sexual difference, gender and 
desire, is premised on an implicit framework of normative 
heterosexuality. It is this that she seeks to challenge in her critique of 
Lacan's notion of the symbolic order. Butler rejects Lacan's view of the 
fixity of the phallus as the founding moment in the symbolic order 
because of her view of the signifying process. Her point is that 
notwithstanding the contemporary privileging of the phallus it is, 
nevertheless, always in a process of signification and resignification. 
As such the phallus is not so much the founding moment of the 
symbolic order as Lacan would have it but rather it is part of a reiterable 
signifying practice. It is this that provides the possibility for change, for 
resignification. 24 
Indeed Derrida also takes issue with Lacan over the reification of sexual 
duality and in particular the indivisibility of castration to which Lacan 
would seem to subscribe. In his discussion of Lacan's 'Seminar on the 
24 Her argument in Bodies That Matter involves a turn to the 
lesbian phallus and a 
discussion of the way in which the hegemonic imaginary - the phallus 
is an imaginary 
effect - constitutes itself through 
the naturalisation of an exclusionary heterosexual 
morphology. Her aim is to rewrite the morphological 
imaginary in order both to 
promote an alternative to this imaginary which 
displaces the symbolic of heterosexist 
sexual difference, and to expose the ways 
in which the naturalisation of an 
exclusionary heterosexual morphology 
happens. 
181 
Purloined Letter' in the Post Card (Derrida 1987) Derrida makes a 
number of charges against Lacan. One of the main problems for 
Derrida is that for Lacan the symbolic order is based on what is for 
Derrida is an untenable transcendental signified: i. e. the phallus, which 
remains as that which gives meaning to everything else but which is 
itself unquestioned. Lacan is accused of succumbing to the metaphysics 
of presence because the phallus, and castration (which signifies lack) 
remain indivisible and because Derrida insists that Lacan maintains a 
link between femininity and truth in his interpretation of Poe's story 
(which is the basis of the seminar) which remain as the ultimate 
signified. 25 Deconstructive insights, in contrast to this, do not depend 
on any ultimate reification of sexual difference or duality. They do not 
support a heterosexist norm. In my view this is one of their greatest 
strengths. 
Conclusion 
Derrida brings an emphasis on the role of exclusions, force and 
signification, in the construction of any presence and norms - an absent 
presence that provides the conditions of possibility for any 'thing'. 
However for Derrida this absent presence never can become present. 
This is the basic premise of his case against the metaphysics of presence. 
But this does not mean that any search for meaning should be 
abandoned, it is rather expressive of concern with how meanings are 
produced and that which is excluded in logocentrism. 
His concern 
therefore is with the limits of meaning.. 
25Psychoanalytic feminists tend to argue that Derrida is too critical of Lacan here and 
view his criticisms unsympathetically e. g. 
Johnson (1977), Felman (1987), Howells 
(1999). 
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Foucault brings an emphasis on power and normalisation; that is on 
the productive force of power in social regulation. This power 
manifested in discourses works on and through bodies to produces 
subjects who are subjected. Foucault is concerned also with the absent 
other but after Madness and Civilisation comes to recognise that there 
simply is no radical alterity, no absolute otherness. Thus he turns his 
attention to exclusions within discourse; to marginality and the role of 
discourse in the production of the same/ other distinction and how that 
can be transgressed. How power works on and through bodies in a 
productive sense and the question of subjugated knowledges and 
reverse discourses. He does not therefore have a sense of something 
outside discourse; something that is not captured in discourse and thus 
his account seems to imply a sense of closure that Derrida's manages to 
avoid. 
Perhaps this is due to Foucault's failure to engage with psychoanalytic 
concepts, in any systematic way. In his haste to reject psychoanalysis 
for its complicity in the 'repressive hypothesis', and its role as part of 
the disciplinary framework and surveillance - bio-power - Foucault 
does not develop the kind of insights concerning the role of a cultural 
unconscious that are to be found in Derrida's work. There is however 
in Foucault's work a notion of subjects and subjectivities changing 
overtime, in accordance with social conditions and the development of 
new discourses. Hence one source of change (as a local intervention) 
for him would be the establishment of reverse discourses. Indeed 
some feminists have adopted this model. Nevertheless, I have argued 
that, ultimately, his account of the workings of bio-power seems to 
result in the production of 'docile bodies' and theoretically precludes 
the space for change. This is despite his own best intentions. 
Reverse 
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discourses are rather problematic in that they tend ultimately to 
reinforce that which they seek to challenge, because they stay within 
the same logic. 
In contrast to Foucaults account I have argued that Derrida's notion of 
a structural unconscious as in his notion of writing, and relatedly 
dif fe ra n ce and iterability, does however provide the theoretical space 
for change, precisely because it does not involve a sense of closure, or 
mechanical repetition. Although Derrida does not apply this to the 
problematic of rethinking the body, subjectivity or corporeal difference 
I have argued that it can usefully be employed in this way. I have 
suggested Judith Butler as an example of someone whose work has 
moved in this direction. This is not however to say that the strategy of 
examining exclusions within discourse is of no use at all. Indeed 
Butler's notion of homosexual bodies as abjected, excluded, 
marginalised is a production within discourse or language. However 
Butler adds to this the notion of iterability in her account of 
performativity and so escapes the determinism of Foucault's account, 
as I will demonstrate in chapter 5. 
To return for a moment to the Foucault/ Derrida debate, Roy Boyne 
(who considers this debate in some detail. though I have not) suggests 
"Foucault's new formulation of power is precisely Derridian, an 
application of the critique of presence, but done from within an 
historical sociology rather than from within philosophy" (Boyne 1990: 
114). In his genealogy Foucault takes to task the language of reason that 
dominates the human sciences and, like Derrida, rejects the possibility 
of any inherent significance in the world or 
in consciousness. Boyne 
further suggests that Foucault's turn to the body may well 
have been a 
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response to Derrida's textualism (Foucault was as critical of this as 
anyone); and that Foucault was thereby providing "a demonstration in 
counterpoint of what he thought to be the latter's inconsequential 
pedagogy" (Boyne 1990: 111). Hence Boyne describes the difference 
between Foucault and Derrida as a difference of focus rather than of 
form. I'm not sure to what extent this may be true, given the 
reservations I have made in this chapter. But the point I want to 
highlight is his conclusion that 
The ultimate lesson of the Foucault Derrida debate is that there is 
no pure other, that ontological difference is a chimera. This 
means that there is no bright promise on the other side of reason. 
It also means, if all is on our side that there is no reason, outside 
of our reach, why we cannot generate our own bright hopes for a 
different future. (Boyne 1990: 170) 
This is precisely my point, and Butler's, who I discuss in the next 
chapter; and to do so entails rethinking the body, corporeality and 
sexual difference, along the lines suggested here. 
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Chapter 5 
Judith Butler: 
Performance and Performativity 
As I've argued in the chapter 3, one of the main strengths of Butler's 
attempt to theorise gendered embodiment lies in her refusal to accept 
any notion of sexual difference as irreducible. In particular, her 
attempt to understand sexual difference as something which is not 
simply given and therefore immutable but rather as something which 
is socially constituted to function as given, to function as an ontological 
category. This then raises a series of questions: How to theorise 
corporeality in its materiality as something that is socially constituted 
and as such open to history, culture and the possibility of change, 
whilst accepting, also, that in any particular embodied being there are 
elements of identity that become entrenched, that are 'durable but not 
immutable'1. How to acknowledge the bodily roots of gender identity 
and to theorise them as socially (rather than biologically) given 
without succumbing to either cultural determinism or some sort of 
voluntarism. How to retain a concept of agency and the possibility of 
resistance and change within this. How to transform the binary code 
that organises the gender hierarchy. Finally, how to reconcile the view 
that sexual difference is but one difference amongst others with 
feminists concerns to assert the primacy of sexual difference. 
Butler attempts to answer these questions in her notion of 
performativity and it is this that I am going to examine in this chapter. 
11 borrow this phrase from McNay 1999. 
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Through this she attempts to explain the relationship between the body 
and identity in linguistic terms. That is, she attempts to explain the 
relationship between the body, identity and signification (or the social). 
In so doing not only does Butler avoid the problems associated with 
sexual difference theorists and some body image theorists concerning 
sexual difference identified in chapter 3. She also avoids some of the 
limitations of recent (male) theories of 'reflexive identity 
transformation' that have become popular in contemporary social 
theory (e. g. Giddens 1992, Featherstone 1992). These latter accounts are 
also concerned with the role of the symbolic. However, as McNay 
argues they tend to place too much emphasis on "the expressive 
possibilities thrown up by the processes of detraditionalisation" 
(McNay 1999: 97) because they do not adequately address the embodied 
pre-reflexive aspects in the constitution of identity. It is precisely these 
aspects that Butler is trying to accommodate in The Psychic Life of 
Power, where, in examining the ways in which these pre-reflexive, 
embodied aspects are both linguistically instituted and intrinsic to the 
process of assujetissement (becoming both a subject and subjected) 
Butler is trying to render those aspects 'durable but not immutable', 
historical and cultural rather than biologically or psychically given. 
Gender as Performance and Performativity 
Let me begin by drawing attention to the fundamental role 
(compulsory) heterosexuality (and relatedly heterosexism), plays in 
Butler's attempt to theorise gender as performance and performative, 
for this 'queer' concern marks a major difference between her \vork 
and the work of Derrida and speech act theory on which she 
draws. 
Butler's notion of the performativity of identity categories in general, 
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and gender in particular, is rooted in an understanding of 
heterosexuality as a matter of imitation and parody and, as such, 
essentially unstable. Indeed this instability is, for Butler, a constitutive 
instability, and it is precisely this constitutive instability that enables 
the possibility of resistance and change. 
Drawing on the work of Foucault, Lacan, Wittig and Kristeva in, the 
now classic, Gender Trouble, and Derrida's reworking of speech act 
theory in the follow up Bodies That Matter, Butler provides an 
influential analysis of sex, gender and desire as forms of enforced 
cultural performance, an impersonation or mime of an impossible 
ideal, that came to be considered as both a seminal contribution to 
feminist gender theory and a founding contribution to the nineties 
phenomenon 'queer theory'. 2 In this radically anti-essentialist, anti- 
foundationalist account of identity categories not only does sex become 
a cultural construct along with gender, so too does the body(as 
discussed in chapter 3). 
The starting point of this account of subjectivity and the body is 
Foucault's view of power and normalisation, adapted to feminist 
concerns. Butler builds on the Foucauldian notion that subjects are 
discursively produced and that this does not involve the notion of a 
2Although, as Butler states in Gender Trouble her aim was to intervene in feminist 
theory and debates about social constructionism and the sex/ gender distinction, her 
work has attracted the label 'queer theory'. There are a number of reasons 
for this. One 
is that this queer theory is concerned with rethinking sex, sexuality and desire. 
Another is the shift in focus from gender to heterosexuality that her notion of gender as 
performance and performativity entails. Another is her discussion of 
her own lesbian 
identity which she both acknowledges and questions as a category. But perhaps the 
most significant, defining feature is that her work involves 
bringing the insights of gay 
and lesbian perspectives on sexuality and inter-sex desire onto the nature of 
heterosexuality as an institution, rather than the other way around, and then tracing 
the epistemological implications of this. For a discussion of the relationship 
between 
feminism and queer theory in general, and Butler's work in particular, see 
Butler 1994b. 
For a discussion of the intersection of sociology and queer theory see 
Seidman (1996). 
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prior subject on whom power and discourses act, but rather that a 
subject is formed through their discursively constituted identity. She 
develops the notion of performativity to explain how this works in 
relation to gender identity; to show how discourses produce sexed and 
gendered subjects in a way that allows for the possibility of gender 
practices as sites of change - without succumbing to the limitations of 
Foucault's own account and falling back on a notion of a pre-discursive 
body, that is a body outside culture and signification. She also both 
criticises, and increasingly draws on, psychoanalysis, linking 
Foucault's critique of the repressive hypothesis - that is the idea that 
sex is somehow innate but repressed (Foucault 1984) as discussed in 
chapter 4- to her critique of (her interpretation of) the Lacanian 
account of subjectivity. She takes from this latter account the idea that 
identity involves multiple and co-existing identifications and that 
gender identifications are 'phantasmatic'. As such they are not 
something that is given in biology. They are impossible to embody, 
and they are not something with which 'a self' could ever entirely 
coincide. 
Basically Butler is rejecting an account of gender in which gender is the 
cultural inscription of a biological sex. She is arguing instead that there 
is nothing given about gender nor is their any pre-discursive or pre- 
cultural sex that provides the basis for the cultural construction of 
gender. The sex/gender distinction which allowed early second wave 
feminists to avoid and challenge biological determinism and to 
examine the cultural production of gender is rejected as inadequate to 
the understanding of the cultural production of sex as itself a gendered 
category. 
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Initially this then was an attempt to intervene in feminist gender 
theory of the 1980s and move beyond the sex /gender distinction that 
had become central to (Anglo-American and Australian) feminist 
theory during the 1970s and early 1980s and which underpinned the 
'essentialism versus constructionism' debates that characterised that 
period. This distinction had been useful in early attempts to 
denaturalise gender and avoid biological determinism by highlighting 
the cultural diversity in constructions of masculinity and femininity. 
However it does seem to involve posing gender as a cultural overlay to 
a basic biological category which is taken as given. As such it came to 
be seen as problematic for later feminists concerned with 
deconstructing such binary oppositions, and the 
essentialism / constructionism dichotomy and extending 
constructionist ideas to include the physical as well as the social world. 
Indeed, for Butler, there is nothing about sex, gender or sexuality that 
is given. She is rather concerned to examine the ways in which these 
categories come to be established as foundational, and their pivotal 
role in what she terms compulsory heterosexuality. 
More recently, amongst queer theorists, there has been a resurgence of 
arguments for radically separating gender from sexuality (e. g. Sedgwick 
1990, Whittle 1996). However Butler argues for rethinking this 
distinction in terms of a set of non-causal, non-reductive relations that 
somehow accommodate the interimplication of gender and sexuality. 
Her notion of the performativity of gender is an attempt to do this. 
Her basic premise is that embodied selves 'do not pre-exist the cultural 
conventions which essentially signify bodies' (Butler 1988: 
526) but 
rather "the foundational categories of identity - the 
binary of sex, 
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gender and the body-can be shown as productions that create the effect 
of the natural, the original and the inevitable" (Butler 1990: viii, my 
emphasis). Hence she wants to expose these foundational categories 
and desire as 'effects of a specific formation of power' (1990: x) (in a 
Foucauldian Nietzschean sense) and reveal the ways that what she 
calls, 'the regulatory norms of sex' work in a performative fashion to 
materialise sexual difference (as ontological difference), and constitute 
the materiality of bodies in the service of what she refers to initially (in 
Gender Trouble) as the heterosexual matrix, but which later becomes 
heterosexual hegemony (in Bodies That Matter). 
Underlying all her work is a concern with a critique of the political 
construction and regulation of identity categories and the possibilities 
for political transgression within this. She wants to challenge the 
naturalisation of identity categories such as sex, gender, the body and 
desire and foreground the role of a hegemonic conceptual scheme 
characterised as compulsory heterosexuality and phallogocentrism in 
their production. These are conceived, in Foucauldian fashion, as 
regimes of power/ discourse (Butler 1990: xi). It is these that produce sex 
as a causal, or foundational, category and gender categories as 
ontological categories and then it is these ontological categories that 
support both gender hierarchies and compulsory heterosexuality. 
Indeed her stated aim in Gender Trouble is twofold. She wants to 
establish a critical genealogy of the construction of identity categories 
sex, gender, desire, the body, woman within a binary frame conditioned 
by 'compulsory' heterosexuality and phallogocentrism; and to 
destabilise both these categories and the epistemological and 
ontological regime that produced them (Butler 1990: xi) 
She wants to 
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reveal that heterosexuality and the binary sex system on which it is 
based are both compulsory and yet permanently unstable and to argue 
that this instability opens up the space for alternative configurations 
and significations. 
How then does this work? What exactly is involved when Butler 
invokes the notion of gender as performance and says that gender is 
performative? 
Gender as enforced cultural performance 
In Gender Trouble, Butler argues that gender is a kind of enforced 
cultural performance and that, as such, it is performative. In saying 
that gender is performative she is saying that rather than expressing 
some inner core or pre-given identity the performance of gender 
produces retroactively the illusion of such a core or essence. These 
then become cultural effects. She also argues that it is a ritualised 
repetition of conventions shaped and compelled by compulsory 
heterosexuality that produces gender. She refers to these as 'sustained 
social performances' which create the reality of gender, but which, 
crucially, are not separable from agents preceding those performances. 
Nevertheless one of the main causes of controversy in the reception of 
Gender Trouble arose from the tendency to associate the notion of 
performance with theatrical models of subjectivity which imply that 
there is an actor who stands outsides the act and does the acting; and 
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voluntarism which implies that there is some sort of everyday 
optionality about sex, gender and the body even. 3 
Moreover Butler's account of the performativity of gender does 
involve a notion of performance and does often invoke a sense of 
theatricality which contributes to this confusion. The association of 
performance with drag and then drag with subversion in Gender 
Trouble also contributes to the voluntarist interpretation. 
Nevertheless as Butler (1993) stresses in Bodies That Matter (and a 
number of other places e. g. Butler 1988,1991) emphasising the 
distinction between a theatrical notion of performance and the notion 
of performance associated with performativity, the model that she is 
positing is not a theatrical model but rather a speech act model based 
on a poststructuralist understanding of subjectivity. Indeed this is a 
distinction Butler stresses from her very earliest work and one that she 
continues to emphasise as she develops her notion of performativity 
in later works (Butler 1997a, 1997b). As it is an important distinction to 
grasp in getting to grips with Butler's work as a whole and, in 
particular, her political strategies and understanding of social change, it 
is worth dwelling on it a little longer. 
Performative Acts and Gender Constitution 
In an early paper entitled 'Performative Acts and Gender Constitution' 
Butler (1988) makes clear the distinction between a theatrical model of 
performance and her own notion of performance that is performative 
3This notion of performing identity has been taken up and applied in a number of 
studies, particularly in the context of performing lesbian 
identity (Kaplan 1992, 
Weston 1993, Koestenbaum 1991, Esterberg 1996). It has also been widely criticised (e. g. 
Tyler 1991). 
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by distinguishing between the notions of acts, performance, role etc. to 
be found in the dramaturgical models employed in both the 
phenomenological work of Edmund Husserl and Merleau Ponty, and 
the symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead and Frying 
Goffman, and her own notion of performance, acts and performativity. 
This, she argues, lies in the constituting role of the 'doer', a or choosing 
subject behind these acts (and her own focus on gender). Whereas these 
accounts seem to posit a 'true self', a 'doer' who is doing the acting in 
Butler's notion of performance the 'doer' is produced in and by the act 
but importantly does not stand outside or before it. This is an 
important distinction and one which Butler continues to emphasize 
(Butler 1992a, 1993,1994a) as she develops the notion of performativity. 
She argues here "In opposition to theatrical or phenomenological 
models which take the gendered self to be prior to its acts, I will 
understand constituting acts not only as constituting the identity of the 
actor but as constituting that identity as a compelling illusion, an object 
of belief" (Butler 1988: 520). It is in this sense that gender is intentional, 
non-referential and contingent. 
Butler argues that this view of gender as performance which 
is 
performative is therefore far removed from an understanding of 
gender as a role undertaken by a pre-existing self, and thus represents a 
marked departure from, say, Goffman's account of role 
in the 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life "which posits a self which 
assumes and exchanges various 'roles' within complex social 
expectations of the 'game' of modern 
life" (Butler 1988: 528). The 
whole point is that Butler rejects the view of gender acts as 
expressive 
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of a core identity, of something prior to the acts themselves that is the 
cultural, spiritual or psychological correlates of a biological sex-. 
It is also a departure from the social constructionist models of sex and 
sexuality that had been developing in sociology and anthropology, 
initially drawing on the theoretical perspectives of symbolic 
interactionism and labelling theory. As Epstein (1996) argues in these 
disciplines classic work such as McIntosh (1968) 'The Homosexual 
Role', and later Plummer (1975), Weeks (1977) paved the way for the 
growth of gay and lesbian studies and queer theory in the 1980s and 
1990s. The basic premise was that against essentialist understandings of 
sexuality including homosexuality whether in biological or 
psychological terms it is in fact socially constructed. It was argued that 
'sexual meanings, identities and categories were intersubjectively 
negotiated social and historical products' (Epstein 1996, p. 145). 
Moreover Epstein identifies a significant difference between this earlier 
sociological concern with the social construction of (homo)sexuality 
and later 'queer' concerns which also applies to Butler. That is the 
latter's apparently paradoxical insistence on the centrality of 
marginality to the study of society and culture (Epstein 1996, p 
147). 
Thus as Namaste argues, in the same collection, although the earlier 
sociological approaches provided a welcome corrective to pathological 
models of homosexuality and psychologistic explanations of 
homosexual behaviour, nevertheless the focus remained on the social 
organisation of homosexual behaviour and 
identity, rather than, as in 
queer theory, the social reproduction of 
heterosexuality and its place as 
4That this interpretation of Goffman might be disputed is another matter, 
the point 
remains the same. 
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a central organising principle in all of social life5. Indeed similar 
distinctions can be made within feminist theory where until very 
recently heterosexuality has largely also remained untheorised and 
taken for granted (Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1993). 
In what sense then is gender an act? 
Gender then far from being an internal property of a pre-existing 
subject, a stable identity or 'locus of agency' is an identity which is 
tenuously constituted in time through a -stylized repetition of acts . 
Moreover the body plays a vital role in all this - but not as in the 
naturalistic fallacy; that the gendered body is performative 'suggests it 
has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute 
its reality' (Butler 1990: 136). Rather, in the Foucauldian sense of a 
'surface politics of the body' in which gender becomes 'an enacted 
fantasy or incorporation' acts, gestures desires produce the effect of an 
internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body. 
"Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are perfor to ative 
in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to 
express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal 
signs and other discursive means" (Butler 1990: 136, original 
emphasis). In other words "acts and gestures, articulated and enacted 
desires create the illusion of an interior and organising gender core, an 
illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of 
sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive heterosexuality" 
(P. 136) and serve to locate the 'cause' of acts, gender, desire within the 
5This collection discusses the intersection of sociology and queer theory generally and 
several of the papers discuss aspects of Butler's work. 
Namaste is concerned to argue for 
a convergence of the insights of sociological and poststructuralist approaches which 
seem to have been concerned independently with similar 
issues and could benefit form 
each others insights. 
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self while simultaneously occluding from view their political 
regulation and production in disciplinary practices. Gender and 
identity then are posed as 'truth effects' of a discourse of a stable, 
primary identity or psychological core. However Butler argues that far 
from being stable and coherent, something that precedes action, 
identity is rather a temporal process which is tenuously constituted in 
time through the 'stylized repetition of acts'. '6 It is through this that 
the illusion of a stable fixed identity is promoted, perpetuated and 
believed. 
Indeed she becomes increasingly concerned with the psychic aspect of 
identity as she develops her notion of performativity in later 
reworkings of Foucault's view of power and engagements with 
Althusser and psychoanalysis (1997b) which I will discuss in due 
course. For now however, the point to note is that she is concerned 
even in Gender Trouble with the construction of the interiority/ 
exteriority binary divide. Her account attempts to accommodate 
interior features of the self without succumbing to essentialist 
understandings or, as yet, psychoanalytic explanations. She argues 
"Because there is neither an 'essence' that gender expresses or 
externalises nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because 
gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create the idea of gender, 
and without those acts, there would be no gender at all" (1990, p. 140). 
Gender then becomes a regulatory ideal, rooted in another regulatory 
ideal - that of reproductive heterosexuality, which constructs the 
fiction 
of its own psychological interiority. 
She uses 'style' in sense of Sartre's 'a style of being', Foucault's 'stylistics of existence' 
and her interpretation of de Beaviour's view of bodies as "styles of the 
flesh". She 
says, "these styles all never fully self-styled, for styles have a 
history and those 
histories condition and limit the possibilities"(] 990: 139). 
197 
Performance, Imitation and Drag: The Critique of Heterosexuality 
Butler draws on the insights of gay and lesbian sexuality and same sex 
desire to argue that the regulatory ideal of reproductive heterosexuality 
is exposed as a fiction by gender discontinuities in lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and heterosexual contexts in which gender does not necessarily follow 
from sex and desire and sexuality does not seem to follow from gender. 
The disciplinary production of gender creates a false stabilisation and 
coherence in the interests of reproductive heterosexuality and as such 
is a regulatory fiction that conceals these discontinuities which 
undermine the expressive model of gender identity. Yet when they are 
taken into account "The regulatory ideal is then exposed as a norm and 
a fiction that disguises itself as a developmental law regulating the 
sexual field that it purports to describe" (Butler 1990. p. 136). 
Although she takes from Monique Wittig the idea that sex is the 
political category which founds society as heterosexual, she disagrees 
with her account in two important ways: she rejects her view of gay 
and lesbian sexuality as outside of and radically 'other' to, 
heterosexuality and she rejects her presumption of a humanist subject. 
Butler suggests rather that the insight of gay/lesbian perspectives on 
sexuality is that heterosexuality is both a compulsory system and an 
intrinsic comedy, a constant parody of itself. 
Heterosexuality offers normative sexual positions that are 
intrinsically impossible to embody, and the persistent failure to 
identify fully and without incoherence with these positions 
reveals heterosexuality itself not only as compulsory 
law, but as 
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an inevitable and intrinsic comedy.. .a constant parody of itself. 
(Butler 1990: 122). 
Gay and lesbian relationships do not mime an originary 
heterosexuality they rather mark the imitative structure and 
constitutive tenuousness of heterosexuality itself. Gender then 
becomes a mime of an ideal, constituted through regulatory norms. 
In Gender Trouble (and in Butler 1991) she develops the notion of 
heterosexuality as involving parody and imitation by associating 
gender with drag, drawing on Esther Newton's Mother Camp. The 
argument is that "drag is not an imitation or a copy of some prior and 
true gender; according to Newton, drag enacts the very structure of 
impersonation by which any gender is assumed" (1991: . 28). Thus, she 
argues, "In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative 
structure of gender itself" (Butler 1990: 137). Gender, Butler argues, 
rather than being a foundational category as in the naturalistic view, is 
"a kind of persistent impersonation that passes as the real" (Butler 
1990: viii). This notion of imitation and gender parody does not imply 
an original: "The parody is of the very notion of an original" (p. 138). 
"To be more precise it is a product which, in effect - that is in its effects - 
postures as an imitation" (p. 138). 
Parody, Politics and Subversion 
The significance of all this for Butler is that heterosexuality is therefore 
both compulsory and fundamentally unstable. Unstable, as Deutscher 
puts it, "because of the perpetual need for reiteration and re-enactment 
because parody lies at the heart of 'natural' gender" (Deutscher 1997: 
26). Compulsory in the sense that "acting out of line with heterosexual 
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norms brings with it ostracism, punishment, and violence, not to 
mention the transgressive pleasures produced by those very 
prohibitions" (Butler 1991: 24). This then "can become an occasion for 
a subversive and proliferating parody of gender norms in which the 
very claim to originality and to the real is shown to be the effect of a 
certain kind of naturalized gender mime" (Butler 1991: 23). "This 
perpetual displacement constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests 
an openness to resignification and recontextualization: parodic 
proliferation deprives hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim to 
naturalised or essentialist gender identities" (p. 138). 
However Butler goes further than this denaturalisation of heterosexist 
gender categories. As I mentioned earlier her stated aims in Gender 
Trouble were not only to denaturalise but also to destabilise identity 
categories such as sex, gender, desire and the body and the epistemic 
ontological regime that produced them. Thus she goes on to claim: 
As a strategy to denaturalize and resignify bodily categories, I 
describe and propose a set of parodic practices based in a 
performative theory of gender acts that disrupt the categories of 
the body , sex, gender and sexuality and occasion 
their 
subversive resignification and proliferation beyond the binary 
frame. (Butler, 1990 xii). 
And this claim has attracted much criticism. Indeed the whole 
question of parody as politics and subversion has proved very 
problematic. Gender Trouble has been interpreted in the main as 
arguing for the proliferation of drag performances as particularly 
subversive of gender norms. 
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Quite how this destabilization is to be effected and how subversive this 
is as a strategy is another matter. Deutscher for instance suggests that 
"Butler is not discussing subversion as political strategy, but rather as 
something which lies at the heart of all reproducibility" (Deutscher 
1997: 26). Gender norms are enabled by their own internal instability, 
by the necessity of reproducibility and parody. Nevertheless, she points 
out, for Butler "the enabling function of parody retains some kind of 
promise as subversive... Parody shows that gender norms are not stable. 
Parody opens up, she will say, the possibility for new configurations" 
(Deutscher 1997: 27). However, there is some ambiguity here, as 
Deutscher argues, as Butler sometimes also seems to close down the 
association between parody and subversion suggesting rather that 
parody would result simply in a "temporary and futile disruption of 
the hegemony of the paternal law" (Deutscher 1997: 26 citing Butler 
1990: 81). 
Indeed Butler herself goes on to argue in Bodies That Matter that drag 
is not necessarily subversive. Moreover in Butler (1994a) she insists 
that although in Gender Trouble she aims at discursive resignifications 
through a politics of gender parody and drag, drag is offered 
nevertheless as an example of performativity not as the paradigm of 
performativity that it is often taken to be. Thus she comments in 
Bodies that Matter: 
As 'Paris is Burning' made clear drag is not unproblematically 
subversive. It serves a subversive function to the extent that 
it 
reflects the mundane impersonations by which 
heterosexually 
ideal genders are performed and naturalized and undermines 
their power by virtue of effecting that exposure. But there 
is no 
guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of 
heterosexuality 
201 
will lead to its subversion. Heterosexuality can augment its 
hegemony through its denaturalization, as when we see 
denaturalizing parodies that reidealize heterosexual norms 
without calling them into question. 
(Butler 1993, p. 231) 
Nevertheless her point is still that it can be subversive, enabling social 
and political resignifications. As she says in an interview in Radical 
Philosophy in 1994, "we don't know when resistance is going to be 
recouped or when it will be groundbreaking. It's like breaking through 
to a new set of paradigms" (Butler 1994a: 38). Moreover in true 
Foucauldian vein she argues that this is but one site of struggle 
amongst others. 
Basically, she is arguing that since gender is constructed through 
relations of power inherent in normative constraints that work 
through a process of ritualised repetition to both produce and regulate 
bodily beings (in all their diversity - those that matter and those that do 
not), then this repetition provides both the space and the possibility for 
change. What is required is a critical reworking of those gender norms. 
In Gender Trouble this takes the form of a politics of parody, cross 
dressing etc. She develops the notion of performativity in Bodies That 
Matter (Butler 1993) (and later Excitable Speech, Butler 1997b) drawing 
on Derrida's reworking of Austin's speech act theory, to show how 
discourses produce subjects, and that this is a continual process. 
In Bodies That Matter concerned to addtess accusations that in Gender 
Trouble she neglects the maternity of the body as a biological entity 
Butler links the materialization of the body to the performativity of 
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gender. She draws on speech act theory via Derrida's critique of Austin 
and his argument with John Searle to develop her account by linking 
the performativity of gender to the materiality and materialization of 
the body and in particular she tells us (Butler 1994a) she wanted to 
return to the category of sex, which she had perhaps dismissed a little 
too hastily in Gender Trouble, to examine how sex is produced as a 
norm. 
She emphasises and extends her earlier distinction between 
performativity and performance to argue that "Performativity cannot 
be understood outside of a process of iterability, a regualrized and 
constrained repetition of norms" (Butler 1993: 95). Performativity 
therefore is reworked as citationality. It involves "a reiteration of 
norms which precede, constrain and exceed the performer" (p. 234) As 
a reiterative and citational practice "A performative act is one which 
brings into being or enacts that which it names, and so marks the 
constitutive or productive power of discourse" (Butler 1995: 134). 
Performative speech acts are those that in being spoken simultaneously 
perform an action and exercise a power that is binding. Butler gives 
the example in terms of gender performativity of the pronouncement 
at birth of 'It's a girl' (Butler 1993: 232). This inaugurates the citation 
and embodying of the appropriate gender norms necessary for the girl 
to become a viable (girl) subject. This process of girling is not entered 
into by an intentional subject as a matter of choice. Butler links it to 
Althusser's notion of interpellation. This refers to the ideological 
process of 'calling' a person to the position 'named'. It involves 
both 
the demarcation of boundaries and the inculcation of norms. 
Therefore once again she stresses that performativity needs to be 
distinguished from the notion of performance in the sense of role play. 
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Performativity, she argues 'is the vehicle through which ontological 
effects are established' (Butler 1994b: 3). 
Where performance implies a 'doer behind the deed', that is a subject 
standing outside of, but doing the performing, performativity she now 
argues, is about the temporal production of the subject, the 'I', the 'we', 
the 'doer' in a network of power/ discourse. This is not to imply the 
final production of a fully constituted subject however but a continual, 
iterable process of constitution and reconstitution and which, 
importantly, is open to resignification from within.? 
Performativity, then, needs to be understood in terms of signification 
and resignification and most importantly as involving a process of 
repetition and recitation. It is this that provides the possibility for 
resignifications or rearticulations. The 'doer' she insists in Feminist 
Contentions Butler (1995) is not an intentional subject who stands 
behind the deed as its originator. It is rather constituted within it. 
"The 'doer' will be the uncertain working of the discursive possibilities 
by which it itself is worked" (Butler 1995: 135). 
Performativity consists of the reiteration of norms which 'precede, 
constrain and exceed the performer... further what is 'performed' 
works to conceal, if not to disavow, what remain opaque, unconscious 
unperformable" (Butler 1993: 234). Indeed it is this open-ended process 
of repetition and recitation that provides the conditions of possibility 
7Drucilla Cornell (1992) takes up this notion of iterability and gender and allies it 
with Luhman's systems theory as a means of attending to structural 
features of gender 
relations. The main problem for Butler is to show how the resignification 
that the 
constant process of iterabilty and citation enables is (or can 
be) operationalised. As I 
will discuss later, one criticism is precisely that 
her account does not allow for the 
possibility of change from within. 
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for subversive repetition and thus agency. Although in this view 'we' 
as subjects cannot be separated from the discursive conventions 
through which we are constituted that there is the possibility of 
opposing and reworking them is crucial to it. For Butler the site of 
resistance comes through the necessary repetition involved in the 
production of gendered identities. In particular the constitutive 
instability at the heart of heterosexuality and the exclusions involved 
in the maintenance of the illusion of heterosexual coherence. 
Subjection 
If, as Althusser implies, becoming a subject requires a kind of mastery 
indistinguishable from submission, are there perhaps political and psychic 
consequences to be wrought from such a founding paradox? (Butler, The Psychic 
Life of Power, p. 30) 
Butler develops this notion of exclusion further in The Psychic Life of 
Power subtitles Theories in Subjection. Her concern now is with "the 
question of how certain forms of disavowal and repudiation come to 
organise the performance of gender" (Butler 1997a: 145). This involves 
attention to the psychic side of identity. Indeed Butler has become 
increasingly concerned with this aspect and ever less satisfied with the 
relationship between interiority and exteriority in a Foucauldian 
framework that rejects psychoanalysis and the psyche, and conceives of 
power in terms of surface inscriptions. What Foucault neglected 
in his 
rejection of psychoanalysis as the 'repressive hypothesis' were 
the 
productive aspects of the regulation of desire. 
She argues that the 
regulation of desire works through foreclosure rather 
than repression. 
"As foreclosure, the sanction works not to prohibit existing desires but 
205 
to produce certain kinds of objects and to bar others from the field of 
social production" (Butler 1997a: 25) i. e. it operates as "a mechanism of 
production, one that can operate, however, on the basis of an originary 
violence" (Butler 1997a: 25). 
In The Psychic Life of Power, then, her concern is with how this works 
through the (psychic) incorporation of norms and it becomes a 
question of the workings of desire: how the subjection of desire 
becomes the desire for subjection. Here she returns to Hegel, the 
subject of her first book Subjects of Desire and the idiosyncratic reading 
of the 'lordship and bondsman' section of the Phenomenology of Spirit 
that she provided there. The desire for recognition is reinterpreted in 
linguistic terms. Desire becomes the desire for existence. The route to 
this is through norms and social regulation that work through the 
establishment of primary dependencies and linguistic categories. 
Hence there is a primary (linguistic) vulnerability to power and 
exploitation (p. 20). "[T]he subject pursues subordination as the 
promise of existence... Subjection exploits the desire for existence, 
where existence is always conferred from elsewhere; it marks a primary 
vulnerability to the Other in order to be" (p. 21). 
Or, as she puts it in Excitable Speech, "That one comes to 'be' through a 
dependency on the Other -- an Hegelian, and indeed, Freudian 
postulation -- must be recast in linguistic terms to the extent 
that the 
terms by which recognition is regulated, allocated, and refused are part 
of the larger social rituals of interpellation" (Butler 
(1997b: 26). She 
goes on "There is no way to protect against that primary vulnerability 
and susceptibility to the call of recognition that solicits existence, 
to that 
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primary dependency on a language we never made in order to acquire 
a tentative ontological status" (Butler (1997b: 26). 
In other words it is only through being interpellated through linguistic 
categories that bodies come into social existence. This process 
inaugurates the being of (any)body either as an intelligible body /being 
or as abjected. It is not simply a matter of recognition in the Hegelian 
sense of self-reflection and the negation of externality, but rather that 
the 'call', the address in interpellation renders recognition (or 
abjection) possible: "the address constitutes a being within the possible 
circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection" (p. 26). 
Thus in Excitable Speech she speaks about "the linguistic conditions of 
survivable subjects" (p. 26). Moreover since language constitutes bodies 
in this way it can also threaten their existence. Hence Butler's aim here 
to chart the injurious aspects of language in her engagement with 'hate 
speech' (and Mackinnon's Only Words). 
The possibilities of this account of subjection through interpellation 
reside in the fact that the terms that facilitate recognition/ existence and 
simultaneously constitute the subjection and inauguration of social 
being are themselves socially produced and historically revisable. 
Though that is not to say that identity categories can simply be 
dispensed with, since the opposite is rather the case. For Butler turns 
to theories of subjection, and relocates speech acts as interpellation, in 
order to combine a Foucauldian theory of power with a psychoanalytic 
theory of the psyche. She wants to theorise the way that power, 
understood as social regulation, produces and regulates 
the psychic 
aspects of identity, moving beyond the rather simplistic notion of 
internalisation. This involves exploring the ways that subjection 
207 
involves both subordination to power and the production of 'stubborn' 
or 'passionate' attachments to identity categories. The term 
'passionate' is used to convey the bodily aspect of those attachments in 
the Freudian sense that the ego is 'first and foremost a bodily ego'. 
Citing Nietzsche and Hegel she employs the figure of the turn in T he 
Psychic Life of Power to explain the relationship between 'stubborn 
attachments and bodily subjection' and to argue that 'subjection must 
be traced in the turns of psychic life' and to explain how this works; 
how power that is apparently external to a subject acquires a psychic 
form that constitutes both self identity and subjectivity. This is not 
simply a matter of internalisation but rather the inauguration of 
identity and subjectivity. "[T]he turn appears to function as a 
tropological inauguration of the subject, a founding moment whose 
ontological status remains permanently uncertain" (Butler 1997a: 3-4). 
One sense of the turn that she invokes is in the sense of the subject 
turning to the policeman who hails him and recognising himself in 
that call, as in Althusser's notion of interpellation. Though note she 
insists she is not suggesting here that there is a prior subject who 
makes the turn, but rather that it is through the turn that the subject is 
constituted. 
Melancholia 
Butler links this account to the Freudian notion of melancholic 
incorporation to explain why the subject turns towards the voice of the 
law -a question that she points out 
Althusser neglects. She is then able 
to employ the concept of passionate attachment' to explain 
how it is 
that in subjection subordination becomes the very possibility 
for 
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existence and subjectivity. Subjection, she argues, "must be traced in 
the peculiar turning of a subject against itself that takes place in acts of 
reproach, conscience, and melancholia that work in tandem with social 
regulation" (p. 18-19). 
The result of this is that gender becomes an effect of melancholia. 
Butler draws on Freud in 'The Ego and the Id' where he acknowledges 
melancholy as central to the formation of identifications that form the 
ego, an ego, moreover, that is 'first and foremost a bodily ego'. Butler 
explains that melancholia in a Freudian sense means 'the unfinished 
process of grieving "(p. 133). Freud argues that identifications formed 
through unfinished grief are the modes in which the lost object is 
incorporated and phantasmatically preserved in, and as, the ego 
(p. 132). A refused loss is a way of preserving the object as part of the ego 
and therefore avoiding complete loss. The object is transformed from 
external to internal and this is described as melancholic incorporation. 
To argue that gender is an effect of such melancholic incorporation 
Butler argues that the bodily ego assumes a gendered morphology and 
therefore is also a gendered ego. She adds this to Freud's notion that 
masculinity and femininity are established through the loss of certain 
sexual attachments, and that those are not grieved. Masculinity and 
femininity are therefore achieved through pre-empting the possibility 
of homosexuality understood as ungrievable loss. She argues that the 
Oedipal conflict involves a presumption that heterosexualisation of 
desire is already accomplished and the distinction between 
hetero/ homosexual is already enforced. This therefore depends on 
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taking masculinity and femininity as accomplishments not 
dispositions as Freud sometimes argues8 
She argues "Freud articulates a cultural logic in which gender is 
achieved and stabilised through heterosexual positioning and any 
threats to heterosexuality become threats to gender itself" (p. 136). She 
acknowledges that not all expressions of gender fit this formulation but 
argues that this does not invalidate the argument. The point is that 
heterosexuality is cultivated through prohibitions, one of which is 
homosexual attachment. Melancholia is the mechanism through 
which the psychic sphere is socially regulated according to established 
norms. 
Butlers stated aim in this context is again two fold. She wants to 
explain the process through which the ego becomes gendered; and she 
wants to examine the implications of this (melancholic formation of 
gender) for life in a culture in which lost homosexual attachments 
cannot very well be mourned. She says her work represents a cultural 
engagement with psychoanalysis and highlights the lack of a public 
language of grief for the great many deaths through AIDS; the lack of 
conventions for acknowledging the loss of homosexual love. . 
She 
suggests this is emblematic of the ungrievability of homosexual 
attachment and heterosexist hegemony. She describes the production 
of melancholy through the compulsory production of heterosexuality 
(a heterosexual melancholy at work in the workings of gender). She 
wants to move from melancholia as a psychic economy in operation at 
8Although in Butlers own account she discusses different accounts in Freud's work I am 
not going to engage with such issues here. I shall stick to the point and implications of 
Butlers deployment of the term. 
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the individual level to an understanding of melancholia as 
characterising in part of the workings of a social, regulatory power. 
In The Psychic Life of Power , then, Butler understands psychoanalysis 
to be linked with gender performativity and performativity to be 
linked with melancholia. This is in contrast to her understanding of 
psychoanalysis in Gender Trouble . 
In the latter she took the view that 
psychic concepts of gender could be explained through the performance 
of gender. In The Psychic Life of Power she rather wants to take from 
psychoanalysis the view that "the opacity of the unconscious sets 
limits on the exteriorization of the psyche" and that what is 
exteriorized or performed can only be understood by reference to what 
is barred from performance, what cannot and will not be performed" 
(p. 145). 
Gender melancholia is to be linked to the practice of gender 
performativity in the sense that if gender is produced as an effect of 
melancholia, as ungrieved loss, then the performance of gender might 
be seen as "acting out" (in the psychoanalytic sense) of unresolved 
grief. Acting out may be related to the problem of unacknowledged 
loss. 
Drag 
This then has implications for Butler's view of drag. In Gender 
Trouble it is argued that drag marks the imitative structure of gender 
and heterosexuality, both of which are essentially unstable, impossible, 
inessential ideals. Whereas from the point of view of melancholic 
incorporation drag is a sort of 'acting out' grounded in unallowable 
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loss, that is a loss that is both refused and incorporated. Heterosexual 
gender is constituted through disavowals and homosexual attachments 
cannot easily be openly mourned in heterosexual culture. 
The concern with instability continues. What shifts is her 
understanding of the (psychic) production of stability. Her point is that 
"drag exposes the mundane psychic and performative practices by 
which heterosexualised genders form themselves through renouncing 
the possibility of homosexuality, a foreclosure that produces both a 
field of objects and a domain of those whom it would be impossible to 
love" (p. 146). In The Psychic Life of Power then, drag has become an 
allegory of heterosexual melancholia. This leads Butler to the startling 
conclusion that the 'truest lesbian melancholic is a straight woman, 
and the truest gay male melancholic is a straight man'. She says she 
knows this argument is somewhat 'overstated' but that this is because 
she wants to emphasise the point that there is no necessary reason for 
identification and desire to be oppositional and to involve this form of 
repudiation. "We are made all the more fragile under the pressure of 
such rules and all the more mobile when ambivalence and loss are 
given dramatic language in which to do their acting out" (p. 150). 
The theatricality that she has consistently maintained is constitutive of 
our identities is glossed in The Psychic Life of Power by mourning. 
The 'acting out' which is produced by melancholia is clearly not 
voluntary. The issue of choice and everyday optionality recedes ever 
more from the bounds of possibility, along with the spectre of 
voluntarism. 
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However one problem that does remain, it seems to me, concerns the 
issue of desire. In her account of subjection Butler retains the notion of 
desire as a performative effect, which is all well and good in a sense, 
but the problem it raises concerns the issue of how to account for the 
variation in individual desires as translated into identity categories 
that are clearly not voluntary. If, in the heterosexual matrix certain 
desires are foreclosed, why and how do some people resist this 
foreclosure while others do not? Butler explains the performative 
production of intelligible and unintelligible bodies through the notion 
of abjection in Bodies that Matter but she does not explain how or why 
it is that, in the process of becoming, some people's bodies become one 
category and some another, except in as much as they relate to the 
heterosexual phallic symbolic order. Nor do the developments around 
subjection and melancholia in The Psychic Life of Power, appear to 
answer this point. It seems to me that this is a question concerning the 
nature of desire (and identity) that cannot be accommodated in Butler's 
Hegelian adaptation of desire as the desire for social regulation in order 
to be. This then is an issue that remains to be addressed. 
Political Implications 
The political implications of this view of gender as an effect of 
melancholia and the unconscious as an effect of power are again bound 
up with resignifications. The point now is that identity is only 
achieved through constitutive exclusions and that while these operate 
through the psyche they are also political, involving social regulation 
and power. Politics therefore needs to address the 
issue of 
identification even though we can not simply discard the identities we 
have become: "Called by an injurious name I come into social being. 
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Inevitable attachment to existence leads me to embrace the terms that 
injure me because they constitute me socially" (Butler 1997a: 104). Or 
as she puts it earlier in the book "Within subjection the price of 
existence is subordination". The political project then involves 
reworking those 'injurious interpellations'. One way to do this, she 
suggests, is to inhabit the social categories through which we are 
constituted in unintended ways, and in so doing challenge and change 
their meaning. (She provides examples in Excitable Speech in the 
context of a discussion of the perfomativity of what she terms 'hate 
speech' and the limitations of relying on legal regulation and 
censorship to combat it with particular reference to racism, as well as 
sexism. ) 
Perhaps the most important point to note is that underlying all 
Butler's work is the view that we are in some essential - and therefore 
inescapable - way linguistically constituted. But at the same time we 
are never fully determined by the categories that constitute us. 
Recognising this, for Butler does not imply some sort of linguistic 
monism, nor does it involve some sort of nominalism. Rather for 
Butler it is a way of approaching the question of social change and self 
transformation; the way to change and transformation is through 
language. Since we are produced as subjects and subjected through 
identity categories that are social rather than 'natural' in origin change 
involves change at the level of the symbolic system which produces 
the categories and frameworks of understanding that shape our 
experience; that come to constitute us our bodies our 
identities 
ourselves, and constrain us. That they also never 
fully determine us 
allows the possibility for resistance, for rearticulations and 
hence social 
and self transformation. Through our 
bodies; ourselves. 
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The Constituted Subject and the Possibility of Agency 
To sum up then, this is an attempt to theorise subjectivity in a way that 
locates the formation of the subject in history and culture, rejecting the 
notion of the universal, transcendental subject, and avoiding gender 
hierarchy. It does not however involve rejecting altogether the idea of 
subjectivity and agency, or critique and historical change (which as 
some would argue are the necessary correlates of the 'death' of the 
universal, transcendental subject in its strong form (e. g. Benhabib 1989, 
1992,1995)). It is not merely that subjects are embedded in history and 
culture but rather the stronger claim that the subject is historically and 
culturally constituted. The "I" that is presumed originary and causal is 
rather an historical effect. While not being reducible to a mere 
linguistic product, this 'I' is as Butler puts it, nevertheless linguistically 
instituted. "It is not the 'I' itself that stands prior to discourse and 
expresses its will through it, it is rather that the discursive constitution 
of the "I" precedes any particular "I", as its 'transitive invocation'. 
'The "I" is thus a citation of the place of the I in speech, where that 
place has a certain priority and anonymity with respect to the life it 
animates: it is the historically revisable possibility of a name that 
precedes and exceeds me, but without which I cannot speak' 
(Butler, 
1993: 226). And it is this historical revisability that provides the 
possibility for agency and change. 
Hence to argue that subjectivity is so constituted does not entail a 
denial of agency or relatedly, the possibility of critique. 
Indeed, to 
reiterate an earlier point, although Butler wants 
to retain a notion of 
gender as constructed whilst rejecting the notion of a 
humanist 
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choosing subject, she also wants to reject cultural determinism and 
retain the notion of gender practices as sites of change, or as she herself 
puts it, critical agency. 
clearly reconceived. 
Critique 
Nevertheless both agency and critique are 
Butler explains her position on the possibility of critique in Feminist 
Contentions, although she would not use the term itself. For her 
critique takes the form of re-signification and the possibility of agency 
stems from this. For, 
[Ijf the subject is a reworking of the very discursive processes by 
which it is worked, then 'agency' is to be found in the 
possibilities of resignification opened up by discourse. In this 
sense, discourse is the horizon of agency, but also, performativity 
is to be rethought as resignification. 
(Butler 1995: 135) 
But note her concern is with the power regimes which constitute us, 
the particular discourses and performative acts, the concrete conditions 
under which agency becomes possible. In answering Benhabib's 
criticisms in Feminist Contentions Butler makes the following point 
which is particularly illuminating in regard to this matter: 
I would argue that there is no possibility of standing outside of 
the discursive conventions by which we are enabled. Gender 
performativity is not a question of instrumentally deploying a 
"masquerade, " for such a construal of performativity 
presupposes an intentional subject behind the deed. On the 
contrary, gender performativity involves the difficult labour of 
deriving agency from the very power regimes which constitute 
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us, and which we oppose. This is, oddly enough, historical 
work, reworking the historicity of the signifier, and no recourse 
to quasi-transcendental selfhood and inflated concepts of History 
will help us in this most concrete and paradoxical of struggles. 
(Butler 1995: 136) 
According to Butler therefore, critique is immanent to particular 
discursive regimes and "the practice of 'critique' is implicated in the 
very power-relations it seeks to adjudicate" (Butler 1995: 138). The 
'grounds' for critique are, she argues, better conceived as sources rather 
than grounds to avoid the foundationalism implied in the latter. 9 
Agency 
Agency then is not something that is presupposed in the structure of a 
prediscursive, universal self and as such prior to power and 
language10. In reformulating agency in terms of signification it 
becomes a contingent possibility that is the effect of historically specific 
discursive conditions and power relations. 11 Just as Butler's notion of 
performance and performativity avoids metaphysical questions about 
the ontological status of sexual difference because it focuses on the way 
that sexual difference functions as ontological difference in the 
contemporary epistemic/ ontological regime. This view of agency does 
not involve metaphysical questions about the self, it rather involves 
an investigation of the concrete conditions under which agency 
becomes possible (Butler 1995). Or, as she puts it in Gender Trouble 
since "the substantive 'I' only appears through a signifying practice that 
seeks to conceal its own workings and to naturalise its effects the 
9The question of foundations is discussed in Butler (1992) and (1995). 
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question of agency is reformulated as a question of how signification 
and resignification work" (1990: 144). 
The question of how signification and resignification work underlies 
all the various developments of Butler's work after Subjects of Desire. 
One aim of this is to show how it is that to be constituted by discourse 
is to not be determined by discourse. Already in Gender Trouble she 
argues: 
[T]he subject is not determined by the rules through which it is 
generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a 
regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and 
enforces its rules precisely through the production of 
substantializing effects. (Butler 1990: 145) 
Moreover, she continues, "it's only within the practices of repetitive 
signifying that a subversion of identity becomes possible" (Butler 1990: 
145). 
Nevertheless in Gender Trouble her suggestions regarding the 
subversion of identity are somewhat problematic (as discussed earlier 
in this chapter) and her notion of agency is also underdeveloped. In 
Bodies That Matter she invokes a notion of temporality in the 
theorisation of the performativity of gender which helps to develop 
these areas. Temporality involves a notion of historicity and iteration 
and reiteration (and citational practices) that are all subject to change 
and it is this that provides the possibility of agency and resistance. 
Moreover in The Psychic Life of Power she further argues on this 
101ndeed not only has the notion of a universal self been revealed by feminist inquiry to 
be androcentric, it has also been shown to 
be ethnocentric in the seminal work of writers 
such as Paul Gilroy (1993). 
11See Benhabib, Butler, Cornell and Fraser (1995) for an illuminating discussion of 
Butler's understanding of agency. 
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This is of course the question that ultimately dogged Foucault's work, 
as discussed in chapter 3. Butler tries to answer it by focusing on the 
psychic aspect of power, i. e. 'the regulatory formation of the psyche" 
(p. 18). She argues that in rejecting psychoanalysis as being about 
repression Foucault failed to acknowledge the productive aspects of 
psychic regulation. It is these that she focuses on in her turn to Hegel 
and Althusser and the politics of subjection and melancholia. She 
wants to avoid the 'political fatalism' of those who would discount the 
possibility of agency in a constituted subject and the 'naive political 
optimism' (p16) of those who would cling to the classical liberal- 
humanist notion of subjectivity. 
Limitations of this account 
Resistance 
One problem identified in this account is Butler's tendency, at times, 
to associate instability with resistance as if the very fact of instability 
amounts to resistance in and of itself. Lois McNay, for example, argues 
that there is an association of the possibility for change presented by 
indeterminacy with "the emancipatory or political per se"(McNay 1999: 
105). Hence "Resistance becomes an inevitable consequence of 
instability rather than a potentiality whose realization is contingent 
upon a certain configuration of power relations" 
(IcNay 1999: 106). 
However I would argue that whilst this may have been true of Butler's 
early work, this problem 
has to some extent been addressed in her later 
work. In Gender 
Trouble and Bodies that Matter there was a tendency 
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to celebrate the emancipatory possibilities of the constitutive instability 
at the heart of heterosexuality and to associate the denaturalising of 
gender norms with resistance in a politics of parody and drag (whether 
intentionally or not, 12 However the emphasis on destabilising and 
denaturalising dominant meanings is developed in The Psychic Life of 
Power and Excitable Speech to include the importance of 
acknowledging our linguistic vulnerability and acting at that level to 
secure change in the categories that inaugurate us into being - as both 
subjects and subjected in our 'stubborn attachments' - and to inhabit 
those injurious categories differently. 
Nevertheless this criticism highlights continuing problems: how 
precisely such a strategy is to be operationalised and wherein does its 
force lie? Inhabiting categories differently does still sound a little like a 
politics of drag and cross-dressing and as such may suffer from similar 
limitations. That is, just as drag and cross-dressing may ultimately 
serve rather to reinforce heterosexuality than to challenge it, 
reclaiming and inhabiting categories differently may well be a necessary 
step in destabilising dominant meanings but is not necessarily 
subversive of dominant meaning systems and structures of thought. 
And this is the problem that remains for contemporary and future 
political activists. 
Biology 
Another major cause for controversy lies in the apparently cavalier 
dismissal of biology that this model of gender as 'enforced cultural 
12Deutscher 1(997) argues that there is some ambivalence regarding this matter in 
Gender Trouble. 
221 
performance' appears to involve. Critics claim that her account leaves 
no role for biology. This is similar to the criticism of Foucault that his 
genealogies of sexuality and the body, although wanting to entail 
resistance, in fact theoretically preclude it. Dews (1987,1992) for e. g. 
argues that in his rejection of a notion of a prediscursive body Foucault 
leaves no room for the libidinal body as a motor for change and/or 
resistance, while paradoxically seeming to presuppose it at times. 
However it is precisely this paradox that Butler aims to avoid in her 
notion of performativity. For Butler the site of resistance comes 
through the necessary repetition involved in the production of 
gendered identities. In particular the constitutive tenuousness 
(instability) at the heart of heterosexuality and the exclusions involved 
in the maintenance of the illusion of heterosexual coherence. 
Nevertheless it could be said that rather than actually answering the 
question of biology - and instead insisting on a genealogy of the body's 
materialisation (see chapter 3) - Butler rather circumvents it. This then 
leaves her account open to a number of related criticisms. One such 
criticism is that not taking account of the biological basis of sex/ gender 
differences neglects the systematic and structural nature of male power 
and domination and thereby colludes in its perpetuation and "helps 
men stay on stop" (Ramazanoglu 1995). Another is that, despite 
pretensions to the contrary, Butler's account lacks a materialist analysis 
(e. g. Ebert 1995, Jackson 1995). 
Materialist Feminist Critiques 
Stevi Jackson argues that Butler is following on from 1970s radical 
feminist critiques of men and women as social rather than biological 
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categories 3. that take the form of class groupings, but as a 
'post modernist' she lacks their materialist analysis. Although she fails 
to explain what she means by postmodern, she defines a materialist 
analysis as one which can accommodate systematic and structural 
inequality. 't'hus she argues that Butler neglects the material and social 
relations which underpin the category of sex brought out in particular 
in the work of Guillaumin (1980) and Delphy (1984). Ultimately then 
Butler's materialism, albeit providing for a critical focus on social 
institutions and practices that regulate, constrain and produce 'us', fails 
in its materialist pretensions, and furthermore because of this in her 
account "we are left with the impression that gender is oppressive, yet 
not clearly hierarchical" (Jackson 1995: 17, talking about Gender 
'1'; 'o ii bl e). 
Teresa Fbert (1995) also takes issue with Butler over her lack of 
materialism. She argues that Butler's notion of performativity neglects 
altogether the "dialectical relation between ideology and the 
economic". In divorcing heterosexuality from the material conditions 
of production, she argues, Butler is then able 'to substitute the symbolic 
regime of heterosexuality for the social formation of patriarchal 
capitalism (which she entirely occludes) as the determining structure 
constructing our lives, gender and sexuality' (Ebert 1995: 142). In other 
words Butler's analysis is accused of being confined to cultural and 
13'1"hese are to be distinguished from what is popularly conceived in Anglo-American 
circles as 'French Feminism' Her examples are Christine Delphy, Monique Wittig, 
Nicole-Claude Mathieu and Collette Guillaumin who were all involved in the journal 
Questions Feministes between 1977-1988. They developed a materialist feminism 
which is a form of radical feminism but which takes a radically anti-essentialist 
position on gender and thereby rejects the celebration of feminine values usually 
associated with other forms of radical feminism. "The journal was dedicated to the 
analysis of patriarchy as a social system in which men and women constitute classes 
with opposing interests" Jackson, 1995, p. 12). 
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institutional 'points if mediation' and divorced from the economic 
conditions that produce them. 
The crucial point in both these arguments, it seems to me, concerns the 
understanding of 'the real', the nature of reality, the material world. 
For Butler the point is that the real cannot be accessed outside of 
cultural and linguistic frameworks which, - although purporting to 
reflect those material conditions whether economic, biological, psychic 
or whatever - in fact produce them as causes. And this point is 
relevant too, to another major criticism of Butler's work: that she does 
not pay enough attention to the material basis of gender, or that she 
emphases the symbolic at the expense of the material (e. g. 
Hawkesworth 1997). As Joan Scott argues in relation to Hawkesworth 
such a view adheres to the view that "there is a necessary opposition 
between the symbolic and the material, the abstract and the concrete, 
the individual and the social, the psychic and the institutional, the 
subjective and the political" (Scott 1997, p. 699). Such views miss the 
point about the materiality of discourses and the critique of binary 
oppositions. 
You must be joking 
The crux of the disagreement lies in that these counter-arguments 
refuse the materiality of the signifier as an appropriate object of study 
and locus of change. They retain an insistence on the notion of an 
objective reality outside signification which, 
it is argued, is suppressed 
in deconstructive approaches. This objective reality is the (material) 
structural factor(s) that generate 
inequality e. g. biology, patriarchy and 
capitalism. It is this 
(these) that provides the grounds for political 
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action and, stemming from that, social change and transformation. 
Whereas the insights of Derrida's work highlight the materiality of the 
signifier and render inseparable distinctions such as meaning and 
being, reference and materiality. Therefore it follows that 
understanding the material entities that comprise social life and 
relations, whatever the focus, requires attention to the materiality of 
the signifier. The search for an objective reality outside signification is 
rendered futile. It is not that an objective reality outside signification is 
suppressed, however, it is rather that the very notion of such an 
objective reality is rendered untenable. Rather than accepting this and 
building their political practice around it, 'materialist' feminists such 
as Ebert argue that without the existence of such an objective reality the 
grounds for political action and social transformation are removed, 
and thus feminism as an emancipatory praxis is rendered defunct. 
Indeed a deconstructive approach such as Butler's is denounced by 
Ebert as a ludic move lacking in ethical value beyond intellectual 
speculation and, as such, not worthy of serious feminist 
contemplation. 
Although I hope I have shown in various ways throughout this thesis 
that this latter is precisely not the case - e. g. in relation to Derrida's 
work in chapter 1, in relation to the feminine in Chapter 
2, in relation 
to the materiality of the body in chapter 3 and in relation to 
Butler and 
the notion of performativity here in chapter 5- in this chapter 
I want to 
examine the basis of these counter-arguments 
from the 'materialist' 
camp in more detail, focusing on Ebert 
in 'Untimely Critiques for a Red 
Feminism' (Ebert 1995). Ebert articulates in relation to 
her 'Red 
Feminism' many of the criticisms of deconstructive approaches 
examined in this thesis, taking an oppositional view 
to my arguments 
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in each case: i. e. in regards to the nature of matter; reality; change and 
transformation; subjectivity; political adequacy. She is most strident in 
her criticisms of such de constructive/ poststructurali st approaches in 
general and she also makes a detailed and explicit argument against 
Butler in particular. 
Ebert's 'Red Feminism' 
Ebert remains an old, unreconstructed historical materialist. She takes 
exception to discursive understandings of materialism since she 
"insists that the material is fundamentally tied to the economic sphere 
and to the relations of production, which have a historically necessary 
connection to all other social and cultural relations" (p. 127). The 
economic sphere and the relations of production are separated from 
the discursive and the ideological which are attributed to the realm of 
the superstructure (and hence become 'merely cultural') 
Ebert continues to use the base/ superstructure model for 
understanding social life. She rejects altogether the attempt to avoid 
binaries such as material/ ideal in theories such as Butler's that engage 
with Derrida's work or Foucault's. This she denigrates as a 'ludic' 
move involving the suppression of objective reality. Objective reality 
is "a reality independent from the consciousness of the subject and 
outside language and other media" (p. 113). It is the objectivity reality 
of surplus labour (i. e. exploitation and class struggle). Indeed this 
objective reality is materialism for Ebert, and it is this that produces all 
social differences; in which case the 'ludic' move does not so much 
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rethink materialism (or the materiality of matter as Butler would 
argue), as involve a denial of it and a reassertion of idealism. 14 
Any attempts at social change are doomed to failure precisely because 
social change requires such a view of objective reality. Without this 
there would be no grounds for transforming existing social relations. 
Indeed, since, in this view, all social differences are produced by the 
(objective reality of the) extraction of surplus labour, she wants to cling 
to the idea that the only route to change and to remedying social 
inequalities is through revolution (p. 117). 
However the difficulties with this view become clear when the 
following statement is considered: 
Ludic theorists, in short are troping the social. In so doing they 
de-materialize social "realities, " cutting them off from the 
material relations of production, and turn them into a 
superstructural matrix of discursive processes and semiotic, 
textual play of difference. (Ebert 1995115). 
This statement not only sums up Ebert's argument against so-called 
ludic theorists, it also demonstrates its flaws. Her argument hinges on 
the understanding of material realities. If material realities were to be 
understood in the way she suggests, this statement may be true. 
However the argument of this thesis is that this view of material 
reality as something outside signification is not sustainable. The use of 
tropes in the work of Derrida and Butler is not a means of de- 
materializing social realities. It is rather a means of examining the 
production of those realities, and trying to find a means to challenge 
14 Cornell, Irigaray, Cixous, Laclau, Derrida, Foucault, Ulmer and Lyotard are all 
cited as examples of ludic social theorists 
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them. For example in her account of subjection Butler's use of tropes 
is a means of extending Althusser's notion of 'the turn' in 
interpellation to show how power takes a psychic form in the 
inauguration of subjectivities. It is an attempt to get at the social reality 
of the operation of power relations and their role in the constitution of 
identities; how power relations operate not simply externally, on the 
matter of bodies for example, but how they act in the production of that 
matter as embodied subjectivities. This is hardly 'merely cultural' or 
simply superstructural. Nor is it just a matter of 'the textual play of 
differences' in the sense implied here of frivolity and of texts divorced 
from material reality. Ebert seems to be making the classic misreading 
of this textuality (and play), that I discuss in chapter 1. To reiterate, 
material reality in Derridian textuality is made up of texts; it is textually 
produced and has multiple determinations rather than one founding 
cause. Once this is accepted it becomes clear that revolutions simply do 
not work in the way that Ebert's historical materialism would suggest. 
As for the argument that transformative politics requires an objective 
reality outside of signification, without which there would be no 
grounds for transforming existing social relations. This is related to the 
discussion of grounds in chapters 1 and 2, in which I follow Diane 
Elam (1994) to argue that although deconstruction renders such 
grounds illusory, it does not, at the same time, occlude the possibility of 
political action or even social transformation. Since the certainty 
provided by such grounds is removed it does, however, mean 
that the 
basis of political action - and social transformation - shifts. 
Political 
action becomes a matter of responsibility and ethical 
judgments rather 
than universal laws. A politics of absolute determinacy gives way 
to a 
politics that involves an engagement with ethics, obligations 
and 
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responsibilities. The kind of revolutionary transformation conceived 
in Ebert's revolutionary feminism, based on historical materialism, 
becomes impossibly utopian. Social transformation has multiple 
determinations and is not predictable in the way that Ebert would have 
it. Such change may be possible but what it will be like, what re- 
imaginings of gender, subjectivity and desire, for example, might come 
to be, it is just not possible to know in advance. To return to a point I 
made earlier, as Butler says in an interview in Radical Philosophy in 
1994, we don't know when resistance is going to be recouped or when it 
will be groundbreaking. It's like breaking through to a new set of 
paradigms. 
Butler 
Turning now to Ebert's critique of Butler. Butler is singled out for 
attention as a prime example of a ludic feminist whose pretensions to 
materialism simply work to occlude historical materialism, and, as 
such, are not a matter of materialism at all, but rather what Ebert terms 
'ludic matterism". The crux of the matter here is the issue of the 
relationship between the discursive and the non-discursive as Ebert 
herself rightly identifies. For Ebert, this remains a matter of the 
relationship between the base (non-discursive) and the superstructure 
(discursive). Not surprisingly, then, she takes issue with Butler's 
notion of discourse over her employment of a Derridian notion of 
supplementarity, (discussed in Part 1) in which the relationship 
between the inside and the outside becomes blurred. Since the outside 
to discourse, for Butler, is that which is excluded by discourse itself, 
materiality and signification become indissoluble and matter or 
materiality becomes a discursive effect, the product of signification and 
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power relations. For Butler this is a means of getting at the ways in 
which bodies are materialised and the role of signification (and 
heterosexism) in this. Ebert however argues that the relationship 
between power and materiality "becomes so circular as to border on the 
ludicrous" (p. 139). It makes materiality a feature of the superstructure, 
obscuring the determining role of the eonomic base, blurring the 
relationship betwen the powerful and the powerless and resulting in 
the reassertion of the sovereign subject. 
Reassertion of the Subject 
To take the last point first. For Ebert, Butler's materialism is not really 
materialism at all, hence her redescription of it as a form of "ludic 
matterism". This is because Ebert interprets materiality (and discourse) 
in Butler's work not only as simply superstructural, but as a matter of 
inference which, she argues, involves the reassertion of the freedom of 
the subject; a sovereign subject who 'invents' or creates it. Thus she 
declares: "It is a materialism that does not determine the non-material 
but is, in fact, determined by the consciousness of the subject that infers 
it and thus constitutes it. " And also "It is the consciousness of the 
subject that creates (invents) this matter" (p. 124-5). 
However this is precisely not the case in Butler's work as I have 
shown. The matter of materiality is not a product of individual 
consciousness or inference but of the performativity of language. 
Language is something which precedes the individual but the 
meanings encoded within it work in a performative 
fashion to produce 
(materialize) and regulate embodied (matter) subjects who are 
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gendered, sexed, classed, raced and in many other ways subjected to 
social regulation, marked and classified.. 
Ebert also makes a similar mistake in arguing that the notion of 
performativity, as Butler employs it in Bodies that Matter , involves 
the reassertion of the subject. This is because she also redefines 
performativity as a matter of individual 'invention', at the level of 
consciousness, as suggested, and disputed, above. Although Ebert 
rightly suggests that Butler's account of performativity involves an 
attempt to develop constructivism to avoid cultural determinacy and 
reinstate agency, she misunderstands how this works. She wrongly 
links the notion of agency involved to that of the sovereign subject, 
which is clearly not the case as my discussion above demonstrates. The 
above discussion also makes it clear that Butler's notion of 
performativity does not involve the sort of voluntarism that Ebert's 
notion of invention would imply. 
Power 
Turning now to the question of power. Ebert argues that the result of 
Butler's view power is that materiality is both relegated to the realm of 
the superstructure (p137-8) and becomes "an extended ideological re- 
mystification" (p. 138). Thus: 
In the name of openness, it puts forth an understanding 
of power as a closed, self-legitimating operation. It 
completely suppresses the real material conditions of 
what Marx calls "the working day": the production of 
profit (surplus value) through the exploitation of our 
unpaid and subsistence labor..... This amounts to the 
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suppression and mystification of the materiality of 
materialism - of labor. (Ebert 1995: 138) 
She argues that this is a way of avoiding the consequences of the 
structural factors of society i. e. the relations of production. It misses the 
point that power is always constituted at the point of production and 
that "[p]ower is a binary relation between exploiter and exploited, 
powerful and powerless; owners of the means of prod and those who 
have nothing but their labour power to sell" (p. 140). And that "the 
resolution of these binaries does not come about through linguistic 
resignification but through revolutionary praxis to transform the 
system of exploitation and emancipate those it exploits" (p. 140). 
However I would argue that Butler's account does not so much miss 
this point as recognise that power simply does not work in this way. 
Similarly it is not to suggest that there is no need for revolutionary 
praxis as to suggest that revolutions (or social change) do not work in 
the way suggested in Ebert's arguments. For example Ebert cites the 
devaluing and subsequent aborting of girl foetuses in India, due to the 
demand for large dowries when girls marry, to argue that "no amount 
of resignification in the symbolic can change what counts as a valued 
body, for what makes a body valuable in the world is its economic 
value" (p143) But this does not take account of the way that economic 
value is itself discursively produced; and that, in countries 
like India, 
these are heavily imbued with contemporary interpretations of 
religious texts. This is all part of the enforced cultural performance of 
sexed and gendered bodies, and works through 
the production of 
individual identities as well as economic relations. This links to the 
discussion of Spivak's argument concerning the effacement of 
the 
232 
clitoris in chapter 2. Indeed, interestingly, postcolonial theories often 
combine a Marxist analysis with a deconstructive approach precisely 
because the former alone is found wanting. 
So, although Ebert concludes that Butler employs a Foucauldian notion 
of power that does not, indeed cannot, address the global relations and 
systematicity of power, both Foucault and Butler would argue that 
power does not have the kind of systemactity implied in this 
argument. There is not an identifiable base or point of origin from 
which power emanates. This is not to say that power relations do not 
operate structurally. As I pointed out in chapter 4, Foucault argues, in 
the History of Sexuality, Volume 1, that state power is only the end 
point of the workings of power and it is power in operation at the 
capillaries that needs to be the focus of attention in any attempt at 
social change. Most importantly for Butler, he also argued that power 
relations work on and through our bodies and are productive of our 
subjectivity. In her latest works, The Psychic Life of Power and 
Excitable Speech, her concern is to develop this insight further. She 
argues, as I have shown, that power relations do not simply act 
externally on our bodies or our minds as distinct from our bodies. 
They have a psychic aspect that works through the dual process of 
subjection and subjectification to produce us as individual sexed 
subjects/subjectivities incorporating social regulation. Social change 
therefore involves addressing these aspects. 
This is not to deny the economic sphere any role, however. 
It is rather 
to widen the economic sphere to incorporate these aspects, as 
Butler 
herself points out in another context. In an article in New 
Left Review 
she addresses Marxist criticisms of 
her work as 'Merely Cultural' (in an 
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article of that name) in the context of a debate with Nancy Fraser. 
Butler points out that sex and sexuality are part of the social relations of 
production and reproduction and as such are intrinsically related to the 
economic sphere, as much feminist work sought to establish in the 
1970s and 1980s. She emphasises that the realm of sexual production, 
conceived as part of the sexual division of labour, was located as part of 
the material conditions of life "because normative gender serves the 
reproduction of the heterosexually normative family (Butler 1998: 40). 
Contra Fraser and applicable also to Ebert's argument, her point is that 
struggles to transform the social field of sexuality do not become 
central to political economy to the extent that they can be directly 
tied to the question of unpaid and exploited labour, but also 
because they cannot be understood without an expansion of the 
'economic sphere' itself to include both the reproduction of 
goods as well as the social reproduction of persons. (Butler 1998: 
40)15 
To return to my argument in chapter 2, political activism is necessary 
but in itself will do little to overcome gender-based inequalities whilst 
the category woman remains unproblematised, and questions of 
identity and subjectivity, i. e. gendered embodiment, are left 
unaddressed. Ebert's view of power as a binary relation is quite unable 
to address these questions. 
Critique of Binary Oppositions 
Moving on now from materialist critiques, another set of criticisms are 
identified around Butler's critique of binary oppositions. This is an 
15 This point is well made by Delphy and Leonard (1992). 
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important element in her work. Indeed the attempt to avoid binary 
thinking is proving a somewhat intractable problem for many 
contemporary feminist theorists concerned with the body and sexual 
difference, and it is argued that despite an expressed attempt to avoid it 
Butler does not manage to do so. I will examine two such criticisms. 
First, the argument that employs a dualistic logic of 
inclusion/ exclusion, domination/ resistance that is inimical to a move 
beyond binary thinking and ultimately results in the retention of a 
monolithic notion of gender. Second, the claim that her account 
ultimately retains a representation/ matter dichotomy. 
McNay (1999) argues that although Butler wants to develop a dynamic 
and non-dichotomous model of the body and identity, in Gender 
Trouble and Bodies That Matter, through an emphasis on the 
instability of dominant norms and the openness involved in 
production of identity, her account in fact continues dichotomous 
thinking rather than breaking with it. Thus : 
This insight is undercut by the drift in her work towards 
reducing the process of subjectification to one of subjection. This 
engenders a dualistic logic of inclusion-exclusion, domination- 
resistance, which ultimately replicates the hyperstatization of the 
dominant and the fetishization of the marginal that haunts 
much of Foucault's work. 
(McNay 1999: 99). 
Furthermore, despite Butler's insights concerning the constitutive 
instability of heterosexuality and 'dominant norms' her concept of 
normative gender identity remains monolithic. 
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McNay argues that this results from the notion of temporality which 
Butler employs. She sees Butler's notion of performativity as relying 
"predominantly on a version of the Freudian idea of repetition 
compulsion and as such reactive and according to some an atemporal 
concept" (McNay cites Smith 1996). Thus: 
This emphasis on the retrospective dimensions of time - the 
performative as 'a repetition, a sedimentation, a congealment of 
the past" (Butler, 1993: 244) - leads to an overemphasis on the 
internal uniformity of gender norms. Reiteration become a 
static rather than temporal act where the reproduction of the 
sex/gender system involves a ceaseless reinscription of the same. 
This notion of time as a succession of self-identical and discrete 
acts renders the dominant hermetic and self-sustaining - it 
emphasises the uniformity of gender norms, for example - and 
means that disruption can only come from outside. This 
provokes the dualisms of subjection-resistance, exclusion- 
inclusion that limit Butler's work. 
(McNay 1999: 102) 
However in a footnote in Bodies That Matter Butler makes it clear that 
this is not the notion of temporality that she wants to employ. She 
explains why she would rather rely on a Derridian notion of 
temporality and explains the significance of this for the notion of 
iterability. Thus: 
As a sedimented effect of reiterative or ritual practice, sex 
acquires its naturalized effect, and yet, it 
is also by virtue of this 
reiteration that gaps and fissures are opened up as 
the 
constitutive instabilities in such constructions, as 
that which 
escapes or exceeds the norm, as that which cannot 
be wholly 
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defined or fixed by the repetitive labor of that norm" (Butler 
1993: 10). 
Reiteration is a sedimented process but it is not, to return to a point 
made in chapter 4, a mechanical process. It needs to be thought in the 
context of Derrida's notions of the performativity of language and 
iterability, and of excess as in his notion of dissemination that I 
discussed in chapter 1, as that which cannot be captured by 
representation. 
Indeed Derrida's notion of dissemination also helps to shed light on 
the second criticism in relation to binary oppositions that I want to 
discuss. Bray and Colebrook (1998) argue that: 
Butler's challenging discursive critique of sex still posits a 
duality between signification and matter, where matter is seen as 
radically anterior. Representation would always remain in some 
sense a negation of matter -a break with a prior materiality, 
even where that materiality is an effect of representation. 
Instead of thinking the body and matter as already coterminous 
within a general discursive field, Butler's reading posits the 
body, or matter, as an originary effect of discursive repression. 
For Butler 'To posit a materiality outside language is still to posit 
that materiality, and that materiality so posited will retain that 
positing as its constitutive condition' (1993,67-68)" 
(Bray and 
Colebrook 1998: 44-5). 
The problem identified here is that in Butler's account 
the view of 
discourse and matter as mutually constitutive 
does indeed serve to 
co rn pli ca to dualism. Nevertheless, since 
it also involves a view of 
representation as a negation of corporeality 
it can't actually o z) erco in e 
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it. However, I would argue that on closer examination it can be seen 
that Butler's notion of performativity involves a view of language and 
signification that relies on neither a representation/ matter duality nor 
a negation of corporeality. The excess to representation that Butler 
conceives is better understood in terms of Derrida's notion of 
dissemination as something inaccessible, spilling over; some other to 
representation in the sense of 'more than', rather than as produced 
through a dichotomy between matter and representation. In terms of 
the body this means that it is not that there is a body that then comes to 
be represented but rather that we can only 'know' the body in and 
through the system of representation and associated norms which 
produce or constitutes it. It is not therefore a question of a prior body 
that is then negated. To make this clearer it is necessary to dwell a little 
longer on Butler's debt to Derrida's notion representation as about 
'force and signification'. 
Derrida and the failure of the performative 
Like Derrida, Butler does not assume a permanent structure of 
exclusion, or a fixed outside to signification. She rather aims to 
accommodate the contingent cultural and historical aspects of sexed 
identity with the fact that sexed identifications are also in some way 
compelling. That they are at once resilient yet not immutable, as I said 
at the start of this chapter. It is for this reason that she adds Derrida's 
reworking of speech act theory to the Foucauldian notion of power 
in 
her notion of the performativity of sex. Of particular concern 
is the 
connection between the norm and the 
failure of signification in 
Derrida's notion of performativity. This is because 
for Derrida the 
failure of signification is revealed to be intrinsic to 
the law of the 
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performative rather than an accidental aspect, precisely because of the 
incompleteness of language, as I have shown in chapter 4.16 
Butler applies these insights to her concern with the compulsory 
character of heterosexuality. Hence, as Ziarek puts it "It is precisely 
because iterability fails to perpetuate the identical and pure form of the 
law that any identity claims have to be reinforced by exclusions - they 
require "a constitutive outside" (Ziarek 1997: 130). For Butler 'the 
constitutive outside' becomes a social abject, whose exclusion ensures 
the domain of social intelligibility. In this formulation, the process of 
exclusion performs a normative and normalizing function. 
The normativity of heterosexuality thus depends on, and works 
through, the production of an outside to the symbolic realm. The 
importance of this, as Ziarek rightly suggests, is that the exclusions 
which constitute this excluded realm, the social abject, are thus 
rendered unstable, historical and contingent rather than being seen as 
an ahistorical Real in a Lacanian sense. That which is excluded from 
the symbolic is not conceived as some sort of prediscursive entity but 
rather "those possibilities of signification that threaten the purity and 
permanence of the law instituting sexual difference" (Ziarek 1997: 129). 
Conceiving of these exclusions in terms of the abject in this way 
enables Butler to move beyond the limitations of the Lacanian notion 
of the symbolic an d imaginary which ren ders sexual 
difference 
immutable. "[i]t will constitute the disruptive return of the excluded 
from within the very Logic of the h eterosexual symbolic" 
(Butler 1993: 
16Ziarek (1997) makes a similar point. 
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12) Indeed the chief concern of Bodies That Matter is to "pursue the 
possibility of such disruption" (Butler 1993: 12). 
Furthermore, as Butler develops these insights within an explicitly 
Foucauldian notion of discourse and the discursive constitution of 
reality, the inside/outside, inclusion/ exclusion dichotomies are 
productions within discourse. They do not involve a radically anterior 
corporeality that is already marked by sexual difference as in certain 
other feminist theories of the body. In particular those that focus on 
the role of body image in the institution of subjectivity and the self, in 
which sexual difference is deemed irreducible and therefore the 
effacement of women needs to be addressed through re-representing 
the female body in positive and autonomous ways (such as Braidotti, 
Grosz that I discussed in chapter 3). The exclusions, Butler emphasises, 
are the exclusions produced within discourse that provide the 
conditions of possibility for particular dominant discourses i. e. 
concerning intelligible bodies and abject bodies. Her account of the 
materialisation of bodies, it is to be recalled involves a notion of 
reiterated and reiterable regulatory power (in the Foucauldian sense 
that it is productive as well as controlling and that it works as the 
regulatory and normative means through which subjects are formed 
(Butler 1993: 22). And one of the effects of this power is the production 
of an outside - in this sense abjected, unintelligible 
bodies that serve as 
the constitutive conditions that secure the domain of 
intelligible 
bodies. Hence her aim in Bodies That Matter , 
to understand how what has been foreclosed or 
banished from 
the proper domain of 'sex' -- where that 
domain is secured 
through a heterosexualising imperative -- might at once 
be 
produced as a troubling return, not only as an 
imaginary 
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contestation that effects a failure in the workings of the 
inevitable law, but as an enabling disruption, the occasion for a 
radical rearticulation of the symbolic horizon in which bodies 
come to matter at all. (Butler 1993: 23) 
In The Psychic Life of Power more attention is paid to the psychic 
aspects of these exclusions and their role in the formation of 'stubborn 
attachments'. 
To return to McNay's argument for a moment, when considered in 
these contexts it becomes clear that this is not a static model of 
domination or performativity. The sedimentations and congealments 
referred to in Gender Trouble and elsewhere are not passed on in a 
uniform manner precisely because of the failure of signification, which 
is also and simultaneously the failure of the performative. Moreover 
Butler is not presenting the possibilities for change in terms of a 
Foucauldian reverse discourse but rather in psychoanalytic terms of 
disruption or the return of the repressed, as I demonstrated in chapter 
4. For Lacan what is excluded can only return at the price of psychosis, 
whereas in Butler's notion of performativity her understanding of the 
historicity of the symbolic framework and sexual difference avoids this. 
Therefore I would argue that the logic of inclusion/ exclusion that 
McNay regards as a weakness in Butler's work, is rather a strength. 
Conclusion 
Butler's notion of performativity avoids the pitfalls of 
feminist 
theories that seem to rely ultimately on an immutable notion of sexual 
difference as simply given and located in the body. It provides a way of 
understanding corporeality in its materiality as something which 
is 
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socially constituted and as such open to history and culture, and the 
possibility of change, whilst accepting also that in any particular 
embodied being there are elements of identity, however insalubrious, 
that become entrenched. It provides a means of recognising the bodily 
roots of gender identity and theorising them those as socially, rather 
than biologically, or psychologically given without succumbing to 
either cultural determinism or voluntarism. The possibility of agency, 
reconceived in terms of signification is retained, and with it the 
possibility of resistance and change. A number of problems, however 
remain. Although Butler's work presents a challenge to the binary 
code that organises the gender hierarchy, it does not provide a means 
to transform it. Her argument that sexual difference is but one 
difference among others is difficult to reconcile with feminists 
concerns to assert the primacy of sexual difference. Finally, the 
problem of how to operationalise the strategy of 'inhabiting categories 
differently' in such a way as to produce resistance, change and 
transformation beyond the level of the self, remains to be addressed. 
Further to this, all of theses criticisms could be linked to the criticism 
that Butler's view of power and materiality cannot accommodate the 
systematicity of power. This is a key issue and one that demands some 
attention. The strength of Butler's deconstructive approach, and her 
notion of performativity, lies in that it helps us to theorise and analyse 
the social constitution of the body and subjectivity as part and parcel of 
the same processes; and to examine the role of power and social 
regulation in this. Furthermore, this helps us to see that conceiving of 
power as a binary relation produced at the point of production, 
in the 
way that a historical materialist approach such as 
Ebert's would have it, 
is unsatisfactory; and that questions of subjectivity, 
identity and desire 
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must be addressed if change is to be forthcoming. The difficulty 
however, for feminist political programmes, is that precisely because of 
the view of power involved, Butlers account, does not, indeed cannot, 
tell us precisely how to effectively co-ordinate large-scale change. Her 
work provides insights concerning the points at which change needs to 
be addressed but at the same time she argues that such co-ordination 
can only be local and specific and accepts that any resistance may well 
be co-opted. However, although this does indeed remain a problem for 
feminist political programmes I would argue that it does not negate the 
utility of Butler's insights. Indeed it seems to me that precisely because 
her deconstructive approach allows us to see that the way that social 
change works is not entirely predictable in advance, it remains ever 
more vital for feminists aiming to facilitate such change to develop 
strategies drawing on these insights in a multitude of political 
programmes, on a multitude of sites, and thus provide the possibility 
of moving towards new possibilities, as yet unthought; of moving 
towards "revolutions that as yet have no model" (Spivak 1980). 
Without the benefit of these insights programmes for change that resist 
the materiality of the signifier and the performativity of language may 
well simply result in the reinstatement of the same. 
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Conclusion 
Taking account of gender/ sexual difference as intrinsic to human 
being, whilst rejecting the idea that it is in any sense in and of itself 
originary or determining requires rethinking the whole philosophical 
framework within which contemporary understandings of subjectivity 
and the body are developed. Deconstruction, as I have presented it 
allows us to do that. Although Derrida himself may, in some sense, be 
accused of reproducing a form of 'injurious speech' in his use of 
metaphors of femininity and the category woman (as I have discussed 
in chapter 2) what he is trying to demonstrate about the undecidability 
of sexual difference is actually very important for women and, as I 
have argued, most significantly opens up the possibility for developing 
alternative understandings of the body. Alternative, that is, to 
traditional philosophical understandings of the body and to biological 
and/or sociobiological models. These understandings may not be 
commensurate with traditional theories of subjectivity, agency, identity 
or politics, to be sure, but they nevertheless enable the reformulation of 
each of these in politically useful ways. Politically useful, that is, to 
feminists and others, who are concerned to redress the notorious 
aporia around gender /sexual difference and the 
(female) body in 
traditional theory and philosophy. 
The thesis began by establishing two related things. The first, in 
chapter 1, was that it is not the case that 
deconstructive insights 
involve a refusal of materiality and leave no way of 
dealing with 
reality; and as, such, are playful rather than serious and 
lacking in 
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political relevance. It is rather that Derrida's work concerning the 
relationship between language, 'writing' and the metaphysics of 
presence involves rethinking the matter of materiality and reality (in 
linguistic terms). It helps us to see that binary oppositions such as 
materiality/ideality; reference or reality/ representation cannot 
accommodate the role of meaning and mediation in the constitution of 
reality - without in any sense denying the materiality of that reality. 
This latter is an important point and it is one to which I returned again 
and again in the course of this thesis. 
The second, thing to be established, in Part 1, relates to the basic 
argument of this thesis that all of these deconstructive insights are of 
enormous significance for contemporary gender/body theory. It 
concerns one of a number of hurdles to a feminist appreciation of these 
insights that I identify. This is a negative response to Derrida's own 
use of the feminine and the category woman. In chapter 2I set out my 
argument against such a negative response. Although Derrida may 
himself be collaborating in some form of 'injurious speech' in his use 
of the feminine and the category woman in the development of his 
arguments, I argue that this usage is not in itself inimicable to feminist 
concerns since it is through this that he demonstrates the 
undecidability of sexual difference and the category woman. At the 
same time he challenges the status of sexual difference as an 
ontological category and highlights the salience of it 
for the 
metaphysics of presence which characterises the Western philosophical 
tradition. All of these moves are of enormous significance for feminist 
attempts to rethink subjectivity as a matter of gendered embodiment. 
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The main purpose of establishing these two points in Part 1 was to 
highlight the positive implications of the radical anti-essentialism and 
critique of the category woman involved in deconstruction for feminist 
theory and practice, despite the threat this would seem to pose to 
women's sense of themselves as women; and at the same time to 
demonstrate the relevance of all this for 'real-life' women. The reason 
for this is that negative responses in these two areas were identified as 
posing two more hurdles to an appreciation of deconstructive insights. 
I further argued that appreciating both these points involved 
rethinking the materiality ideality reference/ representation distinction, 
as introduced in chapter 1, and applying it to the problematic of gender 
and sexual difference. Then it becomes possible to acknowledge the 
materiality of language and at the same time to recognise that this is 
not to subscribe to some kind of nominalism or textual idealism and 
that deconstructive insights do have relevance for the reality of 
women's lives. One example of how this works was provided in 
relation to practices of female genital mutilation, and in particular 
Spivak's argument that contemporary multinational capitalism is 
structured by discourses on sexuality and femininity in which there is a 
theoretical effacement of the clitoris (and a uterine model of women) 
and that practices of female genital mutilation are related to this. 
Indeed this accusation that deconstruction cannot accommodate 'real 
life' women also crops up in relation to Braidotti and the 
body in 
chapter 3, and in relation to Butler's notion of performativity 
in 
chapter 5, and is similarly refuted. 
Finally, as far as Part 1 is concerned, I argue, in chapter 
1, that the 
political and ethical implications of deconstructive 
insights are not 
entirely negative. Although the universal 
laws that once provided 
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certainty are revealed to be based in a metaphysics of presence and, as 
such, illusory, embracing the insights of deconstruction does not 
involve a crippling relativism and an inability to make decisions, as 
the counter-argument goes. It is rather that the removal of such 
grounds requires a politics of undecidability in which the making of 
judgments and decisions involves an engagement with ethics, and 
becomes a matter of responsibilities and obligations. In chapter 2I 
return to this argument in relation to questions of gender and sexual 
difference. I argue that this is a positive move in this regard. The very 
fact of the undecidabilty of the category woman provides the 
possibilities for change and transformation. Following Diane Elam I 
further argue that this provides a sort of 'groundless solidarity' around 
which women can be united. 
In Part 2 of the thesis I develop the significance of these insights for 
rethinking the body and the relationship between sex, gender, 
subjectivity and embodiment. I argue that they provide a fruitful 
starting point for a theory of gendered embodiment. Bringing these 
insights to bear on feminist attempts to rethink the materiality of the 
body can help us to do so in such a way as to combat the somatophobia 
of much of the Western philosophical tradition and recognise the 
corporeal roots of (gendered) subjectivity without, 
however, tying 
bodies to their biology; and importantly without reifying sexual 
difference. 
This latter is an important point because, although there 
is a certain 
amount of agreement that this reassertion of corporeality 
requires 
rethinking the relation between the cultural and 
the natural, 
representation and the objects of representation, 
reference and 
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materiality in order to avoid biological reductonsim, one of the issues 
that currently divides feminist thinking in this area is the extent to 
which this is thought to involve some kind of reconstructive project 
around the bodies of women, as in the Irigarayan move. It is my 
contention that to follow this move and attempt to build some kind of 
reconstructive project around the bodies of women, as both Grosz and 
Braidotti do, is not the most fruitful direction in which to go. The 
approach that I advocate here allows us to see that although Grosz's 
'volatile bodies' and Braidotti's 'nomadic bodies' do take on board 
some deconstructive insights, and undoubtedly provide very 
sophisticated accounts of the body, they both nevertheless fall prey to 
the dangers of reifying sexual difference because they do not take the 
deconstructive move far enough. Whereas, if we apply the insights of 
deconstruction around the indeterminacy of sexual difference to the 
problematic of gendered embodiment it can be seen that it is more 
fruitful to concentrate on rethinking the reference / materiality 
distinction as Butler does. Butler's move can be characterised as 
shifting from examining the role of culture in the construction of 
bodies (as in a rethinking of the sex / gender, nature / culture distinction 
as applied to bodies) to a focus instead on their materialization - as in 
the performative materialization of matter. This avoids reifying sexual 
difference. There is rather a focus on the political effects of grounding 
the category women in the materiality of bodies and posing that 
materiality as causal. Butler argues that one of the effects of this 
is the 
production of the duality of bodies that sustains reproductive 
heterosexuality as a compulsory order. 
Another of the main concerns of Part 2 of this thesis 
has been with the 
notion of the body as a social construct. 
What does it mean to say that 
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the body is a social construct? How can the (incontrovertibly physical) 
body be a social construct? I have argued that a deconstructive approach 
provides valuable insights in the consideration of such questions. In 
particular I have argued that in questioning the reference/ meaning 
distinction it helps us to rethink the biology/culture distinction 
manifest in the sex /gender distinction as bodies (sex) and gender 
(culture). Again, this is not to say that bodies do not exist or are not 
'real'; it is rather to shift the emphasis from bodies /biology/ sex as the 
ground of culture to recognising the productive (or in Butler's case 
performative) role that culture plays in the production of matter, being, 
embodiment, embodied identity, existence. Only then can we begin to 
theorise gender. Breaking down the distinction between the material 
on one side and the linguistic or textual on the other is the most 
productive direction to go in a gender theory that seeks to rethink the 
sex/ gender distinction to recognise the salience of the body to sexual 
difference whilst avoiding biological determinism. It is of particular 
relevance in relation to challenging the causal role that is traditionally 
accorded to biology in the determination of sexual difference and the 
gender hierarchy. 
Another important issue in feminist debates around the extent to 
which the body can or should be perceived as a construction concerns 
the extent to which the body itself takes an active part in that 
construction. 1 The response to this issue marks a significant 
difference 
between deconstructive approaches such as I am advocating and others. 
The deconstructive insights that I have been developing suggest that 
there is always an excess to representation. If this is applied 
to the 
t Austrailian feminsts such as Lloyd and Gatens take this view. 
See the forthcoming 
issue of Hy pat ia on Australian philosophy. 
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matter of the body it would suggest that it is more fruitful to see the 
body as excess - something other that is not captured in 
conceptualisation. This is the model that Butler adopts. The 
advantage of this is that it enables a thoroughly social understanding of 
embodiment that enables the possibility of resistance to 
conceptualizations without rooting that resistance in biology or 
psychology - something we know that is knowable, and again thus 
avoiding the reification of sexual difference. 
Indeed, Butler's concept of performativity provides a way of 
understanding the interimplication of the body and the social that is 
one of the most pressing questions in gender theory today. Her work 
bridges the gap between Foucault's theory of the body and feminist 
concerns with gendered embodiment. In developing Foucault's 
understanding of the body as a social construct, product of disciplinary 
power, in the context of Derridian insights concerning iterability and 
citationality, her work moves beyond the theoretical impasses of 
Foucault's own work to develop a theory of a socially constituted body 
(or gendered embodiment) that can accommodate a notion of 
resistance and change, albeit not freedom and liberation, as I argued in 
chapter 4. An important aspect of Butler's notion of performativity 
that is the focus of chapter 5 is that it provides an example of a 
deconstructive approach that allows an account of the psyche without 
having to make reference to an originary set of mechanisms. It can 
take embodiment seriously without having to return to biology as a 
given. Moreover it also allows for the possibility of innovation and 
change whilst simultaneously accounting for the degree of stability 
that 
our identity categories appear to have. It therefore succeeds 
in 
avoiding both determinism and voluntarism. 
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The issue of materialism crops up in a number of places. Sometimes 
there has been an elision between the terms materialism, materiality 
and matter. This is not a result of careless slippage. It is the result of 
the rethinking of the matter of materiality and, mu to ti s in u to ndis, 
materialism, through the lens of a deconstructive approach. This too 
has been a very important theme throughout this thesis as it is the crux 
of a number of debates both within feminism and between feminists 
and deconstruction. The key questions concern the relationship 
between the material and the ideal, reference or materiality and 
representation, and discourse and not discourse. In particular, 
whether the blurring of the boundaries between these two apparently 
discrete elements in this rethinking involves: a form of frivolous 
idealism; a denial of the real; an inability to accommodate the real 
conditions of women' lives; political inadequacy; a lack of intellectual 
integrity; a (laughable) linguistic reductionism. These are issues that 
permeate all the chapters of this thesis and they are all criticisms that I 
have examined and found wanting. To reiterate once again, although 
a deconstructive approach does indeed involve a linguistic 
interpretation of the constitution of social life, and bodies, as I have 
argued, this does not involve the mere reduction of 'things' to 'words' 
or a denial of the 'real'. Indeed the main strengths of this approach 
lie 
in that the attempt to accommodate the relation between the social, the 
material and language or signification, without reducing 
things to 
words and without indicating a form of 
linguistic monism or cultural 
determinism. And, at the same time not succumbing to either some 
sort of cultural pessimism or the sort of naive cultural optimism 
an 
insistence on the free play of meaning can suggest 
(as in Rorty's simple 
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redescriptions in the conversations of man(sic)kind that I discussed in 
chapter 1). 
It also avoids the simplification of the notion of power and structures 
that continues to limit the rising number of feminists who, refusing 
deconstructive insights, reject the materiality of the signifier as the 
focus of analysis and route to change, and debunking Butler's 
materialist pretensions, regard themselves as the real materialists. For 
example, a key element in the rejection of the material relevance of a 
deconstructive approach is the neglect of material and institutional 
power structures entailed in a linguistic focus. However, as I have 
argued in relation to Butler, in chapter 5, it is not that her account fails 
to incorporate these structures because her analysis rests on the 
performativity of language. It is rather that it shows how it is that 
material and institutional structures of power must be addressed and 
challenged linguistically precisely because of the perfomativity of 
language. 
Another strength of Butler's deconstructive approach and her notion 
of performativity, lies in that it helps us to theorise and analyse the 
social constitution of the body and subjectivity as part and parcel of the 
same processes; and to examine the role of power and social regulation 
in this. Furthermore, this helps us to see that conceiving of power as a 
binary relation produced at the point of production, in the way that a 
historical materialist approach such as Ebert's would have it, is 
unsatisfactory; and that questions of subjectivity, identity and 
desire 
which cannot be accommodated in such an account, must 
be addressed 
if change is to be forthcoming. 
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There is however, one area that remains to be developed in Butler's 
account. This concerns the issue of desire. The problem is that if we 
accept the notion of desire as a performative effect, how do we then 
account for the variation in individual desires as reflected in identity 
categories which, as Butler has established, are clearly not voluntary? 
Why is it that if certain desires are foreclosed in the heterosexual 
matrix, some bodies resist this foreclosure and some bodies do not? 
Butler explains the performative production of intelligible and 
unintelligible bodies through the notion of the abject in Bodies that 
Matter, but she does not explain how or why it is that, in the process of 
becoming, some people's bodies become one category and some 
another, except in as much as they relate to the heterosexual symbolic 
order. This seems to me to be a question concerning the origins of 
desire that has not been accommodated in her account of melancholic 
incorporation or, in her adaptation of Hegelian desire as the desire for 
social regulation, in her most recent work. This is not to suggest that 
this difficulty renders her account of performativity invalid, however. 
It is rather to highlight it as an issue that remains to be addressed. 
A further difficulty for feminist political programmes stems from the 
view of power and, relatedly, social change and transformation, 
involved in Butler's account. Precisely because of her view of power 
she is unable to pinpoint how to effectively co-ordinate large-scale 
change. Her work provides insights concerning the points at which 
change needs to be addressed but at the same time suggests that such 
co-ordination can only be local and specific and accepts 
that any 
resistance may well be co-opted. However, although this 
does indeed 
remain a problem for feminist political programmes, again 
I would 
argue that it does not negate the utility of 
Butler's insights, any more 
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that it negates the utility of the rest of the deconstructive insights that I 
have been discussing. Indeed, it seems to me, precisely because her 
deconstructive approach allows us to see that the way that social 
change works is not entirely predictable in advance, it remains ever 
more vital for feminists aiming to facilitate such change to develop 
strategies drawing on these insights in a multitude of political 
programmes, on a multitude of sites, and thus provide the possibility 
of moving towards new possibilities, as yet unthought as I argue in 
chapter 5. Without the benefit of these insights programmes for 
change that resist the materiality of the signifier and the performativity 
of language may well simply result in the reinstatement of the same. 
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